• Title/Summary/Keyword: 의회의원후보공천방식

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Candidate Selection Methods, Standing Committee and Structure of the Social Security Acts: Compare Korea and Germany (의회의원후보공천방식, 의회상임위원회제도 그리고 사회보장법 구조: 한국과 독일 비교)

  • Lee, Shinyong
    • 한국사회정책
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    • v.20 no.3
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    • pp.9-46
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    • 2013
  • The degree of delegation related to the social security acts is involved in the candidate selection methods and the standing committee system. The social security acts with a small amount of delegation have an affinity with the bottom-up selection methods and the standing committee to guarantee long term in office. In Germany, the bottom-up selection method which guarantees the right of party members to nominate candidates and the standing committee to guarantee long term in office have an affinity with the Social Acts with less delegation. But the social security acts with a large number of delegation have an affinity with the top-down selection methods and the standing committee not to guarantee long term in office. In Korea, the top-down selection method in which the central headquarter of the party dominates the selection process, and the standing committee whose members are to be selected every two years have an affinity with the Social Security Acts with the excessive delegation.

Legislative Performance and Renomination: The Case of Members in the 19th Korean National Assembly (입법성과가 재공천에 미치는 영향에 대한 연구: 제19대 국회의원을 대상으로)

  • Kim, Gidong;Cha, Bokyoung;Lee, Jaemook
    • Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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    • v.24 no.2
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    • pp.101-134
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    • 2018
  • This study examines the effects of members' legislative performance on their renominations in the $19^{th}$ Korean National Assembly. We measure how many bills each member has proposed and passed in the Assembly. In addition, we also include rate of passing bills as an indicator of legislative performance. Particularly, we analyze 320 members in total, and 270 members who got in on the competition for nomination separately. The empirical findings of our study show that, firstly, among the total members in the Assembly, as they propose bills more and pass bills fewer, they are more likely to be renominated in the very next election. However, this is a result of different types of members rather than legislative performance. Secondly, among the members who actually competed for renomination, the legislative performance of members can not affect their renomination. Therefore, we argue that it is necessary to stipulate nominations criteria and transform top-down nomination method to bottom-up one in order to raise responsiveness and enhance representative democracy.