• Journal of the KSME
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• v.35 no.7
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• pp.576-583
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• 1995

최근들어 우리나라의 대일무역적자폭이 확대되면서 이에 대한 대책마련이 시급한 과제로 대두 되고 있다. 1986년에 54억 달러의 적자를 나타낸 대일무역수지는 '87, '88년기간중에 적자폭이 개선되는 기미을 보이다가 '89년부터 다시 증가세로 반전하여 '94년에는 119억 달러의 기록적인 규모의 적자를 나타내었다. 이와 같은 대일무역역조는 우이 상품의 가격 ? 비가격경쟁력의 약 화에 따른 수출증가세의 둔화와 대일수입 유발형 산업구조에서 나타나는 지속적인 수입증가 때 문이며, 여기에 '90년대 이후 내수증가로 인해 새로운 수입수요가 창출되었기 때문으로 보인다. 이 글에서는 우리나라의 대일 무역역조의 현황과 구조분석을 통해 근본적인 해결책을 모색해 보고자 한다.

• Journal of the Korean Wood Science and Technology
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.43-49
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• 1986

In the light of real situation of Korean timber resources, it is no wonder that Korean economy depends on a lot of imported timber, however, we only need to draw attention how have they kept the balance of payment in the field of forest products trade for the last few decades, until the second oil crisis in 1979. Afterwards, the gap between imports and exports of forest products in terms of value has been widened so far, on account of various reasons inside and outside. However, according to national economic policy to drive more active exportation, new policy and strategy to expend world market of forest products urgently expectable in order to shorten the gap between imports and exports of forest products in the future. On the other hand, the current timber importation policy should be reconsidered, not only to support optimum domestic timber price level so as to compensate timber producers' cost but also to make suitable economic environment to induce new investments in the field of private forestry sector.

• Journal of the Economic Geographical Society of Korea
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.65-81
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• 2004

Foreign direct investment (FDI) by firms has various motives in terms of the strategy for firms' long-term growth. This research uses the case study of Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama to analyze the motives of the Korean auto industry's FDI in the U.S. and the locational factors that determined the selection of the site. This paper starts from the question of why Hyundai made the decision to invest in the U.S., which is not favorable in terms of production cost, especially considering that its exports to the U.S. have been on the increase. The results indicate that the strongest motive for the decision to invest in the U.S. was to ameliorate the trade friction between Korea and the U.S. Given that Hyundai depends on the U.S. market to a large extent for its exports, the foremost motive was to use local production in order to reduce the serious trade imbalance in the automobile sector between Korea and the U.S. in order that trade friction with the U.S. may be avoided and causes for trade disputes may be reduced. Other motives such as improving the access to local consumers were of secondary importance. After the selection of the country in which to invest, however, various factors were considered in the decision regarding the location of the plant, and incentives by local governments ultimately played a key role in this decision. The results imply that the Korean manufacturing industry's investment in the U.S. cannot be explained by traditional FDI theories and instead was greatly driven by a strategic defensive motive. In addition, the results confirm that the design of an appropriate incentive structure by host governments is important for attracting FDI.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.32 no.4
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• pp.153-195
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• 2010

The recent global financial crisis has been the outcome of, among other things, the mismatch between institutions and the reality of the market in the current global financial system. The International financial institutions (IFIs) that were designed more than 60 years ago can no longer effectively meet the challenges posed by the current global economy. While the global financial market has become integrated like a single market, there is no international lender of last resort or global regulatory body. There also has been a rapid shift in the weight of economic power. The share of the Group of 7 (G7) countries in global gross domestic product (GDP) fell and the share of emerging market economies increased rapidly. Therefore, the tasks facing us today are: (i) to reform the IFIs -mandate, resources, management, and governance structure; (ii) to reform the system such as the international monetary system (IMS), and regulatory framework of the global financial system; and (iii) to reform global economic governance. The main focus of this paper will be the IMS reform and the role of the Group of Twenty (G20) summit meetings. The current IMS problems can be summarized as follows. First, the demand for foreign reserve accumulation has been increasing despite the movement from fixed exchange rate regimes to floating rate regimes some 40 years ago. Second, this increasing demand for foreign reserves has been concentrated in US dollar assets, especially public securities. Third, as the IMS relies too heavily on the supply of currency issued by a center country (the US), it gives an exorbitant privilege to this country, which can issue Treasury bills at the lowest possible interest rate in the international capital market. Fourth, as a related problem, the global financial system depends too heavily on the center country's ability to maintain the stability of the value of its currency and strength of its own financial system. Fifth, international capital flows have been distorted in the current IMS, from EMEs and developing countries where the productivity of capital investment is higher, to advanced economies, especially the US, where the return to capital investment is lower. Given these problems, there have been various proposals to reform the current IMS. They can be grouped into two: demand-side and supply-side reform. The key in the former is how to reduce the widespread strong demand for foreign reserve holdings among EMEs. There have been several proposals to reduce the self-insurance motivation. They include third-party insurance and the expansion of the opportunity to borrow from a global and regional reserve pool, or access to global lender of last resort (or something similar). However, the first option would be too costly. That leads us to the second option - building a stronger globalfinancial safety net. Discussions on supply-side reform of the IMS focus on how to diversify the supply of international reserve currency. The proposals include moving to a multiple currency system; increased allocation and wider use of special drawing rights (SDR); and creating a new global reserve currency. A key question is whether diversification should be encouraged among suitable existing currencies, or if it should be sought more with global reserve assets, acting as a complement or even substitute to existing ones. Each proposal has its pros and cons; they also face trade-offs between desirability and political feasibility. The transition would require close collaboration among the major players. This should include efforts at the least to strengthen policy coordination and collaboration among the major economies, and to reform the IMF to make it a more effective institution for bilateral and multilateral surveillance and as an international lender of last resort. The success on both fronts depends heavily on global economic governance reform and the role of the G20. The challenge is how to make the G20 effective. Without institutional innovations within the G20, there is a high risk that its summits will follow the path of previous summit meetings, such as G7/G8.