Internet commerce has been growing at a rapid pace for the last decade. Many firms try to reach wider consumer markets by adding the Internet channel to the existing traditional channels. Despite the various benefits of the Internet channel, a significant number of firms failed in managing the new type of channel. Previous studies could not cleary explain these conflicting results associated with the Internet channel. One of the major reasons is most of the previous studies conducted analyses under a specific market condition and claimed that as the impact of Internet channel introduction. Therefore, their results are strongly influenced by the specific market settings. However, firms face various market conditions in the real worlddensity and disutility of using the Internet. The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of various market environments on a firm's optimal channel strategy by employing a flexible game theory model. We capture various market conditions with consumer density and disutility of using the Internet.
shows the channel structures analyzed in this study. Before the Internet channel is introduced, a monopoly manufacturer sells its products through an independent physical store. From this structure, the manufacturer could introduce its own Internet channel (MI). The independent physical store could also introduce its own Internet channel and coordinate it with the existing physical store (RI). An independent Internet retailer such as Amazon could enter this market (II). In this case, two types of independent retailers compete with each other. In this model, consumers are uniformly distributed on the two dimensional space. Consumer heterogeneity is captured by a consumer's geographical location (ci) and his disutility of using the Internet channel (δNi).
shows various market conditions captured by the two consumer heterogeneities.
(a) illustrates a market with symmetric consumer distributions. The model captures explicitly the asymmetric distributions of consumer disutility in a market as well. In a market like that is represented in
(c), the average consumer disutility of using an Internet store is relatively smaller than that of using a physical store. For example, this case represents the market in which 1) the product is suitable for Internet transactions (e.g., books) or 2) the level of E-Commerce readiness is high such as in Denmark or Finland. On the other hand, the average consumer disutility when using an Internet store is relatively greater than that of using a physical store in a market like (b). Countries like Ukraine and Bulgaria, or the market for "experience goods" such as shoes, could be examples of this market condition. summarizes the various scenarios of consumer distributions analyzed in this study. The range for disutility of using the Internet (δNi) is held constant, while the range of consumer distribution (χi) varies from -25 to 25, from -50 to 50, from -100 to 100, from -150 to 150, and from -200 to 200.
summarizes the analysis results. As the average travel cost in a market decreases while the average disutility of Internet use remains the same, average retail price, total quantity sold, physical store profit, monopoly manufacturer profit, and thus, total channel profit increase. On the other hand, the quantity sold through the Internet and the profit of the Internet store decrease with a decreasing average travel cost relative to the average disutility of Internet use. We find that a channel that has an advantage over the other kind of channel serves a larger portion of the market. In a market with a high average travel cost, in which the Internet store has a relative advantage over the physical store, for example, the Internet store becomes a mass-retailer serving a larger portion of the market. This result implies that the Internet becomes a more significant distribution channel in those markets characterized by greater geographical dispersion of buyers, or as consumers become more proficient in Internet usage. The results indicate that the degree of price discrimination also varies depending on the distribution of consumer disutility in a market. The manufacturer in a market in which the average travel cost is higher than the average disutility of using the Internet has a stronger incentive for price discrimination than the manufacturer in a market where the average travel cost is relatively lower. We also find that the manufacturer has a stronger incentive to maintain a high price level when the average travel cost in a market is relatively low. Additionally, the retail competition effect due to Internet channel introduction strengthens as average travel cost in a market decreases. This result indicates that a manufacturer's channel power relative to that of the independent physical retailer becomes stronger with a decreasing average travel cost. This implication is counter-intuitive, because it is widely believed that the negative impact of Internet channel introduction on a competing physical retailer is more significant in a market like Russia, where consumers are more geographically dispersed, than in a market like Hong Kong, that has a condensed geographic distribution of consumers. illustrates how this happens. When mangers consider the overall impact of the Internet channel, however, they should consider not only channel power, but also sales volume. When both are considered, the introduction of the Internet channel is revealed as more harmful to a physical retailer in Russia than one in Hong Kong, because the sales volume decrease for a physical store due to Internet channel competition is much greater in Russia than in Hong Kong. The results show that manufacturer is always better off with any type of Internet store introduction. The independent physical store benefits from opening its own Internet store when the average travel cost is higher relative to the disutility of using the Internet. Under an opposite market condition, however, the independent physical retailer could be worse off when it opens its own Internet outlet and coordinates both outlets (RI). This is because the low average travel cost significantly reduces the channel power of the independent physical retailer, further aggravating the already weak channel power caused by myopic inter-channel price coordination. The results implies that channel members and policy makers should explicitly consider the factors determining the relative distributions of both kinds of consumer disutility, when they make a channel decision involving an Internet channel. These factors include the suitability of a product for Internet shopping, the level of E-Commerce readiness of a market, and the degree of geographic dispersion of consumers in a market. Despite the academic contributions and managerial implications, this study is limited in the following ways. First, a series of numerical analyses were conducted to derive equilibrium solutions due to the complex forms of demand functions. In the process, we set up V=100, λ=1, and β=0.01. Future research may change this parameter value set to check the generalizability of this study. Second, the five different scenarios for market conditions were analyzed. Future research could try different sets of parameter ranges. Finally, the model setting allows only one monopoly manufacturer in the market. Accommodating competing multiple manufacturers (brands) would generate more realistic results.
In this paper, a simple game-theoretic entry deterrence model is developed that integrates both limit pricing and predatory pricing. While there have been extensive studies which have dealt with predation and limit pricing separately, no study so far has analyzed these closely related practices in a unified framework. Treating each practice as if it were an independent phenomenon is, of course, an analytical necessity to abstract from complex realities. However, welfare analysis based on such a model may give misleading policy implications. By analyzing limit and predatory pricing within a single framework, this paper attempts to shed some light on the effects of interactions between these two frequently cited tactics of entry deterrence. Another distinctive feature of the paper is that limit and predatory pricing emerge, in equilibrium, as rational, profit maximizing strategies in the model. Until recently, the only conclusion from formal analyses of predatory pricing was that predation is unlikely to take place if every economic agent is assumed to be rational. This conclusion rests upon the argument that predation is costly; that is, it inflicts more losses upon the predator than upon the rival producer, and, therefore, is unlikely to succeed in driving out the rival, who understands that the price cutting, if it ever takes place, must be temporary. Recently several attempts have been made to overcome this modelling difficulty by Kreps and Wilson, Milgram and Roberts, Benoit, Fudenberg and Tirole, and Roberts. With the exception of Roberts, however, these studies, though successful in preserving the rationality of players, still share one serious weakness in that they resort to ad hoc, external constraints in order to generate profit maximizing predation. The present paper uses a highly stylized model of Cournot duopoly and derives the equilibrium predatory strategy without invoking external constraints except the assumption of asymmetrically distributed information. The underlying intuition behind the model can be summarized as follows. Imagine a firm that is considering entry into a monopolist's market but is uncertain about the incumbent firm's cost structure. If the monopolist has low cost, the rival would rather not enter because it would be difficult to compete with an efficient, low-cost firm. If the monopolist has high costs, however, the rival will definitely enter the market because it can make positive profits. In this situation, if the incumbent firm unwittingly produces its monopoly output, the entrant can infer the nature of the monopolist's cost by observing the monopolist's price. Knowing this, the high cost monopolist increases its output level up to what would have been produced by a low cost firm in an effort to conceal its cost condition. This constitutes limit pricing. The same logic applies when there is a rival competitor in the market. Producing a high cost duopoly output is self-revealing and thus to be avoided. Therefore, the firm chooses to produce the low cost duopoly output, consequently inflicting losses to the entrant or rival producer, thus acting in a predatory manner. The policy implications of the analysis are rather mixed. Contrary to the widely accepted hypothesis that predation is, at best, a negative sum game, and thus, a strategy that is unlikely to be played from the outset, this paper concludes that predation can be real occurence by showing that it can arise as an effective profit maximizing strategy. This conclusion alone may imply that the government can play a role in increasing the consumer welfare, say, by banning predation or limit pricing. However, the problem is that it is rather difficult to ascribe any welfare losses to these kinds of entry deterring practices. This difficulty arises from the fact that if the same practices have been adopted by a low cost firm, they could not be called entry-deterring. Moreover, the high cost incumbent in the model is doing exactly what the low cost firm would have done to keep the market to itself. All in all, this paper suggests that a government injunction of limit and predatory pricing should be applied with great care, evaluating each case on its own basis. Hasty generalization may work to the detriment, rather than the enhancement of consumer welfare.
As the world becomes more globalized, business competition becomes fiercer, while consumers' needs for less expensive quality products are on the increase. Business operations make an effort to secure a competitive edge in costs and services, and the logistics industry, that is, the industry operating the storing and transporting of goods, once thought to be an expense, begins to be considered as the third cash cow, a source of new income. Logistics centers are central to storage, loading and unloading of deliveries, packaging operations, and dispensing goods' information. As hubs for various deliveries, they also serve as a core infrastructure to smoothly coordinate manufacturing and selling, using varied information and operation systems. Logistics centers are increasingly on the rise as centers of business supply activities, growing beyond their previous role of primarily storing goods. They are no longer just facilities; they have become logistics strongholds that encompass various features from demand forecast to the regulation of supply, manufacturing, and sales by realizing SCM, taking into account marketability and the operation of service and products. However, despite these changes in logistics operations, some centers have been unable to shed their past roles as warehouses. For the continuous development of logistics centers, various measures would be needed, including a revision of current supporting policies, formulating effective management plans, and establishing systematic standards for founding, managing, and controlling logistics centers. To this end, the research explored previous studies on the use and effectiveness of logistics centers. From a theoretical perspective, an evaluation of the overall introduction, purposes, and transitions in the use of logistics centers found issues to ponder and suggested measures to promote and further advance logistics centers. First, a fact-finding survey to establish demand forecast and standardization is needed. As logistics newspapers predicted that after 2012 supply would exceed demand, causing rents to fall, the business environment for logistics centers has faltered. However, since there is a shortage of fact-finding surveys regarding actual demand for domestic logistic centers, it is hard to predict what the future holds for this industry. Accordingly, the first priority should be to get to the essence of the current market situation by conducting accurate domestic and international fact-finding surveys. Based on those, management and evaluation indicators should be developed to build the foundation for the consistent advancement of logistics centers. Second, many policies for logistics centers should be revised or developed. Above all, a guideline for fair trade between a shipper and a commercial logistics center should be enacted. Since there are no standards for fair trade between them, rampant unfair trades according to market practices have brought chaos to market orders, and now the logistics industry is confronting its own difficulties. Therefore, unfair trade cases that currently plague logistics centers should be gathered by the industry and fair trade guidelines should be established and implemented. In addition, restrictive employment regulations for foreign workers should be eased, and logistics centers should be charged industry rates for the use of electricity. Third, various measures should be taken to improve the management environment. First, we need to find out how to activate value-added logistics. Because the traditional purpose of logistics centers was storage and loading/unloading of goods, their profitability had a limit, and the need arose to find a new angle to create a value added service. Logistic centers have been perceived as support for a company's storage, manufacturing, and sales needs, not as creators of profits. The center's role in the company's economics has been lowering costs. However, as the logistics' management environment spiraled, along with its storage purpose, developing a new feature of profit creation should be a desirable goal, and to achieve that, value added logistics should be promoted. Logistics centers can also be improved through cost estimation. In the meantime, they have achieved some strides in facility development but have still fallen behind in others, particularly in management functioning. Lax management has been rampant because the industry has not developed a concept of cost estimation. The centers have since made an effort toward unification, standardization, and informatization while realizing cost reductions by establishing systems for effective management, but it has been hard to produce profits. Thus, there is an urgent need to estimate costs by determining a basic cost range for each division of work at logistics centers. This undertaking can be the first step to improving the ineffective aspects of how they operate. Ongoing research and constant efforts have been made to improve the level of effectiveness in the manufacturing industry, but studies on resource management in logistics centers are hardly enough. Thus, a plan to calculate the optimal level of resources necessary to operate a logistics center should be developed and implemented in management behavior, for example, by standardizing the hours of operation. If logistics centers, shippers, related trade groups, academic figures, and other experts could launch a committee to work with the government and maintain an ongoing relationship, the constraint and cooperation among members would help lead to coherent development plans for logistics centers. If the government continues its efforts to provide financial support, nurture professional workers, and maintain safety management, we can anticipate the continuous advancement of logistics centers.
Since the Korean retail industry was made accessible to the big conglomerates and foreign retail companies, local traditional markets have faced serious problems. To sustain the local traditional markets' survival, the Korean government established various remedial policies for addressing, and many scholars published articles to suggest how to find solutions to, the problem. Unfortunately, the results have not been satisfactory. The purpose of this study is to find another way to help the Korean traditional retail market, from the view point of the Green Growth Policy, an initiative designed to address environmentally balanced economic growth in Korea. In order to survive and to maintain sustainable growth, it is incumbent upon retailers in the traditional market to understand the concept of the Green Growth Policy. A survey was conducted as a means of testing the degree of awareness of the Green Growth Policy, as well as determining the relationship between the degree of awareness and the degree of organizational commitment by the retailers in the local traditional markets. Interestingly, we were able to detect some of the features (e.g., they were distinguished by the elderly and the young, as well as low level of education and high level of education) in the traditional market retailers' demographic characteristics. We utilized the analysis of variance (ANOVA) statistical method to simultaneously compare the differences in retailers' demographic characteristics; the results were as follows: Overall, the results showed that the awareness of the Green Growth Policy, the degree of trust in the government's policy, levels of self-efficacy, and levels of organizational commitment were higher with the older traditional market retailers than the younger traditional market retailers. Specifically, the degree of trust in government policies (F=9.964,p < .05), levels of self-efficacy (F=5.532,p < .05), and levels of organizational commitment (F=5.697,p < .05) were statistically significant. Moreover, in the portion of the study that addressed the difference between education levels, all the variables were averaged in the higher education category of the traditional market retailers. Specifically, awareness levels of the Green Growth Policy (F=8.564,p < .005) and levels of self-efficacy (F=6.754,p < .005) were statistically significant. These results revealed that the traditional market retailers' demographic characteristics should be considered important factors in order to realize their policy. The results of the study showed the following: 1) The degree of awareness of the government's Green Growth Policy was statistically significant as it related to traditional market retailers' organizational commitment. 2) The degree of trust of the government's policy was significantly moderated between the awareness of the government's Green Growth Policy and the traditional market retailers' organizational commitment. This result demonstrates that the traditional market retailers' awareness of the government's Green Growth Policy will show more organizational commitment with higher levels of trust of the government's policy. 3) It also revealed that traditional market retailers' self-efficacy was fully mediated between the awareness of the Green Growth Policy of the government and traditional market retailers' organizational commitment. The results suggest that the government should show an interest in showing traditional market retailers how to enhance their traditional markets. Implications and future research directions are also discussed.
It is important to preempt new technology because the technology competition is getting much tougher. Stakeholders conduct exploration activities continuously for new technology preoccupancy at the right time. Gartner's Hype Cycle has significant implications for stakeholders. The Hype Cycle is a expectation graph for new technologies which is combining the technology life cycle (S-curve) with the Hype Level. Stakeholders such as R&D investor, CTO(Chef of Technology Officer) and technical personnel are very interested in Gartner's Hype Cycle for new technologies. Because high expectation for new technologies can bring opportunities to maintain investment by securing the legitimacy of R&D investment. However, contrary to the high interest of the industry, the preceding researches faced with limitations aspect of empirical method and source data(news, academic papers, search traffic, patent etc.). In this study, we focused on two research questions. The first research question was 'Is there a difference in the characteristics of the network structure at each stage of the hype cycle?'. To confirm the first research question, the structural characteristics of each stage were confirmed through the component cohesion size. The second research question is 'Is there a pattern of diffusion at each stage of the hype cycle?'. This research question was to be solved through centralization index and network density. The centralization index is a concept of variance, and a higher centralization index means that a small number of nodes are centered in the network. Concentration of a small number of nodes means a star network structure. In the network structure, the star network structure is a centralized structure and shows better diffusion performance than a decentralized network (circle structure). Because the nodes which are the center of information transfer can judge useful information and deliver it to other nodes the fastest. So we confirmed the out-degree centralization index and in-degree centralization index for each stage. For this purpose, we confirmed the structural features of the community and the expectation diffusion patterns using Social Network Serice(SNS) data in 'Gartner Hype Cycle for Artificial Intelligence, 2021'. Twitter data for 30 technologies (excluding four technologies) listed in 'Gartner Hype Cycle for Artificial Intelligence, 2021' were analyzed. Analysis was performed using R program (4.1.1 ver) and Cyram Netminer. From October 31, 2021 to November 9, 2021, 6,766 tweets were searched through the Twitter API, and converting the relationship user's tweet(Source) and user's retweets (Target). As a result, 4,124 edgelists were analyzed. As a reult of the study, we confirmed the structural features and diffusion patterns through analyze the component cohesion size and degree centralization and density. Through this study, we confirmed that the groups of each stage increased number of components as time passed and the density decreased. Also 'Innovation Trigger' which is a group interested in new technologies as a early adopter in the innovation diffusion theory had high out-degree centralization index and the others had higher in-degree centralization index than out-degree. It can be inferred that 'Innovation Trigger' group has the biggest influence, and the diffusion will gradually slow down from the subsequent groups. In this study, network analysis was conducted using social network service data unlike methods of the precedent researches. This is significant in that it provided an idea to expand the method of analysis when analyzing Gartner's hype cycle in the future. In addition, the fact that the innovation diffusion theory was applied to the Gartner's hype cycle's stage in artificial intelligence can be evaluated positively because the Gartner hype cycle has been repeatedly discussed as a theoretical weakness. Also it is expected that this study will provide a new perspective on decision-making on technology investment to stakeholdes.
Despite the voluminous research on switching barriers, the notion that they can generate negative responses has not been investigated. Further, a critical question is what determines the strength of such negative responses. To address this question, the classic theory of psychological reactance is briefly reviewed, and the idea of switching barrier is advanced. This study attempts to suggest a model on the negative effects of switching- frustrated situation, based on the studies on psychological reactance. According to psychological reactance theory(Brehm 1966), whenever a freedom is threatened or removed, individuals are motivated, at least temporarily, to restore their freedom. For example, if individuals think they are free to engage in behaviors .v, y, or z, then threatening their freedom to engage in x would cause psychological reactance. This reactance could be reduced by an increase in the perceived attractiveness of engaging in, the threatened behavior(Kivetz 2005). This investigation seeks to extend existing switching barrier research in three important ways. First, while the past research has emphasized only positive role of switching barrier, this study address negative role of it by applying psychological reactance theory. Second, to find negative results of switching barrier, I suggest negative psychological response including regret to the past choice, resentment to the present provider, and strong desire to the alternative provider. Third, I suggest the perceived severity of the switching barriers, the attractiveness of the alternative as switching-frustrated situation which can lead to negative results. And, in addition to these relationships, I added moderated effects of perceived justice for better explanation. So this study includes the following hypotheses. H1-1 ~ H1-3: The attractiveness of the alternative has a positive effect regret to the past choice (h1-1), resentment to the present provider (h1-2), and strong desire to the alternative provider (h1-3). H2-1 ~ H2-3 : The perceived severity of the switching barrier has a positive effect regret to the past choice (h2-1), resentment to the present provider (h2-2), and strong desire to the alternative provider (h2-3). H3-1 ~ H3-3 : The positive relationships between the attractiveness of the alternative and consumer' negative responses will be stronger at low level of perceived justice than at high level of perceived justice. H4-1 ~ H4-3 : The positive relationships between the perceived severity of the switching barrier and consumer' negative responses will be stronger at low level of perceived justice than at high level of perceived justice. Survey research is employed to test hypotheses involving perceived severity of the switching barrier(Hess 2008), attractiveness of the alternative(Anderson and Narus 1990; Ohanian 1990),regret(Glovich and Medvec 1995), resentment, strong desire(Alcohol Urge Questionaire: Bohn et al. 1995), perceived justice(Bies and Moag 1986; Clemmer 1993; Lind and Tyler 1998). Previous researches, such as reactance theory, emotion and service failure, have been referenced to measure constructs. All items were measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree". We collected data involving various service field, and used 249 respondents to analyze these data using the moderated regression. The results of our analysis suggest, as expected, that the perceived severity of the switching barrier had positive effects on regret to the past choice(b = .197, p< .01), resentment to the present provider(b = .214, p< .01), and strong desire to the alternative provider(b = .254, p< .001). And the attractiveness of the alternative had positive effects on regret to the past choice(b = .353, p<.001), resentment to the present provider(b = .174, p< .01), and strong desire to the alternative provider(b = .265, p< .001). However, our findings indicate perceived justice partly moderates relationship between switching-frustrated situation and psychological negative response. The study has brought to light a number of insights between switching barriers and consumer' negative responses that have been subject to little prior research. In particular, this study adds to the existing understanding of the psychological responses to switching barriers in switching- frustrated situation. This research therefore has significance to marketers for strategic marketing programs, particularly in terms of customer retention and switching barrier strategies. Since consumers could exhibit negative responses to switching barrier, companies would be able to lose their customer when they thoughtlessly use switching barrier for remaining customer. Although the study has these contributions, there are several limitations including unsupported hypotheses and research method. So, we need to make up for these limitations in the future researches.
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