• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.146
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• pp.1-24
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• 2018

The purpose of this paper is to explore the meaning of theoretical ethics regarding bioethics. First, I explore the meanings and limitations of the bioethics domain for 'the principle of equal consideration of interests' and the 'preference utilitarianism' concepts Singer presents. Secondly, I emphasize the significance of Kant's ethics in the domain of bioethics. Lastly, I suggest that Aristotle's virtue ethics should be realized in the domain of bioethics. Furthermore, I would like to suggest the meaning of human life through this. Singer's argument brings up a new topic about the meaning of evolved life not considered in the history of traditional ethics. He presented undeniable opinions about human dignity that he took for granted. In addition, it is assessed that the scope extension for the life respect target has been reasonably achieved. Contrary to this, Kant's ethics explains the meaning of human dignity based on its metaphysical meaning. Furthermore, it provides an appropriate orientation for human life. Embracing their claims is not sufficient to explain the meaning of Good Life. The meaning of Good Life is likely to be resolved through the application of Aristotle's virtue ethics. The meaning of a being of substance is living and furthermore, it is inherent to being itself.

• Journal of The Korean Association of Information Education
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.589-603
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• 2010

Game addiction is the one of side effects from current knowledge-based society, So it is very important to find students with game addiction and treat them as early as possible. In this paper, first of all, a measure scale is developed for diagnosing game addiction. The scale is made based on the literature reviews. Also, a game model is developed based on virtues education. The proposed model has the following characteristics. First, it can induce active participation of students. Second, it helps students find and decide a moral standard related to online game addiction for themselves. Third, students can learn a moral standard naturally through narratives related to various real-life situations. The followings are concluded after applying the proposed game to elementary school students with game addiction. First, game addiction is relieved for those students, specially for "high risk" and "potential" groups. Second, the proposed game can improve respect to others and individual responsibility.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.142
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• pp.1-25
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• 2017

Kant's doctrine of virtue shows how an actor should behave morally in an individual situation with moral law defines the limits of human action. There is latitude for action in the course of formulating the maxims of action by an actor. And moral judgement, as Aristotle's Pronesis, is very important in the latitude for action. In the doctrine of virtue, Kant suggests two kinds of duty of virtue: one's own perfeciton as an obligatory end, and the happiness to others as an obligatory end-and raises the question of casuistics for each. However, this was the practice and training for the human moral life by application of the moral law. In particular, Kant saw that ethics does not give laws for action, but only give laws for the maxims of action, and further intended to realize the practice in a proper way of seeking truth through casuistical questions. Thus, Kant points out that the casuistic is related only to ethics in a fragmentary way and is added to ethics only as a comment on the system. According to Kant, virtue and judgment are inevitable to apply categorical imperative in the empirical and realistic world. In other words, virtue and judgment are necessary to enable people who are likely to act in accordance to inclination to live a moral life in accordance with the command of reason. Thus Kant saw that in order to take wide duty into narrow ones, human beings must not only have to cultivate virtues as a strong power of will, but also to exercise judgment. In addition, the distinction between duty of law(narrow obligation) and duty of virtue(wide obligation) is dependent on whether there is a latitude for action in the application of both duties. So the role of virtue and training of judgement is very important in the latitude for action that occurs in the process of formalizing actor's maxims. In detail, as the duty is wider, so man's obligation to action is more imperfect, but the closer to narrow duty(Law) he brings the maxim of observing this duty(in his attitude of will), so much the more perfect is his virtuous action. Thus, it was an effort to show how Kant's best moral principles, that is categorical imperative could be applied to the real world at the time of criticism. Of course, even if it is difficult to assess Kant's efforts as successful, criticizing Kant's ethics as 'formal', 'abstract', or 'monologous' is not persuasive because of critics did not understand his ethics as a whole.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.142
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• pp.323-347
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• 2017

In the 1980s, traditional analytic epistemology was abuzz with proposed solutions to the Gettier problem, responses to skepticism, newly minted objections to a variety of internalist and externalist theories of justification, and enthusiastic criticisms of foundationalism and coherentism. Debates over competing analyses of knowledge and justification raged. Since then, virtue epistemology has become a diverse and increasingly well-established field. I think that most researchers in Korea will feel the name "virtue epistemology" itself as strange or unfamiliar. It is primarily because virtue epistemology has a brief history. So, virtue epistemology did not present many opportunities for its introduction to Korean researchers. Another reason is that the name of "virtue epistemology" itself has a strangeness or unfamiliarity. Since the concept of "virtue" has mainly been used in moral or ethical contexts, virtue ethics is very familiar to most people. In contrast, the name of "virtue epistemology", combining "virtue" with "epistemology", is strange to many people. This paper primarily aims to introduce virtue epistemology in our philosophical society. What is it? How is virtue epistemology different from traditional analytic epistemology? What is the nature of virtues in virtue epistemology? What are the advantages, urgent tasks, and prospects of virtue epistemology? Focusing on these questions, I seek to understand the background to the rise of virtue epistemology, the differences and relations between virtue epistemology and traditional epistemology, and the nature of virtue and the main theories in virtue epistemology.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.144
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• pp.371-398
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• 2017

The emotions that Aristotle treats in Rhetoric II 2-11 are broadly divided into two groups: the one is the so-called basic emotions, the other the emotions that are opposed to them. The reason that he draws attention to the opposite emotions is that, for example, angry judges must be placed in an opposite state. The question is whether the calmness treated in Rhetoric II 3 is an emotion. Because it is treated in the Ethics as a virtue and thus as a trait of character. How is calmness distinguished as an emotion from that as a virtue? And in what way is it opposed to anger? In short, what is the calmness, inasmuch as it is an emotion? This is the question which is the task of this work. The thesis asserted in this paper is that calmness is the disposition to do a service for another that results from praise or some other act that enhances a belief in one's worth. To substantiate the thesis, the following questions are discussed. The first question is whether the calmness could also contain proportions of pleasure and pain. The question also arises whether it could be also treated properly according to the standard 'target person-intentional object-mental state'. Finally, there is a comparison between the concept of calmness in the Ethics and Rhetoric, so that the latter concept places itself in the foreground.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.141
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• pp.63-84
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• 2017

In the twentieth century Anscombe's 1958 article "Modern Moral Philosophy" argued that duty-based conceptions of morality are conceptually incoherent for they are based on the idea of a "law without a lawgiver". Concepts such as "morally ought", "morally obligated", and "morally right" require a legislator as the source of moral authority. In the past God occupied the role, but systems that dispense with God are lacking the proper foundation for meaningful employment of those concepts. Aristotle's virtue ethics can do so without appealing to any such lawgiver, and ground morality in the well being of human moral agents. Therefore Anscombe recommends a return to the eudaimonistic ethical theories of the ancients as secular approaches. Eudaimonia is a central concept in Aristotelian ethics, along with the terms "aret?"(translated as virtue or excellence) and "phronesis"(translated as practical wisdom). In Aristotle's works, eudaimonia was used as the term for the highest human good, and so it is the aim of practical philosophy to consider what it really is and how it can be achieved. Eudaimonia is a Greek word commonly translated as well-being, happiness, welfare or "human flourishing". As Aristotle points out, saying that eudaimon life is a life which is objectively desirable, and means living well. Everyone wants to be eudaimon. And everyone agrees that being eudaimon is related to faring well and to an individual's well being. But the really difficult question is to specify just what sort of activities enable one to live well. Aristotle says that the eudaimon life is one of "virtuous activity in accordance with reason," this is a necessary condition of eudaimonia, the pleasure accompanied by virtuous activities is a sufficient condition. Hence we have a more accurate translation of eudaimonia with a review the practical meaning of eudaimonia, and the correlation between eudaimonia and arete, pleasure.

• The Journal of Korean Association of Computer Education
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• v.16 no.6
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• pp.1-10
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• 2013

Until now, the study of Internet addiction have focused on (1)Internet overuse (2)addiction (3)the real situation of disability in order. This approach have given a social awareness about Internet addiction as well as have been used as base for introduction of psychological and emotional means to prevent and treat Internet addiction. However, There are very few an ethical approach that is related in human values that what purpose does people use Internet for and how to use Internet. Accordingly, This study provides teleological, deontological, virtue and responsible ethics of Internet addiction. And, this study insist that Internet addiction is a wrongdoing on the basis of four ethical views. Based on these claims, this study stress the needs for Internet ethical education as a program to prevent and treat Internet addiction and se to tu1rn pop1 computer ethics into theoretical computer ethics.

• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
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• v.46
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• pp.189-234
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• 2023

The most common and prevailing system of virtue ethics is based around the idea of personality rather than external behavior and it grew out of the Aristotelian system of virtue ethics. The purpose of this study is to find out the characteristics of the virtue ethics found within Daesoon Thought through comparison to Aristotelian virtue ethics. This can serve as a basis to establish the virtue ethics of Daesoon Thought in further studies. The systems of virtue ethics posited by the two traditions are similar in that they are both teleological as the virtues they recognize are related to human nature in the context of certain metaphysical assumption and they both exhibit the characteristic tendencies of seeking to realize the highest human good. Therefore, in the Aristotelian context, virtues can be defined as "characteristics needed for the realization of eudaimonia," and for Daesoon Thought, virtues are "characteristics needed for the realization of the Resolution of Grievances for Mutual Beneficence." The representative virtues examined in this comparative study will be the Aristotelian Golden Mean, and the the concepts of guarding against self-deception and great benevolence and great justice in Daesoon Thought. In comparison to Aristotelian virtues, these differ in three main ways. First, Aristotelian virtue is not an innate aspect of character the way it is assumed to be in Daesoon Thought wherein the original human heart bestowed by Heaven is already virtuous. Second, mental virtue in the Aristotelian context centers the mind upon reason whereas in Daesoon Thought, the heart-mind exhibits both reason and emotional concern for others. Third, eudaimonia is a concept limited to humans and their societies whereas the Resolution of Grievances for Mutual Beneficence is a good that includes all beings including divine beings, animals, plants, and Heaven and Earth. Despite the differences, both require practical reason, continuous education, and effort to succeed in the cultivation of virtues and the proper implementation of virtuous living.

• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
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• v.27
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• pp.283-317
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• 2016

This research is an attempt to detail the multi-layered ethical characteristics of 'mutual beneficence', shown in the principle of 'guarding against self-deception' in Daesoon Thought while focusing on its major differences as well as the similarities with Kantian and Utilitarian ethical views. In these Western ethical perspectives, the concept of self-deception has received a considerable amount of attention, centering on the context of natural rights and contract theory. Meanwhile, in Daesoon Thought, 'guarding against self-deception' is presented as one of the principal objectives as well as the method or deontological ground for practice. It further encompasses the features of virtue ethics oriented toward the perfection of Dao. Here, the deontological aspect is interlinked with the concept of cultivation and the pursuit of ethics and morals. Hence this makes it a necessary condition for achieving the perfection of Dao, and likewise renders the practice of 'guarding against self-deception' more active through facilitating mutual relations based on the expansion model wherein human nature is characterized as possessing innate goodness. With regard to the tenet of 'resolution of grievances for mutual beneficence,' this concept is presented as a positive ground for practicing virtues toward others without forming grudges. Furthermore, as long as it reveals the great principle of humanity built on conscience, it will come to harmonize practitioners with others and spirits in an expression of beneficence. Moreover, originating in the Dao of Deities, guarding against self-deception is expressed as a form of life ethics and can be suggested as a new alternative for the model of virtue ethics proposed by Nussbaum. All in all, there is a natural causal relationship by which 'guarding against self-deception' in accord one's own conscience and the principle of humanity as a pursuit of perfect virtues in Dao result in the fulfillment of mutual beneficence. This readily akin to how gravity causes water to flow from high ground to low ground. Consequently, these relational features of mutual beneficence can serve an effective alternative to the Western ethical views which also address the need to overcome the egoistic mind which is liable to self-interest and alienation.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.93
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• pp.121-148
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• 2011

The uncodifiability thesis in anti-theory argument is the typical claim for the impossibility of ethical theorizing. Based on this thesis reflecting particularism strongly, contemporary anti-theorists in ethics argue that individual decisions in particular situations cannot be codified into moral principles. The uncodifiability thesis needs to be examined by the following two issues: a theoretical issue of whether the object of codification is moral practices or not; and a practical one of whether moral principles present the decision procedure of moral reasoning or not. The characteristics of practical reasoning show that the object of codification in ethics, as moral theorists insist, is not moral practices but morality itself. Also moral theorists, contrary to the criticisms of anti-theorists, insist that moral reasoning is comprised of not only moral principles but also moral judgments with contextual knowledge and moral wisdom. In brief, moral theorists make a persuasive response to the uncodifiability thesis when they do neither intend to codify moral practices into moral principles nor to deduce the moral reasoning from moral principles. For them moral judgments should be examined by the moral principles which present universal and idealistic morality.