• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.17 no.3
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• pp.373-399
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• 2014

This paper deals with the question whether the metaphysical dialetheism is a persuasive view or not. That is, the purpose of this paper is to criticize the metaphysical dialetheism by answering three questions, whether the dialetheism is compatible with the correspondence theory of truth, whether there is an observable contradiction, finally what the status of LNC is. In conclusion, it is argued that dialetheism is incompatible with the correspondence theory of truth, because it results in trivialism to suppose that two views are compatible. It is also claimed that LNC should be understood as the principle of exclusion which constrains the structure of the world and that the real world is consistent. Therefore, there is no observable contradiction in the world and the metaphysical dialetheism is not persuasive.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.87-124
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• 2019

A dialetheic approach to the sorites paradox is to understand a borderline case as a true contradiction. In order to accommodate this approach, the possibility of an alternative that does not involve a contradiction should be considered first. Beall presents an alternative that has all virtues of dialetheic solution without contradiction. I do not think his alternative has no contradiction. Using the inclosure schema I will show it. Furthermore, I will show that all alternatives which do not accept the existence of cut-off point imply a contradiction. This means that we have to accept a true contradiction as long as we accept the intuition of vagueness, especially, what is called 'tolerance'.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.241-271
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• 2017

Dialetheism is the view that there exists a true contradiction. This paper ventures to suggest that Priest's argument for Dialetheism from $G{\ddot{o}}del^{\prime}s$ theorem is unconvincing as the lesson of $G{\ddot{o}}del^{\prime}s$ proof (or Rosser's proof) is that any sufficiently strong theories of arithmetic cannot be both complete and consistent. In addition, a contradiction is derivable in Priest's inconsistent and complete arithmetic. An alternative argument for Dialetheism is given by applying $G{\ddot{o}}del$ sentence to the inconsistent and complete theory of arithmetic. We argue, however, that the alternative argument raises a circularity problem. In sum, $G{\ddot{o}}del^{\prime}s$ and its related theorem merely show the relation between a complete and a consistent theory. A contradiction derived by the application of $G{\ddot{o}}del$ sentence has the value of true sentences, i.e. the both-value, only under the inconsistent models for arithmetic. Without having the assumption of inconsistency or completeness, a true contradiction is not derivable from the application of $G{\ddot{o}}del$ sentence. Hence, $G{\ddot{o}}del^{\prime}s$ and its related theorem never can be a ground for Dialetheism.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.233-253
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• 2014

The Pinocchio paradox that Eldridge-Smith suggested is a version of the semantic paradox. But it is unique in the sense that this paradox does not contain a semantic predicate. Tarski's solution which appeals to the hierarchy of language and Kripke's para-completeness which accepts the third truth value cannot solve the Pinocchio paradox. This paper argues that Eldridge-Smith's trial to criticize semantical dialetheism is not successful and that the paradox implies the rule of the truth predicate is inconsistent. That is, the proper diagnosis to this paradox is that the Pinocchio principle should be considered to be potentially inconsistent, which suggests that semantic paradoxes such as the liar paradox arise because the rule of the truth-predicate is inconsistent. The Pinocchio paradox teaches us that consistent view of truth cannot be successful to solve the semantic paradoxes and that we should accept the inconsistent view of truth.