• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.47 no.3
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• pp.174-181
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• 2023

Five local governments along the Korea-Japan Sea (Jeju, Jeonnam, Gyeongnam, Busan, Ulsan) operate a joint countermeasure committee regarding the marine discharge of contaminated water from the Fukushima nuclear power plant by Japan's Tokyo Electric Power Plant. This study compared and analyzed citizen surveys, response strategies, and detailed action plans conducted by the Jeju Research Institute, Busan Research Institute, and Ulsan Research Institute as part of a study on countermeasures for the marine discharge of contaminated water from the Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan. The purpose was to present basic data for the preparation of effective measures. As a result of the perception survey, all citizens of local governments showed a strong negative perception of marine discharge regardless of scientific research results, and it is expected that future fisheries and tourism industries will suffer great damage. In response strategies for each local government, building a control tower was found to be the most urgent task common to all local governments. It is judged that this is because it is necessary to break away from the organization-centered system and to respond to the function-centered system for effective response. In terms of response methods, while Jeju and Busan established response plans for each sector, Ulsan City focused on practical responses with step-by-step response measures according to the release time. In terms of content, the establishment of a marine product radiation inspection system and publicity to relieve public anxiety were important. As the marine discharge of contaminated water from the Fukushima nuclear power plant is scheduled to continue until 2030, strengthening the network for sharing research results and achievements among local government research institutes was deemed necessary.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.29-54
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• 2007

Nuclear Power Sources(NPS) have been used since 1961 for the purpose of generating energy for space objects and have since then been recognized as particularly suited essential to some space operations. In January 1978 a malfuctioning Soviet nuclear powered satellite, Cosmos 954, re-entered the earth's atmosphere and disintegrated, scattering radioactive debris over a wide area of the Canadian Northwest Territory. This incident provided some reasons to international legal scholars to make some principles to regulate using NPS in outer space. In 1992 General Assembly adopted "Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space". These NPS Principles set out certain legal and regulatory requirements on the use of nuclear and radioactive power sources for non-propulsive purposes. Although these principles, called 'soft laws', are not legal norms, they have much enfluences on state practices such as 1983 DBS Principles(Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting), 1986 RS Principles(Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Space) and 1996 Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interests of all States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries. As far as 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space is concerned the main points such as free use of outer space, non-appropriation of celestial bodies, application of international law to outer space etc. have become customary international law binding all states. NPS Principles might have similar characters according to states' willingness to respect them.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• no.spc
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• pp.35-58
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• 2007

Nuclear Power Sources(NPS) have been used since 1961 for the purpose of generating energy for space objects and have since then been recognized as particularly suited essential to some space operations. In January 1978 a malfuctioning Soviet nuclear powered satellite, Cosmos 954, re-entered the earth's atmosphere and disintegrated, scattering radioactive debris over a wide area of the Canadian Northwest Territory. This incident provided some reasons to international legal scholars to make some principles to regulate using NPS in outer space. In 1992 General Assembly adopted "Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space". These NPS Principles set out certain legal and regulatory requirements on the use of nuclear and radioactive power sources for non-propulsive purposes. Although these principles, called 'soft laws', are not legal norms, they have much enfluences on state practices such as 1983 DBS Principles(Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting), 1986 RS Principles(Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Space) and 1996 Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interests of all States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries. As far as 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space is concerned the main points such as free use of outer space, non-appropriation of celestial bodies, application of international law to outer space etc. have become customary international law binding all states. NPS Principles might have similar characters according to states' willingness to respect them.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.10 no.1
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• pp.50-63
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• 1985

A derivation of new release limit, named Derived Release Limit(DRL), into the atomsphere from a reference nuclear power plant has been performed on the basis of the new system of dose limitation recommended by the ICRP, instead of the (MPC)a limit which has been currently used until now as a general standard for radioactive effluents in Korea. In DRL Calculation, a Concentration Factor Method was applied, in which the concentrations of long-term routinely released radionuclides were in equilibrium with dose in environment under the steady state condition. The analytical model used in the exposure pathway analysis was the one which has been suggested by the USNRC and the exposure limits applied in this analysis were those recommended by the USEPA lately. In the exposure pathway analysis, all of the pathways are not considered and some may be excluded either because they are not applicable or their contribution to the exposure is insignificant compared with other pathways. In case, the environmental model developed in this study was applied to the Kori nuclear power plant as the reference power plant, the highest DRL value was calculated to be as $9.10{\times}10^6Ci/yr$ for Kr-85 in external whole body exposure from the semi-infinite radioactive cloud, while the lowest DRL value was observed 3.64Ci/yr for Co-60 in external whole body exposure from the contaminated ground, by the radioactive particulates. The most critical exposure pathway to an individual in the unrestricted area of interest (Kilchun-Ri, 1.3 km to the north of the release point) seems to be the exposure pathway from the contaminated ground and the most critical radionuclide in all pathways appears to be Co-60 in the same pathway. When comparing the actual release rate from KNU-l in 1982 with the DRL's obtained here the release of radionuclides from KNU-1 were much lower than the DRL's and it could be conclued that the exposure to an individual had been kept below the exposure limits recommended by the USEPA.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.41
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• pp.37-66
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• 2014

In recent years, with the development of computers and electronics, electronics and communication technology in a growing and each part is dependent on the cross-referencing makes all electronic equipment is obsolete due to direct or indirect damage EMP. Korea and the impending standoff North Korea has a considerable level of technologies related to the EMP, EMP weapons you already have or in a few years, the development of EMP weapons will complete. North Korea launched a long-range missile and conducted a nuclear test on several occasions immediately after, when I saw the high-altitude nuclear blackmail has been strengthening the outright offensive nuclear EMP attacks at any time and practical significance for the EMP will need offensive skills would improve. At this point you can predict the damage situation of Korea's security reality that satisfy the need, more than anything else to build a protective system of the EMP. The scale of the damage that unforeseen but significant military damage and socio-economic damage and fatalities when I looked into the situation which started out as a satellite communications systems and equipment to attack military and security systems and transportation, finance, national emergency system, such as the damage elsewhere. In General, there is no direct casualties reported, but EMP medical devices that rely on lethal damage to people who can show up. In addition, the State power system failure due to a power supply interruption would not have thought the damage would bring State highly dependent on domestic power generation of nuclear plants is a serious nuclear power plant accident in the event of a blackout phenomenon can lead to the plant's internal problems should see a forecast. First of all, a special expert Committee of the EMP, the demand for protective facilities and equipment and conduct an investigation, he takes fits into your budget is under strict criteria by configuring the contractors should be sifting through. He then created the Agency for verification of performance EMP protection after you have verified the performance of maintenance, maintenance, safety and security management, design and construction company organized and systematic process Guard facilities or secret communications equipment and perfect for the EMP, such as protective equipment maneuver system should take.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Nondestructive Testing
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• v.34 no.3
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• pp.254-259
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• 2014

A pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) core has 380 fuel channels contained and supported by a horizontal cylindrical vessel known as the calandria, whereas a pressurized water reactor (PWR) has only a single reactor vessel. The pressure tube, which is a pressure-retaining component, has a 103.4 mm inside diameter ${\times}$ 4.19 mm wall thickness, and is 6.36 m long, made of a zirconium alloy (Zr-2.5 wt% Nb). This provides support for the fuel while transporting the $D_2O$ heat-transfer fluid. The simple tubular geometry invites highly automated inspection, and good approach for all inspection. Similar to all nuclear heat-transfer pressure boundaries, the PHWR pressure tube requires a rigorous, periodic inspection to assess the reactor integrity in accordance with the Korea Nuclear Safety Committee law. Volumetric-based nondestructive evaluation (NDE) techniques utilizing ultrasonic and eddy current testing have been adopted for use in the periodic inspection of the fuel channel. The eddy current testing, as a supplemental NDE method to ultrasonic testing, is used to confirm the flaws primarily detected through ultrasonic testing, however, eddy current testing offers a significant advantage in that its ability to detect surface flaws is superior to that of ultrasonic testing. In this paper, effectiveness of flaw detection and the depth sizing capability by eddy current testing for the inside surface of a pressure tube, will be introduced. As a result of this examination, the ET technique is found to be useful only as a detection technique for defects because it can detect fine defects on the surface with high resolution. However, the ET technique is not recommended for use as a depth sizing method because it has a large degree of error for depth sizing.