• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.59
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• pp.287-312
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• 2018

Confucianism which pursues the right relationship between person and person, depicts the ideal that moral individuals contribute to community development. In the 16th century, Toegye Yi Hwang, the authority of Korean Confucianism, reflected his educational intentions and interests and made the whole of the body of Confucianism and the whole process of the study into a series of 10 paintings 'Ten Diagrams of Sage Learning'. The purpose of the education which is claimed in the 'Ten Diagrams of Sage Learning' is to become a saint, and it ultimately coincides with the purpose of moral education which is to be introspective and practical moral man. The whole theme of 'Ten Diagrams of Sage Learning' is related to revealing the principles of humanity and morality in order to restore human nature on the basis of piety. Piety(敬) is also a purpose and a method of self-discipline, and is the main content. The method of education for traditional confucianism is aiming for the organic integration of purpose, content and method of education and reveals the consistency of the combination of knowledge and behavior in content and method. Exploring the universal value of traditional culture and re-raising moral culture that is important in traditional education is to discuss that what is valid for the present and the future is derived from the past tradition. That may be useful in solving today's educational problems. Especially, it is very meaningful to adopt a reflective approach to cultivate talented people who can 'realize oneself' and 'care for the community' which is the ultimate goal of education through analyzing the essence of moral education pursued by traditional education.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.144
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• pp.339-369
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• 2017

Mengzi's biological analogies of man's moral tendency need to be analyzed in order to understand his ethical perspective because he uses lots of analogies to advocate his own moral naturalism. The biological analogies he uses are composed of human body, plant's seeds and sprouts. First, Mengzi thinks that human beings have inborn moral nature as if our bodies are given and plants can be grown from their seeds. His ethical approach to define morality in terms of natural properties such as the Four Sprouts(四端) causes a philosophical debate with Gaozi who thinks that morality cannot be described by natural property. Second, we have a moral preference as if we have a physical desire. This kind of moral sentimentalism emphasizing the preference is continued to Jeong Yakyong's ethical theory that nature is a preference(性嗜好說). Third, if we examine our preference and desire, then we can find that the moral preference is more valuable than the physical desire. Fourth, the biological analogies accepts monism that mind and body are composed of material force(氣). For this reason, the innate moral tendency is manifested on body such as a facial expression, a visceral reaction, and affect. Finally, Mengzi's theory of Four Sprouts causes two different interpretation. One is Zhuxi's interpretation that Duan端 is the visible end(緖) of a thread out of pack, the other is Jeong Yakyong's interpretation that Duan端 is a starting point(始) to cultivate virtues. While Zhuxi considers the Four Sprouts as a clue to find virtues in one's mind, Jeong Yakyong believes that we can cultivate our virtues by preserving the Four Sprouts.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.42
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• pp.105-131
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• 2014

The moral categories in the Mengzi have a close affinity with those of Kongzi. Mengzi fostered the Kongzi's teaching on virtuous rule and moral government, and taught benevolent government based on the virtue of benevolence. Mengzi set up a basis for Confucian teaching on human nature, and his teaching of the essential goodness of human nature has been accepted by most Confucian intellectuals. This study explores the Mengzi's teaching of moral education focussing on his instructional method to expand the goodness of human nature. Instructional method refers to educator-centered transmission of values, and it concerns mainly on how to deliver the educational goal and content meaningfully to the educatee. The main concerns of Mengzi's instructional method are teaching-standard setup, delivery of lecture key points, understanding of students' talent and situation, and encouragement of students' initiative. These points are all based on Mengzi's assertion of good human nature, and aim at forming a ideal personality. Confucian ideas of education lie in raising the well-rounded person through moral education. The well-rounded person can be characterized by noble men and sages with benevolence and righteousness. This means that the ultimate goal of well-rounded education is to lead people to attain the sublime moral stage through education.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.137
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• pp.57-79
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• 2016

The purpose of this paper is to explain MacIntyre's critique of moral pluralism of modern society and reveal the limits of his critique of liberalism. It is a distinctive feature of the social and cultural order that we inhabit that disagreements over central moral issues are peculiarly unsettleable. Debates concerned with the value of human life such as those over abortion and euthanasia, or about distributive justice and property rights, or about war and peace degenerate into confrontations of assertion and counter-assertion because the protagonists of rival positions invoke incommensurable forms of moral assertion against each other. We usually call this situation 'modern moral pluralism' and concede as the natural outcome of the activities of human reason under free institution. But in After Virtue, MacIntyre vigorously criticizes modern moral pluralism. The main cause he took which brought about this state of affairs was the failure of 'the Enlightenment project'. According to MacIntyre, the Enlightenment project which has dominated philosophy for the past three hundred years promised a conception of rationality independent of historical and social context, and independent of any specific understanding of man's nature or purpose. But not only has that promise in fact been unfulfilled, the project is itself fundamentally flawed and the promise could never be fulfilled. In consequence, modern moral and political thought are in a state of disarray from which they can be rescued only if we revert to an Aristotelian paradigm, with its essential commitment, and construct an account of practical reason premised on that commitment. But one of the deepest difficulties with the argument of After Virtue is that the very extent of its critique of the modern world seems to cast doubt on the possibility of any realistic revival under the conditions of modernity of the Aristotelianism which MacIntyre advocates. Especially when we consider we are not only the characters found in our narratives but also we ourselves are the author of our own narratives. Moral pluralism is not seen as disaster but rather as the natural outcome of the activities of human reason under enduring free institutions.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.131
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• pp.165-197
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• 2014

In this paper, I investigate on the human nature in philosophy of Wang Yang-Ming and Buddhism from a Kantian point of view. The core argument of the philosophy of Wang Yang-Ming, Buddhism and Kant is that all human beings have the pure abilities a priori to overcome themselves, to realize their own potentialities. This is called immanent transcendence. At this time human beings can be free. Kant, Wang Yang-Ming and Buddhism claim that all human beings themselves will overcome their desires from their mind and body through the immanent transcendence, reflection and contemplation on their own. When we give up the external knowledges, throw away obsessions with the selfish desires and go back to our inside, we can see our original nature. To have an insight into this inner nature, to respect the moral law a priori, this is to overcome the ourselves, and to be a Grate Man(聖人) and a Buddha. This way is the only way to be a Grate Man and a Buddha. The main proposition of Wang Yang-Ming's philosophy is expressed 'There are no things without mind.'(心外無物) The core of Kant's transcendental philosophy is called the Copernican Revolution by himself. Copernican Revolution means the transition from the object-centered epistemology to the subject-centered epistemology. 'Innate Knowing'(良知) and 'Perform Innate Knowing'(致良知), 'All human beings have the mind of Buddha'(一切衆生悉有佛性) contain the apriority, immanence of Moral Law. In this respect, the theory of Innate Knowing in Wang Yang-Ming and mind of Buddha in Buddhism, pure Moral Law in Kant has the same structure grounded in subjectivity. Even if we have the mind of Buddha, innate Knowing, moral law a priori, the reason why we don't know our original nature is that we fall into the obsessions with selfish desires, and that we have inclination to external interests. So the moment you see our original nature, ordinary people themselves turn into a Buddha. These changes and transitions are immanent transcendence. All human beings have the ability to do this changes and transitions. Buddha does not exist outside of us, but it exists with our reflections on our human nature. Buddha can not existed without our insight into the our innate Ego. Where there is our original nature, there is a Buddha. So Buddha is called the another name of the original figure of human beings.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.142
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• pp.1-25
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• 2017

Kant's doctrine of virtue shows how an actor should behave morally in an individual situation with moral law defines the limits of human action. There is latitude for action in the course of formulating the maxims of action by an actor. And moral judgement, as Aristotle's Pronesis, is very important in the latitude for action. In the doctrine of virtue, Kant suggests two kinds of duty of virtue: one's own perfeciton as an obligatory end, and the happiness to others as an obligatory end-and raises the question of casuistics for each. However, this was the practice and training for the human moral life by application of the moral law. In particular, Kant saw that ethics does not give laws for action, but only give laws for the maxims of action, and further intended to realize the practice in a proper way of seeking truth through casuistical questions. Thus, Kant points out that the casuistic is related only to ethics in a fragmentary way and is added to ethics only as a comment on the system. According to Kant, virtue and judgment are inevitable to apply categorical imperative in the empirical and realistic world. In other words, virtue and judgment are necessary to enable people who are likely to act in accordance to inclination to live a moral life in accordance with the command of reason. Thus Kant saw that in order to take wide duty into narrow ones, human beings must not only have to cultivate virtues as a strong power of will, but also to exercise judgment. In addition, the distinction between duty of law(narrow obligation) and duty of virtue(wide obligation) is dependent on whether there is a latitude for action in the application of both duties. So the role of virtue and training of judgement is very important in the latitude for action that occurs in the process of formalizing actor's maxims. In detail, as the duty is wider, so man's obligation to action is more imperfect, but the closer to narrow duty(Law) he brings the maxim of observing this duty(in his attitude of will), so much the more perfect is his virtuous action. Thus, it was an effort to show how Kant's best moral principles, that is categorical imperative could be applied to the real world at the time of criticism. Of course, even if it is difficult to assess Kant's efforts as successful, criticizing Kant's ethics as 'formal', 'abstract', or 'monologous' is not persuasive because of critics did not understand his ethics as a whole.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.126
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• pp.423-461
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• 2013

The researcher conducted this study to investigate what special meaning does an emotion experience program, a Confucianism philosophical thinking, has for Sunwoo(善友), and based on what structure it unveils a good clue of Sunwoo(善友); and to reveal the structure of philosophical counselling treatment simultaneously. Thus, the researcher performed an "emotion experience program for 3 weeks, targeting 22 research subjects and collected the data of their experience. As for date analysis, a phenomenological analytic method of Colaizzi (1978), one of qualitative research methods was used. It was because the phenomenological analytic method of Colaizzi was suggested to derive common properties of whole research subjects rather than those of individual research subject, which could help develop the theories of philosophical counselling treatment. The finding of the analysis revealed the intrinsic structure of the phenomenon which the research subjects experienced through "an emotion experience program" was reborn as 'unfamiliarity and suspicion', 'burden', 'recognition of a method and a need', 'self-reflection', 'awareness of nature and the correct behavior', 'joy and pleasure', and 'rebirth as a valuable existence'. These were categorized to examine the structure of philosophical counselling treatment. The findings revealed the treatment went through the precesses: 'the start of learning and intentional guidance', 'reflection', 'enlightenment', 'Sugichiin(修己治人)', 'freedom', and 'transcendence. Considering the purpose of Confucian philosophy is living valuable life and the accomplishment of objectives is based on the transcendence, realizing preallotment and putting it into practice, the structure of emotion experience by the research subjects is appropriate for the purpose of Confucian philosophy and the process of objective accomplishment.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.68
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• pp.283-317
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• 2017

Issues over morality and profit usually address relations between moral principles and material gains. In the history of traditional Oriental philosophy, discussions about them were called "Yi-Li zhi bian." The ideas of Confucius and Mencius also contain various discussions about Yi-Li. Both Confucius and Mencius defined Yi as a value concept to represent "natural," "appropriate" or "just" and regarded Yi as an external moral principle on the one hand and an internal moral emotion on the other hand. They had, at the same time, differences, as well. While Confucius placed importance on the external and acquired nature of Yi as a goal of morality, Mencius argued for the internal and innate nature of Yi as the nature of morality partially while recognizing its externality overall. Such Yi is a general term for subjective moral emotions and objective moral principles. Li was a concept of fact to represent "gain," "profit" or "profit-making." Both of them were against private interest and emphasized public interest. As for their differences, Confucius was positive about Li to some degree by saying "One should think of Yi when making profit," whereas Mencius was almost negative about Li and perceived it to be for Yi by saying "One should give up even his own life for Yi." He meant Li's dependence on Yi and also Yi's absoluteness for Ri. Both of them found a mix of opposite features in Yi such as internality and externality, subjectivity and objectivity, specificity and generality, and uniqueness and universality and also in Li such as individuality and specialty and public and private interest. Those features have both disadvantages including theoretical irrationality and logical contradiction and advantages including ideological diversity and conceptual polysemy. If efforts are made to avoid their disadvantages and highlight their advantages, they will provide some elements to consult in the creation of new global ethics required today when East and West are becoming one. In the modern society, the Yi-Li issues can be divided into the issues of morality and economy, personal and social profit, and moral ideal and material gain. If these modern Yi-Li issues are combined with the traditional Yi-Li issues, two paths will emerge over the order of Yi-Li. Of the many perceptions of Yi-Li issues of Confucius and Mencius, the idea of "Yi First, Li Later" can be very useful for creating a new ethics theory to represent "humanism" that we all need today when everyone considers their own pursuit of profit and satisfaction of needs as the best values. Sound Yi-Li relations will be possible only through Yi's orientation toward externality based on internality and Li's pursuit of private interest on the premise of public interest according to the spirit of "Yi First, Li Later."

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.116
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• pp.437-464
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• 2010

The article, focusing on the theory of Zhong-He, sheds a new light on the philosophy of Daizhen. The theory of Zhong-He, according to the philosophical system of Zhuxi, serves as the theoretical foundation in erecting the apriori moral nature and guiding mental cultivation of subjects. Daizhen, on the contrary, criticizes the doctrine of Zhonghe in Zhuxi's philosophy as it produces negative side-effects of moral dogmatism. Zhuxi's doctrine, according to Daizhen, as it reduce the origin of morality to apriori condition of consciousness and delimit the range of cultivation to psychological realm of subjects, restricts moral subjects in the fortress of their own subjectivity. In this vein of his criticism, Daizhen attempts new interpretation on Zhonghe. The character Zhong (中), according to him, does not refer to apriori moral state or metaphysical moral substance as it does in the doctrine of Zhuxi. On the contrary, it denotes the state in which diverse existent beings are placed in their own position by their own dispositions. Similarly, the other character He (和) does not refer to the condition where an individual's consciousness is in equilibrium, but to the process of achieving the harmony of entire society in which diverse existent beings are communicating to each other. With his novel interpretation of the theory of Zhong-He, Daizhen could dissolve the tradition of Weifa (未發) and moral subjectivism in Zhuxi's philosophy and provide a way of establishing reciprocal communication and harmony between various individuals. It is in his ethics of rational mutual understanding where the significance of Daizhen's philosophy should be found.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.105
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• pp.49-74
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• 2008

Le but de notre recherche est $d^{\prime}{\acute{e}}clairer$ la nature du $d{\acute{e}}passement$ de soi aux actes humaines dnas le Thomisme. Dans le Thomisme la nature humaine qui a la raison et la $volont{\acute{e}}$ a une $intentionnalit{\acute{e}}$ ver la fin ultime. De sorte que les actes humaines qui $corr{\grave{e}}spondent$ cette nature humaine a un $caract{\grave{e}}re$ du $d{\acute{e}}passement$ de soi visant toujours plus que le $pr{\acute{e}}sent$. Le fondement de cet acte du $d{\acute{e}}passement$ de soi est $l^{\prime}{\hat{a}}me$ rationelle qui est la forme substantielle de l'homme et de soi subsistante. Chez st. Thomas ce $caract{\grave{e}}re$ du $d{\acute{e}}passement$ a trois ${\acute{e}}taps$ distinctes : (1)le $d{\acute{e}}passement$ dans l'ordre du $progr{\grave{e}}s$ naturel (2)le $d{\acute{e}}passement$ de soi dans l'ordre morale (3)le $d{\acute{e}}passement$ de soi dans l'ordre de la religion. Le $d{\acute{e}}passement$ dans l'ordre du $progr{\grave{e}}s$ naturel apparaît d'abord au $caract{\grave{e}}re$ de $l^{\prime}{\hat{a}}me$ rationelle. St. Thomas $d{\acute{e}}finit$ les vertus rationelles comme $^{\prime}pl{\acute{e}}nitude$ dans le $f{\acute{e}}blesse$, parce qu'il $consid{\grave{e}}re$ la vertu rationelle comme $finalit{\acute{e}}$ des $facult{\acute{e}}s$ du sens $ext{\acute{e}}rieur$. L'homme par le sens $ext{\acute{e}}rieur$ reçoit des $esp{\grave{e}}ces$ sensibles(especies sensibilis), et $poss{\grave{e}}de$ les images. Puis cette images sensible devenant la $r{\acute{e}}alit{\acute{e}}$ spirituelle sous forme du $m{\acute{e}}moire$ et du souvenir, devient aussi la partie de son existence. Donc chez st. Thomas la vertue rationnelle n'est pas simplement un $facult{\acute{e}}$ $sp{\acute{e}}culative$, mais elle est dans l'ordre du devenir et du $pl{\acute{e}}nitude$. A cette raison st. Thomas compare la raison(ratio) comme $g{\acute{e}}n{\acute{e}}ration$(generatio) et l'intelleigence(intellectus) comme ${\hat{e}}tre$(esse). C'est-${\grave{a}}$-dire la raison $d{\acute{e}}passe$ le sensible et l'intelligence $d{\acute{e}}passe$ la raison. Le $d{\acute{e}}passement$ de soi dans l'ordre morale $li{\acute{e}}$ au $progr{\grave{e}}s$ de la conscience. Chez st. Thomas la perception de l'objet $ext{\acute{e}}rieur$ ayant pour but d'avoir conscience de soi, se perfectionne ${\grave{a}}$ ceci. D'avoir conscience de soi signifie d'avoir $l^{\prime}identit{\acute{e}}$ de soi, et de-$l{\grave{a}}$ apparaît l'acte moral en tnat qu'acte $sp{\acute{e}}cifique$ humain. La raison pour laquelle la vie morale elle-$m{\hat{e}}me$ a un $caract{\grave{e}}$ du $d{\acute{e}}passement$, c'est que l'acte humaine qui corresfonde ${\grave{a}}$ $l^{\prime}identit{\acute{e}}$ du soi est une vie qui vise toujours plus que le $pr{\acute{e}}sent$ ou $l^{\prime}id{\acute{e}}al$. Quant au problem du $d{\acute{e}}passement$ dans l'ordre de la religion, chez st. Thomas en raison de $l^{\prime}affinit{\acute{e}}$ entre Dieu et l'homme, $o{\grave{u}}$ il y a des vertues infuses(virtutes infusas), il y a une sorte du $d{\acute{e}}passement$ religieux. Car ces vertues infuses signifie la communication entre Dieu(${\hat{E}}tre$ absolu) et l'homme(${\hat{e}}tre$ fine) et cela signifie le $d{\acute{e}}passement$ de l'humain vers le divin. Cette $id{\acute{e}}e$ thomiste permet de penser que $o{\grave{u}}$ il y a un $d{\acute{e}}passement$ de soi dans la vie religuse d'une personne, il y a une intervention $r{\acute{e}}elle$ de la providence divine. Cette $pens{\acute{e}}e$ thomiste sera alors un $caract{\grave{e}}$ $r{\acute{e}}aliste$ face ${\grave{a}}$ la $pens{\acute{e}}e$ $id{\acute{e}}aliste$ qui n'admette que le $d{\acute{e}}passement$ absolu comme $d{\acute{e}}passement$ religieux.