• Title/Summary/Keyword: 산업집중도

Search Result 1,750, Processing Time 0.028 seconds

Development of market concentration analysis module (산업별 시장성장성 및 경쟁상황분석시스템 지원모듈)

  • Kim, Ji-Hui;Yoo, Hyoung Sun;Park, Jinhan;Kim, You-Eil;Hwang, Jee Na
    • Proceedings of the Korea Contents Association Conference
    • /
    • 2017.05a
    • /
    • pp.381-382
    • /
    • 2017
  • 본 논문의 주요 목적은 시장집중도, 경쟁현황에 대한 산업정보를 분석, 생산하기 위한 비즈니스 인텔리전스 시스템을 제공하는 것이다. 이러한 산업정보들은 주로 전체 산업 내 기업들의 연도별 매출액으로 분석하였고 산업시장은 한국표준산업분류에 의해 세분화하였다. 이 연구를 통해 얻어진 결과는 수요자 중심형 산업/시장인텔리전스 시스템인 KMAPS에 하나의 모듈로서 적용하였고 그 결과는 전문가들의 정성적 분석 결과와 비교하여 신뢰성을 검증하였다. 이 시스템을 통해 얻은 시장집중도 및 경쟁상황정보는 기업들이 새로운 제품개발 후 시장진입 시 필요한 의사결정을 하는데 활용될 수 있다는데 본 연구의 의의가 있다.

  • PDF

A Study of Developing a Relative-Specialization Index Using Expected Frequence (기대빈도를 활용한 새로운 상대집중지수의 제안)

  • Nam, Ki-Seong;Oh, Min-Hong;Hong, Hyun-Guyn
    • The Korean Journal of Applied Statistics
    • /
    • v.21 no.4
    • /
    • pp.581-588
    • /
    • 2008
  • The purpose of this study is to introduce a relative specialization index, the Nam-Oh-Hong Index(NOHI) and to investigate regional distribution of occupational specialization using the newly developed index. Compared with Location Quotient(LQ), the advantages of the index is that the NOHI enables comparison between inter-regional and intra-regional concentration of employment possible at the same time. The results of the specialization analyses show that Seoul is specialized in management, book-keeping and office related occupations, whereas Busan in machine and material related occupations.

Analyzing the Relationship between Market Concentration and Performance in Global Pay TV Markets for the Media Industry Regulation and Policy (해외유료방송의 시장집중과 시장성과 간의 관계분석을 통한 미디어산업 규제 및 정책 방향)

  • Lee, Chi-Hyung;Lee, Bong-Gyou
    • Journal of Internet Computing and Services
    • /
    • v.12 no.4
    • /
    • pp.51-59
    • /
    • 2011
  • The purpose of this study is to provide relevant directions of media industry regulation and policy by analyzing the relationship between market concentration and performance in global pay TV markets. The market concentration has long been regulated in the media industry under the belief that it harms market efficiency and cultural diversity. As the global media market is undergoing significant chance accelerated by the advance of technology, it is necessary to examine the feasibility of this long myth. The data are collected from global 17 pay TV markets and analyzed to see whether the highly concentrated markets by a single player result in higher price and slower service penetration. The result indicates that the price is not escalated and the penetration is not limited even in the markets where a dominant player takes high market share. It implies that more diverse factors other than the market concentration affect the market performance and that maintaining strict regulation of the market concentration is likely to have negative effect on technology innovation.

How Does the Concentration of Ownership Impact R&D Investments? Evidence from Korean Pharmaceutical Firms (소유 집중도가 기업 연구개발 투자에 미치는 영향: 국내 제약 산업을 중심으로)

  • Han, Kyul;Moon, Seongwuk
    • Journal of Technology Innovation
    • /
    • v.22 no.2
    • /
    • pp.157-183
    • /
    • 2014
  • This paper examines how the concentration of ownership in firms influences the R&D investment decision and whether the type of a firm's management (i.e, the owner-manager or professional manger) differentiates the relationship between the ownership concentration and R&D investments by using data of Korean pharmaceutical companies between 2004 and 2008. The results show that the share of the largest shareholder and R&D investment have an inverted U-shaped relationship, and whether a CEO is an owner or a professional manager affects the curvature of the inverted U-shaped relationship. Specifically, when a firm's CEO is a professional manager and the share of his stock is small, increase in the CEO's share increases the R&D investment in the larger amount than when a firm's CEO is an owner. This is because the increase in ownership reduces agency cost; However, when the share of his stock is large, the increase in CEO's share decreases R&D investment in the larger amount than when a firm's CEO is an owner. This is because a professional manager gets concerned over excessive risk exposure more than an owner-manager does.