• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.13-25
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• 2013

After studying FSMA 24, We found that the insolvency rule of financial institutions in FSMA consists of eight provisions: 1) voluntary arrangement, 2) administration order, 3) receiverships, 4) voluntary winding up, 5) winding up by the court, 6) bankruptcy, 7) provisions against debt avoidance, and 8) supplemental provisions in insurance cases. Insolvency provisions in FSMA explain powers and accountabilities of FSA in relation to these insolvency proceedings. Although there are some differences in proceedings, provisions entitle FSA the same status as creditors to petition the court, with a right to participate in related meetings and to be notified of any matters involving insolvency proceedings. The differences and implications between U.K.'s FSMA and Korean regulations are related to the insolvency rule of financial institutions. First, in FSMA, FSA has a comprehensive power to manage insolvency proceedings of financial institutions in a centralized way. However, Korean regulations have special laws to regulate insolvency in a decentralized way. The offices executing those laws are the Financial Services Committee, the Financial Supervisory Service, and the Financial Deposit Insurance Corporation. This characteristic results from an accelerated legislation procedures related to financial reform in 1997 Korean financial crisis. Second, FSA contains special provisions on continuation of contracts of long-term insurance considering the characteristics of insurance industry related to insolvency of financial institution. However, Korean insolvency rules applied to financial institutions do not consider industrial differences and the characteristics of financial contracts, so need to be supplemented in the future.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.3-39
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• 1993

부실기업정리(不實企業整理制度)의 경제적(經濟的) 성격(性格)은 기업의 존속과 채권(債權)-채무(債務)의 조정(調整)으로 나누어 볼 수 있다. 본고(本稿)에서 필자(筆者)는 기업존속여부의 결정과 채권(債權)-채무(債務)의 조정시 사용될 수 있는 효율성(效率性)과 공정성(公正性) 기준을 제시한 뒤, 이에 입각하여 과거(過去) 및 현행(現行) 법정관리제도(法定管理制度)와 합리화조치(合理化措置)의 내용을 평가(評價) 분석(分析)하고, 개선방안을 제시하였다. 과거(過去) 및 현행(現行) 법정관리제도(法定管理制度)와 합리화조치(合理化措置)는 기업(企業)과 기업주(企業主)를 구분하지 못하여 기업의 조속결정과 채권(債權)-채무조정(債務調整)이 효율성(效率性)과 공정성(公正性)의 기준에 맞지 않게 이루어진 경우가 많았다. 본고(本稿)에서 제시한 주요(主要) 개선방안(改善方案)은 다음과 같이 요약할 수 있다. 부실기업정리시(不實企業整理時) 기업존속여부의 결정은 청산시 잔액가치(殘額價値)와 존속시 자산(資産)의 현재가치(現在價値)의 상대적(相對的) 크기에 의해 결정되어야 하며, 채권(債權)-채무(債務)의 조정은 본래의 채무계약(債務契約)의 정신을 계승하는 것이 바람직하다. 둘째, 채권(債權)-채무(債務)의 조정(調整) 부채(負債)-주식(柱式)의 교환(交換)과 제(第)3자(者) 매수방식(買受方式)을 적극 활용하여야 한다. 셋째, 부실기업(不實企業)에 대한 대규모 자금지원(資金支援)이 불가피한 경우 미국(美國)의 "크라이슬러"사(社)의 경우와 같이 주식전환부(柱式轉換附) 사채형식(社債形式)을 취하는 것이 바람직하다.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.6 no.12
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• pp.244-252
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• 2006

The main results of this study can by summarized as follows. First, the incremental effect of equity to shareholders is common in the sample of this study. The sample contains 46 non-listed firms that filed for legal management and had confirmed their reorganization plans. Second, the results of the regression model analyzing the determinants of incremental equity to shareholders in legal management show that it is negative related to the solvency(total debt/total asset), firm size, and weight of claims for secured creditors and banks significantly. But corporate reorganization period(from filing to confirmation)are not significant.

• Proceedings of the Korea Contents Association Conference
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• 2006.11a
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• pp.327-332
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• 2006

Entering legal management, shareholders receive some payment. We call this phenomenon the deviations from absolute priority. This study focuses on incremental effect and determinants of equity to shareholders by wealth transfer from creditors to stockholders in the process of legal management. The main results of this study can by summarized as follows. First, the incremental effect of equity to shareholders is common in the sample of this study. The sample contains 46 non-listed firms that filed for legal management and had confirmed their reorganization plans. Second, the results of the regression model analyzing the determinants of incremental equity to shareholders in legal management show that it is negative related to the solvency(total debt/total asset), firm size, and weight of claims for secured creditors and banks significantly. but corporate reorganization period(from filing to confirmation)are not significant.

• Proceedings of the Korean Society of Computer Information Conference
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• 2020.07a
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• pp.159-162
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• 2020

배우자상속에 있어서 독일 등 다수 선진국들은 배우자 일방의 사망 시 부부재산제에 따른 청산을 통하여 생존배우자를 고정적으로 배우자상속분을 확보해줌과 동시에 철저히 보호를 하고 있는데, 우리나라 가족법에서는 다른 나라들에 비해 생존배우자에게 일정비율의 상속분만을 인정하고 있어 생존배우자의 상속권을 실질적으로 강화될 수 있는 방안이 필요하다고 본다. 특히 2014년 법무부 민법개정위원회의에서 현행법상 배우자 상속제도를 해결하기 위하여 제1008조의4 배우자의 선취분 조항과 제1008조의5 배우자의 선취분 침해에 있어서 회복청구권에 대한 조항신설이 논의 되어 국민들의 높은 호응이 있었음에도 불구하고, 생존배우자 법정상속분을 상향조정을 하게 되면 기업상속 등에 문제가 발생한다는 논리로 개정안은 입법예고도 못하는 상황에 이르게 되었다. 또한 초고령화사회에 살고 있는 생존배우자의 노후생활 보장과 직계비속과 공동으로 상속받는 경우 직계비속의 수에 따라 배우자의 상속분의 유동성 등이 문제점으로 대두되기 때문에 합리적인 생존배우자의 상속분 상향조정되는 입법안이 새롭게 시작되는 21대 국회에서 조속히 마련되기를 기원하는 차원에서 생존배우자의 효율적인 입법방안을 제시하고자 한다.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.32 no.1
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• pp.177-200
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• 2017

This writer have thus far reviewed the civil and criminal obligations of the directors of a parent company that sponsored financially troubled affiliates. What was discussed here applies to logistics companies in the same manner. Hanjin Shipping cannot expect its parent company, Korean Air to prop it up financially. If such financial aid is offered without any collateral, under Korean criminal law, the directors of the parent company bears the burden of civil and criminal responsibility. One way to get around this is to secure fairness in terms of the process and the content of aid. Fairness in terms of process refers to the board of directors making public all information and approving such aid. Fairness in terms of content refers to impartial transactions that block out any possibilities of the chairman of the corporate group acting in his private interest. In the case of Korean Air bailing out Hanjin, the meeting of board of directors were held five times and a thorough review was conducted on the risks involved in the loans being repaid or not. After the review, measures to guard against undesirable scenarios were established before finally deciding on bailing out Hanjin. As such, there are no issues. In terms of the fairness of content, too, there were practically no room for the majority shareholder or controlling shareholder to pocket profits at the expense of the company. This is because the continued aid offered to a financially troubled company (i.e. Hanjin Shipping) was a posing a burden to even the controlling shareholder. This writer argues that the concept of the interest of the entire corporate group needs to be recognized. That is, it must be recognized that the relationship of control and being controlled between parent company and affiliate company, or between affiliate companies serves a practical benefit to the ongoing concern and growth of the group and is therefore just. Moreover, the corporate group and its affiliates, as well as their directors and management must recognize that they have an obligation to prioritize the interests of the corporate group ahead of the interests of the company that they are directly associated with. As such, even if Korean Air offered a loan to Hanjin Shipping without collateral, the act cannot be treated as an offense to law, nor can the directors be accused of damages that they bear the responsibility of compensating under civil law.