• Title/Summary/Keyword: 북한 전략군

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Factors associated with the attitude of South Korean adults toward food aid to North Korea (남한 성인의 대북식량지원에 대한 태도 관련 요인)

  • Nam, Youngmin;Yoon, Jihyun
    • Journal of Nutrition and Health
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    • v.53 no.2
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    • pp.215-229
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    • 2020
  • Purpose: This study examines the attitude of South Korean adults toward food aid to North Korea and factors associated with it. Methods: An online survey involving 1,000 adults aged 19-69 years was conducted between September-October 2019. Throughout South Korea, the subjects were proportionally distributed with respect to gender, age, and region, to represent South Korean adults. Results: A total of 44.6% of the respondents agreed (Agreement group), 36.7% disagreed (Disagreement group), and 18.7% neither agreed nor disagreed to food aid to North Korea. Compared to the Disagreement group, the Agreement group had a higher concern of food aid to North Korea and a more positive perception on the effect of it. The Agreement group selected "direct assistance from the government" whereas the Disagreement group chose "support through international organizations" as the most appropriate channel for food aid to North Korea. Logistic regression analysis revealed that South Korean adults showing a more positive perception on the effect of food aid to North Korea were more likely to agree to the aid (odds ratio [OR], 19.32). Moreover, compared to the conservatives, the progressives were more likely to agree to food aid to North Korea (OR, 5.94). South Korean adults in their 40-50s were more likely to agree to food aid to North Korea than those in their 20-30s (OR, 2.81). South Korean adults with a higher concern of food aid to North Korea (OR, 3.93) and a greater positive perception on Korean unification (OR, 1.88) were more likely to agree to food aid to North Korea. Conclusion: The most important factor associated with the attitude of South Korean adults toward food aid to North Korea was their perception on the subsequent effect. As strategies to draw social consensus on food aid to North Korea, we recommend systematizing the monitoring process on the effect of providing food aid to North Korea and informing the public of the outcomes.

Eurasian Naval Power on Display: Sino-Russian Naval Exercises under Presidents Xi and Putin (유라시아 지역의 해군 전력 과시: 시진핑 주석과 푸틴 대통령 체제 하에 펼쳐지는 중러 해상합동훈련)

  • Richard Weitz
    • Maritime Security
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    • v.5 no.1
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    • pp.1-53
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    • 2022
  • One manifestation of the contemporary era of renewed great power competition has been the deepening relationship between China and Russia. Their strengthening military ties, notwithstanding their lack of a formal defense alliance, have been especially striking. Since China and Russia deploy two of the world's most powerful navies, their growing maritime cooperation has been one of the most significant international security developments of recent years. The Sino-Russian naval exercises, involving varying platforms and locations, have built on years of high-level personnel exchanges, large Russian weapons sales to China, the Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, and other forms of cooperation. Though the joint Sino-Russian naval drills began soon after Beijing and Moscow ended their Cold War confrontation, these exercises have become much more important during the last decade, essentially becoming a core pillar of their expanding defense partnership. China and Russia now conduct more naval exercises in more places and with more types of weapons systems than ever before. In the future, Chinese and Russian maritime drills will likely encompass new locations, capabilities, and partners-including possibly the Arctic, hypersonic delivery systems, and novel African, Asian, and Middle East partners-as well as continue such recent innovations as conducting joint naval patrols and combined arms maritime drills. China and Russia pursue several objectives through their bilateral naval cooperation. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation lacks a mutual defense clause, but does provide for consultations about common threats. The naval exercises, which rehearse non-traditional along with traditional missions (e.g., counter-piracy and humanitarian relief as well as with high-end warfighting), provide a means to enhance their response to such mutual challenges through coordinated military activities. Though the exercises may not realize substantial interoperability gains regarding combat capabilities, the drills do highlight to foreign audiences the Sino-Russian capacity to project coordinated naval power globally. This messaging is important given the reliance of China and Russia on the world's oceans for trade and the two countries' maritime territorial disputes with other countries. The exercises can also improve their national military capabilities as well as help them learn more about the tactics, techniques, and procedures of each other. The rising Chinese Navy especially benefits from working with the Russian armed forces, which have more experience conducting maritime missions, particularly in combat operations involving multiple combat arms, than the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the negative side, these exercises, by enhancing their combat capabilities, may make Chinese and Russian policymakers more willing to employ military force or run escalatory risks in confrontations with other states. All these impacts are amplified in Northeast Asia, where the Chinese and Russian navies conduct most of their joint exercises. Northeast Asia has become an area of intensifying maritime confrontations involving China and Russia against the United States and Japan, with South Korea situated uneasily between them. The growing ties between the Chinese and Russian navies have complicated South Korean-U.S. military planning, diverted resources from concentrating against North Korea, and worsened the regional security environment. Naval planners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan will increasingly need to consider scenarios involving both the Chinese and Russian navies. For example, South Korean and U.S. policymakers need to prepare for situations in which coordinated Chinese and Russian military aggression overtaxes the Pentagon, obligating the South Korean Navy to rapidly backfill for any U.S.-allied security gaps that arise on the Korean Peninsula. Potentially reinforcing Chinese and Russian naval support to North Korea in a maritime confrontation with South Korea and its allies would present another serious challenge. Building on the commitment of Japan and South Korea to strengthen security ties, future exercises involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States should expand to consider these potential contingencies.

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The Comparison and Analysis on Students' Awareness of National Security -Focus on the students of military science established college and those of military science non-established college- (대학생들의 안보의식에 대한 비교·분석 -군사학과 설치 대학과 미설치 대학 대학생들을 중심으로-)

  • Lee, Sung Choon
    • Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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    • v.15 no.7
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    • pp.4246-4257
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    • 2014
  • The aim of this study was to search for a security strategy and security education program by analyzing the security awareness of universities with and without Department of Military Science. The results of university student's security awareness revealed a normal level of recognition and differences according to region and gender. The recognition of stability of current Korean national security is normally low on average, which suggests that students feel anxiety towards national security. In addition, the North Korea provocation influence on national security has been recognized highly (score of 4.33 on average). The national security awareness of university students in the case of whether establishing a Dept. of Military Science or not showed a normal level, which revealed a score of 3.44, and differed according to region, gender and recruitment, and had a relationship with the recognition of Dept. of Military Science management. Therefore, the political consideration of security authorities is in strong demand to improve the security awareness of general university students, and have an influx of great human resources by advertising the educational contents, advantages and future career of Dept. of Military Science students.

Monitoring bird and mammal diversity using camera trapping in Jingwan-dong wetland (카메라 트래핑을 활용한 진관동습지의 조류 및 포유류 종다양성 모니터링)

  • Jiyoon Park;Yujin Kang;Youngkeun Song
    • Korean Journal of Environmental Biology
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    • v.42 no.3
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    • pp.219-231
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    • 2024
  • This study applied a camera trapping method to investigate species diversity of birds and mammals in Jingwan-dong Wetland located in Bukhansan National Park, Seoul, Korea. The objectives of this study were to (1) verify the efficiency of the camera trapping method through a combination of literature and observation surveys, and to (2) propose it as an effective monitoring method to assessing changes in biodiversity. From February 2022 to June 2022, a total of six cameras were installed for 121 days to conduct camera trapping in three aquatic environments. As a result, a total of 14,742 videos were obtained with a data acquisition rate of 59.2%. Analysis of the data identified a total of 20 families and 47 species of birds with 7 families and 8 species of mammals. When previous field observation data compiled from the past 10 years starting from 2011 were analyzed, a total of 33 families and 90 species of birds with 5 families and 6 species of mammals were identified. Camera trapping in Jingwan-dong Wetland recorded species list, including 3 families and 3 species of bird and 2 families and 2 species of mammal not observed in the past decade. Thus, camera trapping, which complements temporal limitations of field survey, can be an effective monitoring method for rapidly changing biodiversity if spatial limitations are improved. Resulting species lists can serve as a basis for future restoration and management plans.

The Revision of the Rules of the Workers' Party of Korea and the Organizational Changes of the 'Monolithic Guidance System of the Party Core': Focusing on Party-Government-Military Relations in Kim Jong Un Regime (조선노동당 제8차대회 당규약 개정과 '당중앙의 유일적 영도체계'의 조직적 변화: 김정은 정권의 당정군관계를 중심으로)

  • Kim, Tae-Kyung;Lee, Jung Chul;Yang, Hui
    • Analyses & Alternatives
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    • v.6 no.1
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    • pp.115-162
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    • 2022
  • The Rules of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), revised at the eighth Party Congress in 2021, reflect the Kim Jong Un regime's changes in strategic lines and ideological justifications on North Korea's socialism and communism, and its recent stances against the external environment. Moreover, they contain critical changes in the party's organizational system encompassing the central and the provinces. This study explores the organizational changes of the "monolithic guidance system of the party core" stipulated by the new party rules in January 2021, based on the analysis of the entire nine revised rules of the WPK since 1945. In the 2021 Party Congress, the Kim Jong Un regime, which officially came to power after the fourth Party Conference in 2012, has institutionalized the monolithic guidance system centered on the party core, or the head of state, Kim Jong Un. The newly set leadership and execution system, which reorganized party, government, and military organizational structure and accompanied the relevant personnel changes, was derived from the attempts for reinstating the Kim Jong Un regime as a more normalized party-state structure before its 10th year in power in April 2022. The "monolithic leadership system of the party core" established a system of "organizational leadership" through the organization of the Central Committee, directed by the Party Head, or General Secretary. The institutionalization of the new system resulted from the ten-year development of the revival of the party-state structure, which compromised the status of the military and reconfirmed the party's control of the military. This study explains the new system from the perspectives of both institutionalization and top-down unity, shedding light on the new party-military-government relations of the Kim Jong Un regime. The analysis contributes to a better understanding and forecasting of the Kim Jong Un regime's governance, which currently strengthens the monolithic leadership system as a crisis management system in the face of the "triple hardships" of sanctions, Covid and disaster.