• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2014.10a
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• pp.917-920
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• 2014

In Korea mobile phone subscribers exceeded 1 million people in 1995, and ten million people in 1998. Prevalence of the mobile phone increased dramatically over 110% compared to the population. And all family members including children and students use one or two mobile terminal. Mobile phone is obviously necessary good more than washer, vacuum cleaner, passenger car. Our daily life with mobile communication are conveniently positioned, but communication related costs including the price of the device has become a big burden on the household. But the government does not seem to do the right role at the right time to prevent the failure of the market to further maximize consumer welfare and social welfare through fair competition. This principal-agent problems exist especially in perspective of joint use of the mobile communication network, number portability, separation of phone distribution and phone service and network neutrality among in mobile communication policies since the early 1990s up to now.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.615-621
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• 2016

This study examines whether there is agency cost in a public R&D subsidy program by applying agency theory. If there is agency cost, the composition ratio of the government subsidy and the firm's own R&D fund would have a significant (-) effect on technological performance. Companies that received a public R&D subsidy in Korea from 2000 to 2009 were selected as a sample. Frequency analysis and multiple regression analysis were used. The independent variables was the ratio of public R&D subsidy cost to the Firm's own R&D cost, and the dependent variables were the number of patent applications and the number of patents registered. The control variables were firm size and R&D cost. The results show that there are agency problems in the government-sponsored R&D system. A future study is needed to examine how much agency problems deteriorate the efficiency of the system.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.26 no.4
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• pp.1-34
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• 2009

We test the effect of corporate cash holdings on firm value by using the KOSPI listed firms over the period between 2002 and 2007 from the agency theories perspective, which has not been the central interest of prior studies. Unlike existing studies, using the manager's ownership ratio or foreign investor's shareholder ratio as a proxy variable for agency costs, we use the individual firm's corporate governance scores by the KCGS to test the effect of agency costs on the value of firm's cash holdings. We find that a firm value is positively related with its cash holdings. We also find that a firm with good corporate governance tends to experience a higher value of its cash holdings, compared with a firm with bad corporate governance. These results are consistent even after controlling for the endogeneity problems between corporate governance and firm value, strongly supporting the agency theory of cash holdings. Therefore, a firm's cash holdings, even from liquidity or precautionary motives, could increase the firm cash value, as long as its managers' interest is shareholders' wealth maximization rather than their private benefits.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.181-203
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• 1997

본 논문은 미국 다국적 기업의 해외 합작투자 발표가 개별 기업의 주식 가격에 미치는 영향에 관하여 분석하였다. 본 연구에서는 개별 기업의 경영능력 및 대리인 비용의 존재 여부에 따라 기업의 투자의사 결정시 증권시장이 차별적으로 반응한다는 점을 가설화하였으며 이를 실증연구를 통하여 입증하였다. 평균적으로 해외 합작투자 발표 당일에 주가 상승으로 인한 평균초과수익율은 0.4%로 기업 인수 합병에서 인수 기업이 실현하는 수익률에 상응하는 수준이었다. 본 논문의 실증연구 결과는 Jensen(1986)이 제시한 '사내잉여자금-과잉투자'(Free Cash Flow - Overinvestment)가설과 대체로 일치하고 있다. 즉, 기업의 관리능력이 뛰어나고 사내에 축적된 잉여자금의 양이 적은 경우 해외 합작투자 결정은 증권시장의 호의적인 반응을 받은 반면 경영이 부진하고 사내에 유보된 잉여자금의 양이 많은 기업의 경우 투자자의 관심을 끌지 못하였음을 알 수 있다.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.99-123
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• 2004

We focus in this study on incremental financing decisions and estimate a logit model for the probability a firm will choose a private placement over a public bond issue. We hypothesize that information asymmetry, financial risk, agent cost, and proprietary information may affect a firm's choice between public debt and private placements. We find that as the size of firm increases, the probability of choosing a private placement declines significantly. The age of the firm, however, is not a significant factor affecting the firm's choice between public and privately-placed bond. The coefficients on the firm's leverage and non-investment grade dummy are significantly positive, meaning firms with high financial risk and credit risk select private placements. The findings regarding agency-related variables, PER and Tobin's Q, are somewhat complex. We find significant evidence that firms with high PER prefer private placements to public bonds, suggesting that borrowers with options to engage in asset substitution or underinvestment are more likely to choose private placements. The coefficient of Tobin's Q is negative, but not significant, which weakly support the hold-up hypothesis. When we construct an interaction term on the Tobin's Q with a non-investment rating dummy, however, the Tobin's Q interaction term becomes positive and significant. Thus, high Tobin's Q firms with a speculative rating are significantly more likely to choose a private placement, regardless of the potential hold-up problems. The ratio of R&D to sales, proxy for proprietary information, is positively significant. This result can be interpreted as evidence in favor of a role for proprietary information in the debt sourcing decision process for these firms.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.6.1-6.16
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• 1998

입찰계약방식은 발주기업인 구매자가 최선의 공급자를 결정하기 위해 선택 가능한 하나의 전략적 도구로서 매우 중요한 의의를 지니고 있다. 본연구는 대리이론과 거래비용분석에 의해 발주기업의 입찰계약방식결정에 영향을 미치는 요인을 이론적으로 제시하고 있다. 본 연구는 입찰계약방식이 거래의 관계지향성과 계약의 명시성의 두가지 차원을 본질로 하고 있으며, 이들 두가지 차원에 영향을 미치는 요인으로 정보의 비대칭성, 지각된 위험의 크기, 성과측정 및 감시의 필요성, 응찰기업에 대한 신뢰와 몰입수준, 발주기업의 상대적 의존도의 다섯 가지 요인을 들고 있다. 본연구는 입찰계약방식이 이들 요인에 의해 어떻게 결정되는가를 명제의 형태로 제시하고 있으며, 실증분석을 위한 몇 가지 제언도 함께 제시하고 있다.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.30 no.3
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• pp.217-239
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• 2011

The paper explores how corporate payout polish depends on managers' stock-option value. Specifically, this paper examine the relationship between managers' stock-option value and the ratio of stock repurchase, and analyze the relationship between price-incentive intensity of managers' stock-option and the ratio of stock repurchase. The hypotheses mentioned above are empirically tested using 137 firms listed on the Korean Exchange(KRX). OLS and Tobit regression method are used to above hypotheses. The results of this paper are as follows: First, as managers' stock option value increases, future the ratio of stock repurchase increase. Second, as the price-incentives intensity of managers' stock option increases, the patio of stock repurchase also increase. Overall, The above results imply that managers with stock option prefer stock repurchase over cash dividends to increase private benefits.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.493-499
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• 2015

In Korea mobile phone subscribers exceeded 1 million people in 1995, and ten million people in 1998. Prevalence of the mobile phone increased dramatically over 110% compared to the population. Almost every family members including children uses more than one mobile terminal. Mobile phone is obviously more necessary good than washer, vacuum cleaner and passenger car. Our daily life are conveniently positioned with mobile communication, but communication related costs including the price of the device and service charges become a big burden on the household. But the government does not seem to do the right role at the right time to prevent the market failure to maximize consumer welfare and social welfare through supporting fair competition. This principal-agent problem issues of mobile communication policies will be understood in perspective of public choice against joint use of the mobile communication network, number portability, separation of phone distribution and phone service, network neutrality, mobile phone subsidy since the early 1990s when mobile phone service was introduced in Korea.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.27 no.2
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• pp.205-237
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• 2005

This paper analyzes a mechanism through which product market competition affects allocation of the managerial efforts. There are two types of firms, incumbents and entrants. Each incumbent firm delegates its control to a manager and cannot observe the manager's total effort. The managers of incumbent firms allocate their effort to two different activities: cost reduction (productive effort) and rent protection (unproductive effort). An increase in competition, measured by the number of incumbent firms, has two effects: an "output effect" which decreases the managerial incentive for productive effort, and an "effort substitution effect" that makes managers exert more productive effort and less unproductive effort. This paper identifies the conditions under which product market competition lowers the cost of providing incentives for productive effort and hence, to the conclusion that increased competition leads to increased efficiency.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.26 no.3
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• pp.1-29
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• 2009

Since convertible debt has both characteristics of stocks and bonds, its issuance can be related to both interests of stockholders and bondholders. Nevertheless, the existing studies focused mainly on the wealth effect on stockholders. In this paper we revisit the hypotheses on the issue of convertible debt especially from the viewpoint of a firm's growth, by making an additional investigation into bondholders' wealth effects. We find that stockholders' wealth increases with bondholders' wealth in the firm whose book-to-market ratio is low and thus is considered a growth firm. This finding seems consistent with the hypothesis in which the issue of convertible debt mitigates the agency cost of debt in the high-growth firm.