• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.123
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• pp.379-407
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• 2012

The main purpose of this paper is to make a case for the availability of pragmatist ethics by showing the differences between utilitarianism and pragmatism. In this paper, drawing on Dewey's view, I show that Bentham and Mill were doomed to failure because they both regarded moral conduct not as a process but as a fixed act, the remarkable differences between their views notwithstanding. Besides, I also show that pragmatism distinguishes itself from utilitarianism by its focus on the aspect of the amendment of a conduct rather than its attainment. Pragmatist ethics works on the assumption that moral conduct arises only in conscious experience. What pragmatists mean by consciousness is not an ability just given to haman, but a function emerging from the human interaction with his environment. Therefore, morality is extended from and restricted by experience, because it is grounded in concrete experience, but not in the transcendental nor a priori realm. Since pragmatism suggests the possibility of "ethics without principles" in that it works through the way which successfully rejects the traditional absolutist ethics, while avoiding the downslide to a nihilistic form of skepticism. Thus, it may serve as a third view that overcomes a seriously divergent situation of the current ethical arguments. In other words, starting from the very nature of experience, pragmatist ethics offers a 'bottom-up' ethics, instead of a 'top-down' one. This reconstructive reading of pragmatism away from utilitarianism is expected to offer a more comprehensive account of our moral experience in the pluralistic world of diverged values.

• Current Industrial and Technological Trends in Aerospace
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• v.4 no.2
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• pp.3-9
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• 2006

우주개발 이념은 크게 과학탐구주의, 상업주의 등 여러 가지 요소들이 각각 다른 비중으로 우주개발 혁신체제에 영향을 미쳐왔다. 우리나라 우주개발 중장기기본계획 상에서 실용주의(상업주의)의 산업경쟁력 강화가 일관되게 강조되어지고 있다. 한국의 우주개발이 본격화된 시기인 1993년부터 2005년까지의 김영삼, 김대중, 노무현 대통령 말씀 내용분석에 있어서, 우주개발을 통한 산업경쟁력 강화라는 실용주의(상업주의)가 일관되게 강조되어 왔다.

• Journal of Korean Society of Rural Planning
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• v.5 no.1 s.9
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• pp.76-86
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• 1999

본 연구는 미국의 실용주의 철학자인 존 듀이의 공생적 합리주의 모형에 대한 분석과 이 모형의 계획이론의 적용에 대한 사회규범적 논의에 관한 것이다. 다양한 사회과학분야의 문헌고찰과 듀이를 비롯한 실용주의학파들의 연구를 중심으로 이루어진 본 연구는, 최근 논의되고 있는 사회 규범적 차원에서 논의되고 있는 계획이론의 이론적 근거를 존 듀이의 공생적 합리주의에서 찾고자 하였다. 민주주의의 속성상 계획과정에서의 상충과 갈등이 피할수 없는 현실이라면, 이러한 갈등과 상충이 발전적 도구로 존재할 수 있다고 제시한 듀이의 공생주의는 합리성의 가능성에 바탕을 둔 고전적 합리주의 이론을 대체할 수 있는 하나의 이론으로 제시될 수 있을 것이다. 존 듀이의 공생주의 이론에 대한 연구는 기존의 계획이론분야에서는 제시된 적이 없는 최초의 연구로서, 향후 계획이론 분야의 발전에 있어서 이론적 분석의 한 축을 제시했다는데 본 논문의 기여가 있다고 하겠다.

• 에너지협의회보
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• s.61
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• pp.38-39
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• 2002

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.143
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• pp.67-86
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• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to critically investigate John McDowell's naturalism, and propose an alternative direction of inquiry in order for his naturalism to have a more explanatory cogency. McDowell's main project is to settle a philosophical anxiety that has made traditional philosophy waver between mind and world. If one stands on the world side, he would appeal to "the unintelligible given," and on the other hand, if one stands on the mind side, he would fall into anarchistic relativism. In order to relieve the traditional philosophical anxiety, what McDowell has in mind is to reintroduce an empiricistic intuition into a pragmatic conceptual setting. Although McDowell is successful in that it could avoid methodological difficulties with which traditional philosophy has faced, his discussion seems to give rise to a charge of "the Myth of the Given," presenting perceptual judgement as a model of judgement. I propose that McDowell has yet to account for the relation between perceptual and abstract judgements in a more cogent way, which has been far better explained by the experientialist account of the nature and the structure of the embodied experience.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.120
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• pp.109-130
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• 2011

The main purpose of this paper is to examine Putnam's recent conception of ethics, and show that it gives rise to an ineluctable incoherence with his rationalism. This suggests that Putnam's philosophy has to be far more naturalized to make his new position cogent. Putnam recently has shown some explicit turn toward pragmatism a la James and Dewey under the name of "pragmatic pluralism." Putnam says that traditional ethics has presupposed some form of ontology in one way or another, which he sees is based on an unnecessary pursuit of a misleading conception of objectivity. Putnam tries to get rid of any notion of ontology in ethics, whereby we can talk about a third view which runs between traditional objectivism and nihilistic relativism. In this sense, he defines pragmatism as "fallibilism cum antiskepticism." Putnam's suggestion makes a good sense as far as it goes. However, his continuous transition toward pragmatism is critically impeded by his own adhesion to the normative conception of "reason." In this light, Putnam himself is wobbling between Kant and Dewey, just as he describes ethics is. Dewey's pragmatism does not have recourse to the very notion of reason to secure objectivity necessary to make sense of moral experience. Putnam needs to be far more naturalized to reach cogently where he espouses, and this can be done only by renouncing the normative conception of reason.

• 발명특허
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• v.33 no.5
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• pp.53-55
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• 2008

• 대학교육
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• s.99
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• pp.93-95
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• 1999

• 베이커리
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• no.8 s.433
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• pp.156-157
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• 2004

• 열린충남
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• s.60
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• pp.56-63
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• 2012