• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.875-896
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• 2010

Using the difference in differences (DID) estimation method, this paper analyzes the effect of European Union's Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) on the reduction of per capita $CO_2$ emission among the twenty five participating countries. For this, the panel dataset of forty two European countries for the period 1990~2007 is constructed. Special attention is paid to the bias of the standard errors in the DID estimation due to the presence of serial correlation in the error terms. The results shows quite a robust effect of EU ETS on the reduction of per capita $CO_2$ emission among the participating countries regardless of the calculation methods of standard errors. The results also shows that the increased implicit tax rate on energy has a robust effect on the reduction of per capita $CO_2$ emission. On the contrary, the estimation results regarding the effects of per capita GDP and population density on the per capita $CO_2$ emission seem inconsistent. In particular, the environmental Kuznets curve is not statistically supported with the use of robust standard errors.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.915-961
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• 2010

This study is concerned with health damages from $SO_2$ under different assumptions on the relationship between air concentrations and their marginal health impacts. $SO_2$ concentration profiles resulting under emission caps, and a system of tradable emission allowances are compared. Using slopes and curvatures of the health response function consistent with evidence in medical literature, emission caps are shown to lead to lower aggregate damages under all considered parameters, an advantage of $26~452 million. The benefit of emission caps over tradable allowances increases with the curvature of the response function, but falls with its slope. The advantage of emission caps in terms of environmental damages is never overturned completely for the considered functional forms. The marginal damage function would have to be steeper than what the current medical evidence suggests for price instruments to outperform emission caps in terms of aggregate damages. With other welfare consequences included-emission abatement costs, consumer and producer surpluses, and government revenue-emission caps always lead to a $3.7~4.1 billion greater measure of social welfare.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.24 no.3
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• pp.489-522
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• 2015

According to Law on Allocation and Trading of GHG Allowances of 2013 in Korea as well as the 2014 National Master Plan for Korean Emissions Trading System, the System should be designed to minimize the change in the market positions of the affected firms. In this paper, we investigate how that principle might become ineffective by the ways of distributing allowances and applying different accounting methods using a Cournot duopoly model. Although the way of allocating allowances freely to firms combined with accounting them for having no values would minimize their market positions, it would not the most cost-effective way of GHG reduction since it does not provide financial market with accurate informations.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.63-101
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• 2015

Banking and borrowing under the ETS may affect the low carbon technology investment level. If the indirect implementation measures are allowed, firms can gradually adjust their carbon reduction costs between implementation periods based on their carbon reduction costs and emission price forecasts. This implies that banking and borrowing may reduce or increase the level of low carbon technology R&D investment. In an oligopoly market, the effects of the measures are quite different from the ones in a perfectly competitive market. This is because the indirect implementation measures can shift market competition in Cournot competition model. The effects of banking and borrowing on the carbon reduction R&D investments depend on emission reduction costs, marginal production costs, discount rate, initial free allocation, and the cost reduction effects of R&D investment.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.31 no.2
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• pp.261-290
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• 2022

Although market stabilization measures have been triggered in the K-ETS, carbon price is still under uncertainty. Considering Korea's 2030 enhanced reduction target announced in October 2021, it is crucial to have practical stabilization measures to appropriately deal with price uncertainty. This study examines the quantitative effects of a price collar, which is considered as a means of alleviating price uncertainty, on expected cumulative emissions and abatement costs. There are three main scenarios: carbon tax, emissions trading system, and emissions trading system with a price collar. Monte Carlo simulation was conducted to reflect uncertainty in emission. There are several results as follows: 1) In a price collar, domestic emission target is likely to be achieved with a lower expected abatement cost than other scenarios. In addition, there is a small amount of excess emissions in this research and it would be not critical(0.1% excess than target); 2) Prohibiting banking increases the expected abatement cost. This is because firms can not intertemporally reallocate allowances to match the firm's optimal emissions path; 3) With the adoption of a price collar, government's net revenue can be positive even if the government's purchase volume of emissions allowances is more than sales volume. This is because the government sells them at price ceiling and purchases them at price floor.

• Korea Petroleum Association Journal
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• s.300
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• pp.12-15
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• 2016

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.403-419
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• 2016

Cap-and-trade policies that allow firms to trade emission allowances are designed to reduce emissions at least cost and are shown to be efficient when there is no uncertainty over emissions. This paper examines how uncertainty in emissions affects firms' decisions about permit purchase and abatement. The results show that whether firms abate more under uncertainty compared to a case with no uncertainty depends on the expected penalty cost and marginal abatement cost. If the expected marginal penalty cost is greater than the marginal abatement cost, the firm will choose to reduce emissions and abate more under uncertainty. When the expected marginal penalty is greater than the marginal cost of abatement, increases in uncertainty result in reduced emissions. This paper also examines whether the order of abatement and permit trading and the realization of uncertainty affect firms' decisions. The results show that total expected emissions are the same regardless of the order of moves.

• Korean Chemical Engineering Research
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• v.60 no.4
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• pp.478-485
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• 2022

The certification performance issued through an external business is sold to companies subject to the emission trading system allocation, and the company subject to the allocation can secure the quota by converting the purchased external business certification performance into offset credits. In this methodology, when fossil fuels that used existing oil boilers (by oil type) were replaced with boilers using propane gas with a relatively low carbon content, the amount of carbon dioxide emission reduction by oil type was recognized. As an initial analysis to make up for the insufficient quota of large corporations, the amount of carbon reduction emissions and emission rights trading was calculated.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.33 no.3
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• pp.93-104
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• 2014

This study investigates price discovery between BlueNext spot and futures in EU ETS carbon emission markets using vector error correction model, GG and Hasbruck information ratio. Especially EUA is European Union Allowances traded on the Emissions Trading Scheme. This emission asset attracts and increasing attention among operators, investors and brokers on emission markets. In this study, we found BlueNext spot and EUA futures market are cointegrated. Following the preceding studies, we judged that EUA futures market contribute to the price discovery process than BlueNext spot market when this GG and Hasbrouck information ratio for BlueNext market are larger than 0.5. In other words, the futures market of EUA plays a more dominant role in price discovery than the spot market.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.493-518
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• 2005

It has been taken for 10 years since Climate Change Convention could it be made. And Kyoto Protocol will come into force as an international law as from 16. Feb 2005. As based on it, Annex I countries will implement their mitigation projects on GHG reductions and press developing countries on GHG reduction target. Korea has not duty target on it yet. But it will be held a COP(Conference of Party) on negotiation for reduction target of second commitment period. If Korea has a real duty, Industry sector should reduce GHG emissions. Then Market mechanism will be need to introduce for this. This study started having a question "Is it possible to introduce emissions trading in Korea?". To solve the problem, this study analysed GHG emissions, marginal abatement cost, market price with 11 companies of industry (about 36% of Korea emissions). minus target is impossible to implement reduction target ver base year (2002). And emissions trading scheme also can't make the market without additional policy and measures. This study suggest that it is need to import credits and give a subsidy of government to encourage it. The imported credit can reduce the demand curve within the marginal abatement cost curves. But the effectiveness of credit is not the same as continually growth. As a result, Allowing 40% credit into emissions trading market is the best to reduce costs. However, a subsidy is the little bit difference. A subsidy make marginal abatement cost curves down for itself. Giving 30% for subsidy, it is the best. Considering both of importing credits and subsidy, it is the best effects in the reducing cost for company. especially 30% is the best effects respectively. This Study show that government wants to consider designing emissions trading, encourage participants competitiveness, and encourage the early action, government has to allow credit trading and give a subsidy to participants.