• Korean Journal of Labor Studies
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.1-34
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• 2013

Labor share of income in Korea has fallen from 90% in 1996 to 79% in 2010. This paper explores the factors driving the movements in the labor share of income based on a panel dataset containing 19 years of data on 18 Korean manufacturing industries. The effects of technical progress, globalization and the bargaining power of labor and capital on the labor share of income are tested for the period of 1991-2009. The main empirical results are as follows. (1) Capital-aug menting technical prog ress measured by capital-labor ratio and R&D intensity has a negative effect on the labor share. (2) Market openness measured by the value of export and import as a ratio to value-added production is found to have a positive impact. (3) Globalization of production measured by inward-FDI and outward-FDI as a ratio to total domestic fixed capital is found to have a negative impact on the labor share. (4) Union density is found to have had a statistically significant effect in 1991-1998. This finding is consistent with the efficient bargain model in which firms and workers bargain over both wages and employment. But union density is insignificant in 2000-2009. This implies that since the financial crisis in 1997, the bargaining institution in Korea has been approaching the right-to-manage model in which firms and unions bargain over wages and then firms set employment unilaterally. (5) Variables for domestic financialization measured by dividend-income ratio and financial-fixed assets ratio have an insignificant effect on labor share.

• Strategy21
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• s.46
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• pp.239-276
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• 2020

The failure of early economic sanctions aimed at hurting the overall economies of targeted states called for a more sophisticated design of economic sanctions. This paved way for the advent of 'smart sanctions,' which target the supporters of the regime instead of the public mass. Despite controversies over the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a coercive tool to change the behavior of a targeted state, the transformation from 'comprehensive sanctions' to 'smart sanctions' is gaining the status of a legitimate method to impose punishment on states that do not conform to international norms, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction in this particular context of the paper. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council proved that it can come to an accord on imposing economic sanctions over adopting resolutions on waging military war with targeted states. The North Korean nuclear issue has been the biggest security threat to countries in the region, even for China out of fear that further developments of nuclear weapons in North Korea might lead to a 'domino-effect,' leading to nuclear proliferation in the Northeast Asia region. Economic sanctions had been adopted by the UNSC as early as 2006 after the first North Korean nuclear test and has continually strengthened sanctions measures at each stage of North Korean weapons development. While dubious of the effectiveness of early sanctions on North Korea, recent sanctions that limit North Korea's exports of coal and imports of oil seem to have an impact on the regime, inducing Kim Jong-un to commit to peaceful talks since 2018. The purpose of this paper is to add a variable to the factors determining the success of economic sanctions on North Korea: preventing North Korea's evasion efforts by conducting illegal transshipments at sea. I first analyze the cause of recent success in the economic sanctions that led Kim Jong-un to engage in talks and add the maritime element to the argument. There are three conditions for the success of the sanctions regime, and they are: (1) smart sanctions, targeting commodities and support groups (elites) vital to regime survival., (2) China's faithful participation in the sanctions regime, and finally, (3) preventing North Korea's maritime evasion efforts.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.69-92
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• 2018

North Korea conducted a total of six nuclear tests from the 1st test of 2006 to September, 2017. North Korea developed an armed forces security strategy at the level of regime protection and defense to respond to U.S. hostile policy. However, it is certain that strategic goals of North Korea's nuclear test were to overcome a crisis in North Korea's regime through US-North Korea negotiation and complete nuclear armed forces for socialist unification on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's continuous nuclear test is a direct factor in threatening peace on the Korean Peninsula and an indirect factor in security dynamics of Northeast Asia. The U.N. Security Council has enforced sanctions against North Korea through six resolutions against North Korea's reckless nuclear test for the past 10 years. However, Kim Jong-Un's regime is in a position to stick to simultaneous pursuit of nuclear and economic development in spite of anti-North sanction of international society including U.N. and U.S.A. It is understood that North Korea was stimulated to conduct intense nuclear test as U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction was not effective on North Korea. Full-scale and local wars are expected as military options, one of anti-North sanctions of the Trump administration. The Trump administration has attempted diplomatic pressure strategy as a secondary boycott unlike previous administrations. Nevertheless, North Korea has stood against U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction with brinkmanship tactics, announcing full-scale military confrontation against U.S. It is judged that North Korea will pursue simultaneous nuclear weapons and economic development in terms of regime survival. North Korea will have less strategic choices in that its regime may collapse because of realistic national strategy between U.S.A. and China.