• Title/Summary/Keyword: 유상증자공시효과

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Effect of Dividend Policy on the New Issue Announcement Effects (배당정책에 따른 유상증자 공시효과)

  • Lee, Young-Hwan;Yoon, Hong-Geun;Ahn, Byung-Hwa
    • Journal of Digital Convergence
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    • v.12 no.3
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    • pp.149-160
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    • 2014
  • This paper analyses whether change in corporate dividend policy affects the new issue announcement effects. By conducting an event study using 683 new equity announcements data from year 2000 to year 2009, we find firms paying more dividends experience relatively negative announcement effects of seasoned equity offerings comparing with firms paying less dividend. The cross sectional regression analysis results confirm our findings. These results indicate that corporate dividend policy change may interact with forthcoming new equity announcement decision, which may result in a negative signal to the capital markets.

유상증자의 공시효과

  • Sin, Yong-Gyun
    • The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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    • v.12 no.1
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    • pp.75-92
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    • 1995
  • 본 연구에서는 1985년부터 1993년까지의 기간동안 유상증자를 공시한 총 1,529건 중에서 표본의 선정기준에 따라 최종적으로 548건의 표본을 선정하여 유상증자의 공시시점에서의 주가반응효과와 이러한 주가반응을 설명해 줄 수 있는 원천을 실증적으로 검증하였다. 분석결과에 의하면 유상증자의 공시시점에서 정(+)의 주가반응을 관찰할 수 있었으며, 이와 같은 정(+)의 주가반응은 우리나라에서만 존재하는 유상증자의 제도적인 특성으로 인해 기존주주들이 독점적으로 부를 획득할 수 있다는 효과인 구주주이익가설로 설명되고 있음을 발견하였으며, 기존의 연구에서 발견된 투자기회가설에 대한 유의적인 증거는 발견할 수 없었다.

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Management Performance and Announcement Effect of Seasoned Equity Offering (기업의 경영성과가 유상증자 공시효과에 미치는 영향)

  • Yoon, Hong-Geun;Lee, Young-Hwan;Park, Kwang-Suck
    • Journal of Digital Convergence
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    • v.11 no.2
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    • pp.101-114
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    • 2013
  • This paper investigates whether the announcement effect of seasoned equity offering is affected by management performance. We used Korean stock market data from 2000 to 2007 to analyze the possible relation between net income and seasoned equity offerings announcement effect. The sample of 308 firms are selected for the study from the original population of 750 seasoned equity offering announcements. and We analysis this article through event studty of Brown and J.Warner. We divide the data into two groups. - the previous offerings year's positive net income group and negative income group. Both positive and negative net income samples affect stock price positively. However, the CAR for the negative net income offerings becomes zero around 25days after the announcement date. To analyze the impact of accounting income on the seasoned equity offering announcement effects fully, we introduce a cross-sectional regression analysis by setting the cumulative abnormal returns as a dependant variable and net income as an explanatory variable. The beta coefficient of the net income shows a statistical significance. These results can be considered as an evidence to support our hypothesis.

Seasoned Equity Offering announcement and Market Efficiency (유상증자공시와 시장효율성)

  • Chung, Hyun-Chul;Jeong, Young-Woo
    • The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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    • v.25 no.3
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    • pp.79-109
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    • 2008
  • According to asymmetric information hypothesis (for example, Ross (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984)), the impact of seasoned equity offering (SEO) announcement on the stock price depends mainly on the informational market efficiency. Despite of the importance of this fact, most of the previous SEO-related studies have done under the assumption of equal informational market efficiency among sample firms. This study intends to solve this problematic assumption and explores the real impact of SEO announcement on the stock prices. For this purpose, we divide 122 SEO firms into two subgroups; one with firms from KOSPI200 and the other including firms from the rest of KOSPI, assuming the former is more informationally efficient than the latter. Different from the US market-based study demonstrating short-and long-term negative price impacts of SEO announcement, most of the Korean market-based ones show price increases up until the announcement and decreases just after the announcement and in the long run. These previous studies attribute this difference to the different market system and regulation between them. Our results indicate that this discrepancy can be attributed to the different degree of market efficiency as well as the different market system and regulation.

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유상증자의 주가변화 -가격압박가설, 부의 이전가설, 정보전달가설

  • Lee, Yong-Hwan
    • The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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    • v.11 no.2
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    • pp.161-173
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    • 1994
  • 유상증자의 주가하락에 대하여 유상증자 공시일전 내부자순매수를 종속변수로 설정하여 선형회귀분석한 결과, 이전의 논문결과와는 달리 유상증자규모효와 자본구조변화효과는 보이지 않았으며, 반면에 유상증자의 주가하락이 내부자순매수와 통계적 유의성이 높은 비례관계가 있음을 밝혀 내었다. 이 결과는 유상증자규모효과로 인한 가격 압박가설과 자본구조변화효과로 인한 부의 이전가설을 기각시키고 정보전달가설이 유상증자의 주식 가격 하락현상을 설명하는 설득력 있는 가설임을 시사하고 있다.

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The Signaling Effect of Stock Repurchase on Equity Offerings in Korea (자기주식매입의 유상증자에 대한 신호효과)

  • Park, Young-Kyu
    • The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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    • v.25 no.1
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    • pp.51-84
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    • 2008
  • We investigate the signaling effect of repurchase preceding new equity issue using Korean data. In a short time span, firms announce stock repurchases and equity offerings. The proximity of two events in Korean firms indicates that those are not independent of each other. In this paper, we test the signaling effect of repurchase on equity offerings on the two measures. One is announcement effect, which is measured as CAR(0, +2). The other is the effectiveness which is measured as CAR(0, +30) because the price movement during this window influences on the price of new issues. Previous studies that stock repurchase convey positive signal to equity offerings-Billet and Xue(2004) and Jung(2004)-construct sample without the limit of time interval between two events. This causes the unclear relation between those because of the long time interval. In this study we consider only samples of being within one year each other to reduce this problem and clarify the signal of repurchase on equity offerings. Korean firms are allowed to repurchase own shares with two different method. One is direct repurchase as same as open market repurchase. The other is stock stabilization fund and stock trust fund which trust company or bank buy and sell their shares on the behalf of firms. Generally, the striking different characteristic between direct repurchase and indirect repurchase is following. Direct repurchase is applied by more strict regulation than indirect repurchase. Therefore, the direct repurchase is more informative signal to the equity offering than the indirect repurchase. We construct two sample firms- firms with direct repurchase preceding-equity offerings and indirect repurchase-preceding equity offering, and one control firms-equity offerings only firms-to investigate the announcement effect and the effectiveness of repurchases. Our findings are as follows. Direct repurchase favorably affect the price of new issues favorably. CAR(0, +2) of firms with direct repurchase is not different from that of equity offerings only firms but CAR(0, +30) is higher than that of equity offerings only firms. For firms with indirect repurchase and equity offerings, Both the announcement effect and the effectiveness does not exist. Jung(2004) suggest the possibilities of how indirect stock repurchase can be regarded as one of unfair trading practices on based on the survey results that financial managers of some of KSE listed firms have been asked of their opinion on the likelihood of the stock repurchase being used in unfair trading. This is not objective empirical evidence but opinion of financial managers. To investigate whether firms announce false signal before equity offerings to boost the price of new issues, we calculate the long-run performance following equity offerings. If firms have announced repurchase to boost the price of new issues intentionally, they would undergo the severe underperformance. The empirical results do not show the severer underperformance of both sample firms than equity offerings only firms. The suggestion of false signaling of repurchase preceding equity offerings is not supported by our evidence.

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