• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.116
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• pp.465-484
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• 2010

In diesem Aufsatz werden die Si Dan(四端) in dem Mengtzu durch die Bedeutung des Abbruchs der Selbstliebe in der Kriktik der praktischen Vernunft projiziert und gelesen. Fuer Kant ist die Befriedigung der Neigungen die subjektiven Bestimmungsgruenden seiner Willkuer. Nach ihnen macht sich selbst das allgemeine Prinzip der Selbstliebe die eigene Glueckseligkeit "zum objektiven Bestimmungsgrund." Das moralische Gesetz schlaegt jenes subjektive Prinzip der Selbstliebe nieder, und das bedeutet die Si Dan(四端) in dem Mentzu. Die Si Dan sind die Bestimmungsgruende der menschlichen Wesen. Das Subjekt des moralischen Gesetzes bricht deswegen seine Selbstliebe ab und richtet sich an sozialen Gemeinschaft, weil die Selbstlibe fuer den Individualismus.

• KLA journal
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• v.38 no.6 s.307
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• pp.40-44
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• 1997

이제 우리는 전문인으로서의 도덕적 가치체계를 확립하고 행동의 지향점을 명백히 정립할 수 있는 지표를 갖게 되었다. 1997년 10월 30일 한국도서관협회가 주관하는 제 35차 전국도서관대회에서 '도서관인윤리선언'이 채택되고 만인이 지켜보는 가운데 공식적인 선포식을 갖게 됨으로 역사상 최초로 우리의 덕목과 행위지표가 창제된 것이다. 주문(主文) 7개조항과 28개 행위지표로 설정된 이 윤리선언은 도서관인의 존재양식을 극명하게 부각한 것이며 시대가 부과하고 있는 임무를 적극 수용하려는 결연한 의지가 담겨 있다. 선언문의 기본 개념은 한국의 사회적 현실이, 그리고 도서관이 처하고 있는 여건이 개선되고 시정되지 않으면 않되며, 그 일차적 책무는 우리 도서관인에게 있다는 것이다.

• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
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• v.28
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• pp.103-131
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• 2017

As the establishment of self-identity is based on 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence,' the formation of 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence' is the only road to the security and confirmation of self-existence. But given that our ordinary life almost entirely consists of actions objectifying others, the formation of 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence' is by no means easy. The formation of 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence' should be based on morality, controlling self-desire, and not objectifying others. Philosophy based on a priori reasoning describes self-control over selfdesire as the domination of the body through a priori reasoning. But this practical philosophy cannot present a self-evidential internal motivation behind moral actions. Due to this, the application of moral order given by a priori reasoning in response to reality is likely to be reinterpreted on basis of self-interest. With regards to this, the 'propensity towards sympathy' is given as new moral norm. The 'propensity towards sympathy' as emotion is direct and consistent given that feeling occurs prior to thinking. The 'propensity towards sympathy' is intuitive in the sense that it is an instinctual response preceeding a reasoned judgment. The 'propensity towards sympathy,' as a natural moral emotion, is self-validating given that all human beings know it and practice it. But previous studies on the 'propensity towards sympathy' have an obvious limitation because they adopt phenomenological approaches to the 'propensity towards sympathy' which eschew the investigation of morality. Though they present the 'propensity towards sympathy' as a natural emotion based on body rather than reason, they do not philosophically explain the 'propensity towards sympathy.' Thus the 'propensity towards sympathy' as a natural moral emotion is likely to be interpreted as a subjective and relative moral norm. This paper philosophically explains that the 'propensity towards sympathy' is a universal moral norm on the basis of Merleau-Ponty's 'flesh.' 'Flesh' is formed as the entanglement between oneself and others and presents the 'propensity towards sympathy' as its philosophical basis. In other words, 'flesh' formed as the mixture or entanglement between oneself and others is the material foundation upon which one can activate the 'propensity towards sympathy.' This paper's approach to the 'propensity of sympathy' can be desribed as a phenomenological approach to the 'propensity towards sympathy' as a universal moral norm.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.137
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• pp.57-79
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• 2016

The purpose of this paper is to explain MacIntyre's critique of moral pluralism of modern society and reveal the limits of his critique of liberalism. It is a distinctive feature of the social and cultural order that we inhabit that disagreements over central moral issues are peculiarly unsettleable. Debates concerned with the value of human life such as those over abortion and euthanasia, or about distributive justice and property rights, or about war and peace degenerate into confrontations of assertion and counter-assertion because the protagonists of rival positions invoke incommensurable forms of moral assertion against each other. We usually call this situation 'modern moral pluralism' and concede as the natural outcome of the activities of human reason under free institution. But in After Virtue, MacIntyre vigorously criticizes modern moral pluralism. The main cause he took which brought about this state of affairs was the failure of 'the Enlightenment project'. According to MacIntyre, the Enlightenment project which has dominated philosophy for the past three hundred years promised a conception of rationality independent of historical and social context, and independent of any specific understanding of man's nature or purpose. But not only has that promise in fact been unfulfilled, the project is itself fundamentally flawed and the promise could never be fulfilled. In consequence, modern moral and political thought are in a state of disarray from which they can be rescued only if we revert to an Aristotelian paradigm, with its essential commitment, and construct an account of practical reason premised on that commitment. But one of the deepest difficulties with the argument of After Virtue is that the very extent of its critique of the modern world seems to cast doubt on the possibility of any realistic revival under the conditions of modernity of the Aristotelianism which MacIntyre advocates. Especially when we consider we are not only the characters found in our narratives but also we ourselves are the author of our own narratives. Moral pluralism is not seen as disaster but rather as the natural outcome of the activities of human reason under enduring free institutions.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.27
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• pp.417-446
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• 2009

This study was to review the features of the preventive dimension in connection with adolescent deviation on the basis of the morality and ethics held by Confucian doctrine. To find solutions to the problems of adolescent deviation is never easy. As adolescent deviation always does occur, it is important to consider the methods that can minimize and prevent it. The traditional society of Korea laid weight on the education and training in the aspect of preventive measure against such adolescent deviation by emphasizing moral edification and realization of spiritual understanding for it. In this paper, the researcher tried to understand the problem situations by examining the image of such deviation and its type as well as the method on response thereto targeting the young generation of Korea. In addition, the researcher analyzed how the adolescent was recognized in the traditional society that was established on the Confucian values, and moral standards that applied to them, and the process of education as well. Through the moral concepts of Confucianism that were revealed in the Doctrine of the Mean (中庸, pronounced 'Jungyong' in Korean) in particular, the researcher sought the possibility of education on morality and ethics that will be able to prevent adolescent deviation. This study suggests that the morality and ethics held by Confucian doctrine can prevent adolescent deviation and open a new horizon of ethics education.

• Korean Architects
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• s.558
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• pp.150-157
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• 2015

대한건축사협회 50년 동안 제도의 생성과 흐름을 이해하는데 먼저 제도란 무엇인지에 대한 이해가 필요하다. 제도는 규범의 복합체라고 한다. 규범의 내용이 형식화되고 정리되어 공권력을 수반하는 법률에서부터 형식화되지 않은 채 일상생활에서의 막연한 약속과 같은 집단의 도덕적 기준이나 관습에 이르기까지 그 범위는 광범하다. 즉 정치 경제 교육 제도 등에서부터 도덕이나 언어와 같은 것까지 포함한다. 이 제도가 존재함으로써 사회를 구성하는 모든 개인의 행동은 얼마간 틀에 박히고 방향이 부여되기 때문에 사람들을 시행착오의 낭비를 절약하여 큰 불편 없이 어느 정도 자동적으로 행동할 수 있다. 이런 점에서 제도는 사회질서 유지를 그 중요한 기능으로 하는 한편 모든 개인의 자유를 다소나마 규제하고 부자연스럽게 하는 측면도 있다. 모든 개인에 대한 제한이나 속박이 심해져 정상적인 대다수의 개인의 생활요구가 자해되고 억제되는 정도가 지나치게 되면 그 사회의 가치체계나 규범이 흔들리기 시작하며, 마침내는 기존의 제도가 바뀌고 새로운 제도가 생기게 된다고 한다.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.131
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• pp.273-301
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• 2014

This study aims to reconstruct Leibniz's theodicy. Theodicy is to defense of the highest wisdom of the creator against the charge which reason brings against it for whatever is the evil in the world. For this defense, Leibniz created his own new kind of concepts: the principle of sufficient reason, the principle of perfection, the best of all possible worlds, moral necessity. Leibniz's theodicy is developed as following. Most good and wisest God created this world freely by moral necessity. God's will was to choose the goods antecedently. But God's will could not create goods only. For God's final purpose is to create the best. For this reason, it happens that the evils may come about by concomitance, and as a result of other greater goods. Therefore the evils are necessary in the world. And evil consists in imperfection. Man has free will as God. Freedom, according to Leibniz, consists in intelligence, which involves a clear knowledge of the object of deliberation. Man has freedom, but man's freedom is imperfect. Evil is originated in man's imperfect freedom.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.116
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• pp.281-312
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• 2010

Der vorliegende Beitrag problematisiert die Zeichen einer Zeit, in der nach der 'Wende des Sprachparadigmas' alle Prozesse einer Posttranszendenz, die in der heutigen philosophischen Problemsituation versucht werden, $bel{\ddot{a}}chelt$ werden, der Relativismus, Partikularismus und Skeptizismus $verst{\ddot{a}}rkt$ wird, und als Resultat die Kritik, Ablehnung und das Desinteresse an der Ideologie der Vernunft und Wahrheit sich verbreitet. Ich werde daher umgekehrt gerade an diesem Punkt ansetzen und ${\ddot{u}}ber$ die Notwendigkeit und Dringlichkeit der Rehabilitierung der "$Realit{\ddot{a}}t$ einer moralischen Vernunft" nachdenken. Zweck dieses Beitrags ist es, in Zusammenhang mit der Rehabilitierung der $Realit{\ddot{a}}t$ einer moralischen Vernunft, aufzuzeigen, welche theoretische Erkenntnis bzw.moralische Erkenntnis wahr ist, d.h., dass ein 'bewiesenes', da 'objektiv gerechtfertigtes' Argument existiert. $Daf{\ddot{u}}r$ werde ich als erstes auf das Problem der Relativistischen und Skeptizistischen Anhaltspunkte philosophisch eingehen(2), zur ${\ddot{U}}berwindung$ dieser Anhaltspunkte eine Rechtfertigung der rationelen und moralischen $Begr{\ddot{u}}ndung$ versuchen(3). In Folge soll betrachtet werden, dass die Rechtfertigung der rational moralischen $Begr{\ddot{u}}ndung$ mit dem Problem der $Letztbegr{\ddot{u}}ndung$ in enger Verbindung steht(4), und nachdem darauf hingewiesen wird, dass dies durch eine Konfrontation mit der Fallibilismus These zu erkenntnistheoretisch objektiver $G{\ddot{u}}ltigkeit$ gelangt(5), werde ich den Beitrag $abschlie{\ss}en$(6).

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.57
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• pp.9-30
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• 2018

The paradigm of existence and recognition was changed in the context of modernity in Choi Han-gi's thought, in which the resource of all things and all affairs was not li but ki and li could be guessed from ki. And there are lis in the sphere of recognition as well as in that of existence in Choi Han-gi's thought, which might be different from traditional thought system such as Neo-Confutionism. li is called Yuhaenguili in his ontological theory and Chucheukuili as one epistemological part. At anyhow there are many lis, which may be approached as the meaning of mechanism, in his philosophy. Besides there are, not only ontologically but also epistemologically, energetic factors, named as Unhwaki, whch are generating, moving, changing and altering. In his Kihak as an ki categorical thought, above all one's experience is of importance. He believed moral act, for example the expose of saving mind that was called Cheukeunjisim by Mencius, could be derived from social experience or contact. And he thought that the recognition of moral act might be achieved by the action of mysterious energy names as sinki of the essence of mind. Like these aspects, all things and all ones have their active, movable, and changeable natures in the sphere of both existence and recognition in Choi Han-gi's thought. In this way he got out of the previous ideas and presented practical and modern way of life to us.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.148
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• pp.1-27
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• 2018

The 10th constitution established in 1987 serves as the theoretical foundation of democracy in South Korea in the 21st century. Respect for human rights, resistance to injustice, and equality consciousness inherent in this constitution do not conflict with the content of Confucian philosophy. This means that the spirit of the constitution of South Korea in the 21st century was formed under the influence of the idea of democracy and Confucian philosophy. However, the 10th constitution attaches importance to the idea of the 'Basic free and democratic order', which was accepted in the Yushin constitution and inherited by the military forces. The Yushin constitution was affected by liberalism that prioritizes freedom over equality rather than supporting the compatibility between freedom and equality. Therefore, policies to expand the interests of the bourgeoisie rather than public welfare or the interests of the public have been implemented frequently. In particular, during the Lee Myeong-bak and Park Geun-hye regimes, many unequal phenomena were mass-produced. Confucian philosophy in the 21st century critically sees this unequal society. Confucian philosophy thinks that a sense of relative deprivation plays a role of alienating humans and emphasizes the importance of equal relationships. In addition, this constitution emphasizes the rule of law. However, the rule of law attaches importance to positive laws when the spirit of the constitution that contains natural law is applied to reality through systems. This rejects autonomous judgments and choices while inducing reliance on heteronomy. These heteronomous laws as such are accompanied by forcibleness. The positive laws as such can degrade humans into passive beings that indiscriminately adapt themselves to frames already set instead of active beings that think freely and creatively. Confucian philosophy regards and criticizes the rule of law as a system that makes humans into a means. Confucian philosophy regards humans as moral beings instead of tools. Confucian philosophy seeks to build a healthy society through morality accomplished through conscious realization of the principles of life. Confucian philosophy regards humans as originally free beings. Therefore, human beings are autonomous beings, not heteronomous beings. According to Confucian philosophy, humans beings that can realize the morality contained in their inner side by themselves to responsibly carry out their own judgments and choices. Therefore, Confucian philosophy, which considers human beings as beings to be trusted instead of beings to be distrusted, attaches importance to the realization of human decency through edification rather than by punishment through the law. This means that human values cannot be kept by the heteronomy termed positive laws but the identity of humans can be maintained by voluntary choices and judgments. As such, the comment of Confucian philosophy on the problems of liberal democracy and positive laws contained in the 10th constitution can be helpful in essentially solving the contradictions of modern South Korean society.