• Journal of the Korean Institute of Landscape Architecture
• /
• v.43 no.2
• /
• pp.87-104
• /
• 2015

As the influence of Landscape Urbanism has grown, various criticisms on the discourse also have increased. A study on critical opinions of Landscape Urbanism is necessary to fully comprehend the theoretical structure of the discourse and its limitations. This study introduced the concept of Intension and Extension, which is used in the field of Logics and Semiotic, as an analytical tool to interpret various criticisms based on different views in a more objective and synthetic way. After examining the development of criticisms of Landscape Urbanism, 30 texts with important critiques on the theory were selected and analyzed. Criticisms can be classified as internal criticism and external criticism according to specific topics they are engaged with. The study only covers internal criticism as a research scope. The internal criticisms on Landscape Urbanism are re-categorized into topics of theory, practice and the relation between theory and practice. Vagueness of concepts and error in concepts are two types criticism related to the issue of theory. Lexical Ambiguity and Intensional Vagueness are the main causes of conceptual vagueness in Landscape Urbanism. Conceptual vagueness related with the problem of redefining an existing concept through expanding its meaning reveals a structural dilemma. There are three types of criticism included in the topic of practice: absence of practical results, form-oriented practice, and ambiguous identity in practical results. Ambiguous identity is caused by Extensional Vagueness allowing borderline cases. Because these borderline cases overlap with extensions of landscape architecture, it is hard to differentiate projects of Landscape Urbanism and those of conventional landscape architecture. Most criticisms on the relation between theory and practice raise the question on the practical method. Two types of criticism are engaged with the topic of the practical method: errors in practical methods and absence of practical methods. The absence of practical methods is a fundamental problem of Landscape Urbanism which is hard to solve by the proposed solutions. However, these structural problems are not only the weak point but also the factor that is able to prove the potentials expand the scope of Landscape Urbanism. In addition to the results of the study, internal criticisms on Landscape Urbanism should be examined in the following studies in order to predict the next direction of Landscape Urbanism.

• Journal of Information Management
• /
• v.30 no.2
• /
• pp.53-68
• /
• 1999

This paper focuses on the critique of citation analysis and then attempts to prospect for the future. The development of citation analysis has been marked by the invention of new techniques and measures, the exploitation of new tools, and the needs of evaluation of scientific research. Normative theory takes the lead in this development. But critics have questioned both the assumptions and methods of citation analysis. This critics are based on the microsociological perspective.

• Korean Journal of Logic
• /
• v.14 no.1
• /
• pp.1-23
• /
• 2011

I take the position of the thirders on the sleeping beauty problem like Elga and criticize Lewisian halfers. In particular, I attack Franceschi's recent arguments for the halfers. In addition, I claim that Bostrom's and Kim's hybrid view is not satisfactory, because it is to pre-empt or to take the burden of proof that the problem is the genuine paradox. Consequently, the purpose of this paper is to show that the thirders' argument is more intuitive than others and what the fallacies of the halfer's arguments are.

• Korean Journal of Logic
• /
• v.16 no.3
• /
• pp.381-406
• /
• 2013

This paper deals with the question whether the para-completeness theory of Kripkian style can avoid the revenge problem. According to the para-completeness theory, there are some sentences that are neither true nor false. And the liar sentence is the exemplar of such sentences. But the para-completeness theory has been criticised to give rise to the revenge problem, since Kripke suggested his theory. Maudlin argues that he can construct the para-completeness theory which avoids the problem by appealing to his foundationalist semantics. The aim of this paper shows that the para-completeness theory, including Maudlin's, cannot avoid the problem. Furthermore, it is argued that Maudlin's view is ad hoc suggestion just to avoid the problem.

• Korean Journal of Logic
• /
• v.13 no.1
• /
• pp.83-100
• /
• 2010

In his recent paper "Early Wittgenstein, Logic, and Metaphysics" Professor Jinho Kang argues that there has been an important change in Wittgenstein's view on the nature of logic between October 1913 and December 1916, which resulted in his change of attitude toward metaphysics. In my paper, raising some questions regarding his basic assumptions and arguments, I attempt to show that Professor Kang's paper fails to provide convincing solution to the points at issue.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
• /
• no.33
• /
• pp.305-334
• /
• 2008

This paper is intended to present the philosophical thoughts of Yu Won-Ji who was one of famous scholars in The School of Toegye. He criticized Yi I(Yulgok) and Jang Hyeon-Gwang(Yeohyeon) because they regarded Li and Ch'i as one. Yi was considered an actual founder of their theoretical and political rival party called the School of Yulgok. Jang also refused to accept Toegye's theory and had developed his own theory, which emphasized the unity of Li(principle) and Ch'i(material force). Therefore Yu might well exclude Yi I(Yulgok) and Jang Hyeon-Gwang and criticize their theories severely. First, he was convinced that Toegye's doctrine(Li-Gi-Ho-Bal-Seol) was a orthodox theory accurately succeeding to Jhu Xi's learning. Secondly, he criticised Yi I(Yulgok) for looking upon Li and Ch'i as one thing. Thirdly, he regarded Jang's doctrine as same with Yulgok's. Fourthly, he thought it is necessary to criticize Jang's theory in order to preserve Toegye's learning and establish the theoretical identity of the Toegye School.

• Korean Journal of Logic
• /
• v.12 no.2
• /
• pp.171-199
• /
• 2009

This essay will consider evolutionary views that attempt to capture the continuity of theory-change from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics via the formal aspects of these theories. Although it cannot be denied that the formal aspects such as 'correspondence principles' and 'covariance principles' provide important information concerning this theory-change, these formal properties are not sufficient to capture the essential elements of any evolutionary account of the development of Einstein's special and general theories of relativity from Newtonian mechanics.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Navigation and Port Research Conference
• /
• 2018.05a
• /
• pp.126-128
• /
• 2018

왜(倭)는 15-20회의 견당사를 파견하였는데, 838년 견당사의 항해와 관련해서는 이에 동승한 엔닌(円仁)이 "입당구법순례행기"를 남김으로써 그 항해의 전말이 상세하게 남아 있다. 이 기록에서 특히 관심을 끄는 것은 엔닌이 승선한 견당사선이 중국의 양주 해릉현 연안에 표착하였을 당시 기사에 언급된 정체를 알 수 없는 '누아'에 관한 기사다. 여기에서 누(?)는 ?(괭이 누), ?(김맬 누)와 같으며, '낫'이나 '호미'를 뜻하지만, 아는 중국이나 일본에서 전혀 사용되지 않는 한자어여서 글자 그대로 무엇을 의미하는 지가 불분명하다. 따라서 누아가 무엇을 의미하는지에 대해 선저 결구, 횡강력재, 피수판 등 여러 견해가 제기된 바 있다. 이 논문은 "입당구법순례행기"에 기록된 선박부재 '누아'가 무엇인지 살펴본 것이다. 먼저 "입당구법순례행기"의 여러 편역본에 '누아'가 어떻게 번역 내지 해석되고 있는지 살펴보고, 왜의 견당사선의 선형이 어땠을 지를 검토한 뒤, 이 선형의 견당사선이었을 경우 '누아'는 선박의 어떤 부재였을지를 추정해 보고자 한다. 특히 누아를 '피수판'으로 보는 최근식의 견해와 '??(진복)'의 오기로 보아 '횡강력재'로 보는 허일의 견해를 비판적으로 재검토할 것이다. 결론적으로 누아는 녹복(??)(기댈 녹, 들보 복, 즉 지지용 들보)의 오기로 판단했다. 또한 일본학자들이 견당사선을 '중국형 정크선'으로 추정하는 것과는 달리, 중국형 선박에는 선저와 상부에 횡강력재가 각각 독립해 있는 부재가 없는 것으로 보아 견당사선은 화선형 선박이거나, 한선형 선박일 것으로 추정하였다. 결론적으로 엔닌이 언급한 누아는 화선형 선박일 경우 船梁(후나바리), 한선형 선박일 경우 가룡목과 가목으로 볼 수 있다.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
• /
• no.25
• /
• pp.411-437
• /
• 2009

Generally transition of Thought from Wang Yangming(王陽明) to Liu Zongzhou(劉宗周) is construed from emphasis of subjectivity to emphasis of intention(意; Yi). This Transition from emphasis of subjectivity to emphasis of intention is definitely expressed between Wang Yangming's Four-Sentence Teaching(四句敎) and Liu Zongzhou's explanation of Wang Yangming's Four-Sentence Teaching. Wang Yangming's Four-Sentence Teaching evoked much controversy among scholars of Yangming school. Consequently Four-Sentence Teaching's controversy caused Yangming school's division. Also this was a representative controversy on the transition period from The Ming Dynasty to The Ching Dynasty. Liu Zongzhou's critique and exposition of Four-Sentence Teaching was result from this controversy. The difference between Wang Yangming's Xinxue(心學) and Liu Zongzhou' Xinxue(心學) is due to different interpretation of intention. As is generally known Wang Yangming interprets intention is in heart stiring, but Liu Zongzhou interprets intention is being before heart stiring, immanence in heart. Liu Zongzhou suggests new exposition of Four-Sentence Teaching on intention being before heart stiring, immanence in heart. Liu Zongzhou's critique and exposition is not only criticizing Yangming's Four-Sentence Teaching, but also solves troubles of the times. As a result he promotes theory of Xinxue(心學) being peculiar his own.

• Korean Journal of Logic
• /
• v.15 no.3
• /
• pp.347-375
• /
• 2012

In my article published in 2008, I offered an inferentialist account of indicative conditionals. In her recent paper, Professor Seawha Kim raises three objections. First, I misunderstand Sellars-Brandom in that I take only concept-constitutive inferences as materially valid inferences. Second, Sellars and Brandom talk about the common features of all kinds of conditionals including counterfactual conditionals, but I construe their view as the analysis of the indicative conditionals only. Third, either my analysis is incompatible with Sellars-Brandom inferentialism or my analysis is too general. In this paper I argue that Seawha Kim's objections are all based on insufficient understandings of Sellars's and Brandom's views. First, it is Sellars's view that materially valid inferences are restricted within concept-constitutive inferences. Second, neither Sellars nor Brandom proposes a specific theory about the indicative conditional. Instead, they argue for the expressive role of the conditional. What I accept from their views is this expressive role of the conditional. The detailed proposals about the indicative conditional in my aforementioned article are my own. Third, the differences among conditionals have no direct bearing on Sellars-Brandom inferentialism. In addition, the meaning and role of the conditional expression 'if-then' do not require more than what I have argued for it.