• The Korean Journal of Financial Studies
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• v.9 no.1
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• pp.189-219
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• 2003

본 연구는 한국증권거래소의 현금배당락조치 폐지 이전과 1998년 7월 현금배당락 조치 폐지 이후의 표본을 이용하여 인위적인 거래소의 배당락조치 변경이 배당락일의 주가행태에 미치는 효과를 분석하였다. 실증분석 결과 현금배당락조치 폐지 이후 거래소 배당락기준가격의 오차는 예상대로 더욱 확대된 것으로 나타났다. 두 기간 모두 배당락일의 주가가 금기예상실효배당금과 거래소가 배당락조치를 위해 인위적으로 산정한 배당금과의 차이인 거래소 배당락기준가격의 오차를 반영할 수 없었다. 또한, 김성민(1997)과 일관되게 단기차익 거래의 유용성은 표본그룹에 관계없이 금기예상실효배당금에 대한 정보소유자가 연말 폐장일에 배당부종가로 구입하여 배당락일인 연초 개장일에 배당락 종가로 매도하는 것이 배당락 시가로 매도하는 것보다 더 효과적임을 알 수 있었다. 그리고, 이러한 차익거래를 통한 보유기간 세후 수익률은 현금배당락조치 폐지 이전인 1997년(4.7%)에 비해 현금배당락조치 폐지 이후 현금배당락을 시키지 않은 $1998{\sim}1999$년(8.9%) 기간에 더 증가하였다. 단기차익을 위한 차익거래가 실질적으로 이루어 졌는지 연초 배당락일 주변의 초과거래량을 분석한 결과 $1997{\sim}1998$ 회계년도의 배당락일에는 유의적인 양(+)의 초과거래량이 발생하였지만 1999 회계년도의 배당락일에는 유의적인 음(-)의 초과거래량이 발생하여 이에 대한 결론을 내릴 수 없었다. 본 연구는 금기예상현금배당에 대한 완전예측을 가정함으로써 배당락일의 주가하락과 주주총회에서 실현될 주당배당금의 괴리는 차익을 제공할 수 있으나 무위험 차익거래 기회가 아님을 밝혀 둔다.효과적인 것으로 판단되었다. 조사한 모든 일중 및 1일(overnight) 투자수익률에서 옵션 거래량의 상대적 비율에 의거한 투자전략은 통계적으로 유의한 투자수익률의 차이를 가져왔다.e 측정치에 의해 평가했을 때, 회사채가 주식보다 더 우수한 것으로 평가되었으나 Treynor 측정치에 의한 평가를 했을 때는 정기예금이 가장 우수했다. 그리고 Jensen 측정치에 따라 투자대상을 평가했을 때는 회사채와 국채가 주식보다 앞섰다. 마지막으로, 종합적인 평가를 했을 때는 회사채가 주식보다 우수했고 정기예금은 주식과 동일한 수준으로 평가되었다. 유의성은 없었다.의 선도효과가 지배적임을 발견하였다.적 일정하게 하는 소비행동을 목표로 삼고 소비와 투자에 대한 의사결정을 내리고 있음이 실증분석을 통하여 밝혀졌다. 투자자들은 무위험 자산과 위험성 자산을 동시에 고려하여 포트폴리오를 구성하는 투자활동을 행동에 옮기고 있다.서, Loser포트폴리오를 매수보유하는 반전거래전략이 Winner포트폴리오를 매수보유하는 계속거래전략보다 적합한 전략임을 알 수 있었다. 다섯째, Loser포트폴리오와 Winner포트폴리오를 각각 투자대상종목으로써 매수보유한 반전거래전략과 계속거래 전략에 대한 유용성을 비교검증한 Loser포트폴리오와 Winner포트폴리오 각각의 1개월 평균초과수익률에 의하면, 반전거래전략의 Loser포트폴리오가 계속거래전략의 Winner포트폴리오보다 약 5배정도의 높은 1개월 평균초과수익률을 실현하였고, 반전거래전략의 유용성을 충분히 발휘하기 위하여 장단기의 투자기간을 설정할 경우에 6개월에서 36개월로 이동함에 따라 6개월부터 24개월까지는 초과수익률이 상승하지만, 이후로는 감소하므로, 반전거래전략을

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.129-153
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• 2017

Fair Competition policy in aviation field has been discussed since open skies policy began in 1970s. This issue has been also the main topic in the ICAO's Worldwide Air Transport Conference, the Air Transport Symposium, etc. ICAO defines competition as the existent or potential rivalry between two or more operators, carriers or groups, striving for advantages in the same market based on different prices, qualities and services. In a broader sense, the definition includes more various meanings; reasonable, fair, effective, and unrestricted competitions. Nowadays, competition laws and regulations to air transportation have been applied more frequently and the issues varies from antitrust immunity, mergers and alliances, abuse of dominant positions, capacity dumping and predatory pricing, sales and marketing, to airport charges and fees, state aid and loan guarantees. Now, the competition among the airlines or nations in aviation industry is changing to cooperation level. A lot of airlines try to survive by various cooperation methods. Therefore the policy of Korean aviation industry should be developed, taking so-called "the viewpoint of national aviation industry ecosystem" into consideration and Korean government should prepare a policy of fair competition to cope with it. First, in the process of open skies policy with neighboring countries such as China, Japan and the Middle East, it is necessary to apply the fair competition act and prepare laws and regulations to implement it. Second, the standards of effective ownership and control of air transportation business should be reviewed. Third, in preparation for aviation agreements and liberalization, the Korean aviation industry needs to study and review competition and cooperation issues through the analysis of strict aviation market structure for airlines and airport operations. Fourth, it is necessary to create a fair air transportation environment for the development of air transportation and competitiveness through preemptive policies such as the approval of mergers, acquisitions, JV and the ripple effects analysis.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Aviation and Aeronautics
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.38-53
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• 2007

In a seminal judgment of November 2002 (Case C-476/98) relating to the compatibility with Community laws of the 'nationality clause' in the 1996 amending protocol to the 1955 U.S.-German Air Services Agreement, the European Court of Justice(ECJ) decided that the provision constituted a measure of an intrinsically discriminatory nature and was thus contrary to the principle of national treatment established under Art. 52 of the EC Treaty. The Court, rejecting bluntly the German government' submissions relying on public policy grounds(Art. 56, EC Treaty), seemed content to declare and rule that the protocol provision requiring a contracting state party to ensure substantial ownership and effective control by its nationals of its designated airlines had violated the requirement of national treatment reserved for other Community Members under the salient Treaty provision. The German counterclaims against the Commission, although tantalizing not only from the perusal of the judgment but from the perspective of international air law, were nonetheless invariably correct and to the point. For such a clause has been justified to defend the 'fundamental interests of society from a serious threat' that may result from granting operating licenses or necessary technical authorizations to an airline company of a third country. Indeed, the nationality clause has been inserted in most of the liberal bilaterals to allow the parties to enforce their own national laws and regulations governing aviation safety and security. Such a clause is not targeted as a device for discriminating against the nationals of any third State. It simply acts as the minimum legal safeguards against aviation risk empowering a party to take legal control of the designated airlines. Unfortunately, the German call for the review of such a foremost objective and rationale underlying the nationality clause landed on the deaf ears of the Court which appeared quite happy not to take stock of the potential implications and consequences in its absence and of the legality under international law of the 'national treatment' requirement of Community laws. Again, while US law limits foreign shareholders to 24.9% of its airlines, the European Community limits non-EC ownership to 49%, precluding any ownership and effective control by foreign nationals of EC airlines, let alone any foreign takeover and merger. Given this, it appears inconsistent and unreasonable for the EC to demand, $vis-{\grave{a}}-vis$ a non-EC third State, national treatment for all of its Member States. The ECJ's decision was also wrongly premised on the precedence of Community laws over international law, and in particular, international air law. It simply is another form of asserting and enforcing de facto extraterritorial application of Community laws to a non-EC third country. Again, the ruling runs counter to an established rule of international law that a treaty does not, as a matter of principle, create either obligations or rights for a third State. Aside from the legal problems, the 'national treatment' may not be economically justified either, in light of the free-rider problem and resulting externalities or inefficiency. On the strength of international law and economics, therefore, airlines of Community Members other than the designated German and U.S. air carriers are neither eligible for traffic rights, nor entitled to operate between or 'free-ride' on the U.S. and German points. All in all and in all fairness, the European Court's ruling was nothing short of an outright condemnation of established rules and principles of international law and international air law. Nor is the national treatment requirement justified by the economic logic of deregulation or liberalization of aviation markets. Nor has the requirement much to do with fair competition and increased efficiency.