• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.69-92
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• 2018

North Korea conducted a total of six nuclear tests from the 1st test of 2006 to September, 2017. North Korea developed an armed forces security strategy at the level of regime protection and defense to respond to U.S. hostile policy. However, it is certain that strategic goals of North Korea's nuclear test were to overcome a crisis in North Korea's regime through US-North Korea negotiation and complete nuclear armed forces for socialist unification on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's continuous nuclear test is a direct factor in threatening peace on the Korean Peninsula and an indirect factor in security dynamics of Northeast Asia. The U.N. Security Council has enforced sanctions against North Korea through six resolutions against North Korea's reckless nuclear test for the past 10 years. However, Kim Jong-Un's regime is in a position to stick to simultaneous pursuit of nuclear and economic development in spite of anti-North sanction of international society including U.N. and U.S.A. It is understood that North Korea was stimulated to conduct intense nuclear test as U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction was not effective on North Korea. Full-scale and local wars are expected as military options, one of anti-North sanctions of the Trump administration. The Trump administration has attempted diplomatic pressure strategy as a secondary boycott unlike previous administrations. Nevertheless, North Korea has stood against U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction with brinkmanship tactics, announcing full-scale military confrontation against U.S. It is judged that North Korea will pursue simultaneous nuclear weapons and economic development in terms of regime survival. North Korea will have less strategic choices in that its regime may collapse because of realistic national strategy between U.S.A. and China.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.16 no.4
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• pp.167-178
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• 2021

The purpose of this study is to analyze the direct investment decision factors in the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Vietnam, and to contribute to the creation of domestic jobs and the revitalization of the inter-Korean economy. According to the analysis, most of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Vietnamese investment companies are entering the complex for the purpose of utilizing cheap labor, cheap factory locations, sales/development of local markets, and bypass export production bases in third countries. This can be divided into production-efficient investors using differences in production price such as labor costs and market-oriented investors to sell and expand the local market, which seems to be consistent with global direct investment patterns such as Nike, Apple, and Amazon. However, even if the North Korea-U.S. denuclearization talks ease or lift sanctions, Vietnamese investors' willingness to invest in the North Korea has been most burdened by the possibility of closing special economic zones due to political risks. Last but not least, it is important to note that those willing to invest in North Korea are mostly smaller enterprises in textiles, sewing, footwear and leather industries-those that benefit from low-cost labor. Since their size is small, they need policy support in financing, especially in the early stages of their business. Even after they grow past the early stages, those without collateral would still need state guarantee letters to get financing. Thus, it is worth considering to use the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund to compensate commercial banks for bad loan loss or for low-interest loans for smaller SMEs. The interviews with SMEs found that red-tape is one of the biggest difficulties they face. Thus, it is recommended that a one-stop service agency should be established to cover all processes and issues related to inter-Korean economic cooperation to eliminate redundancy and expediate government support for SMEs.