Purpose: This study aims to find empirical evidence and clarity on the phenomenon of the direct and indirect effect of perceived behavioral control on fraud prevention through whistleblowing intention. This study also aims to understand the influence of organizational ethical culture moderating between whistleblowing intention and fraud prevention. Research design, data, methodology: The samples of this research are 236 respondents consisting of the Head of the Finance Subdivision and Head of the Reporting Planning Subdivision and the finance staff who were determined using the purposive sampling method. The data obtained were analyzed using the Structural Equation Modeling technique. Results: The study results show that perceived behavioral control positively and significantly affects whistleblowing intention. In addition, perceived behavioral control does not affect fraud prevention mediated by whistleblowing intention. Furthermore, organizational ethical culture moderates whistleblowing intention and has a positive and significant effect on fraud prevention. Conclusions: This study concludes that the phenomenon of scandal that often occurs on a television is not a habit that must be followed. It requires an active role from the community as a form of concern for whistleblowing. Futher researchers can add other construct variables, such as good corporate governance to assess the performance improvement of the organizational layers, both internally and externally

Purpose: This study predicted cost asymmetry as a determinant of investment efficiency, and empirically analyzed the relationship between cost stickiness and investment efficiency. Research design, data and methodology: Using a sample of 4,382 Korean firm-year observations over 2011-2017 period, I examined the relationship between cost stickiness and investment efficiency. Asymmetrical cost behavior is measured as model of Homburg and Nasev (2008) and model of Park, Koo, and Pae (2012). Investment efficiency is measured as Chen, Hope, Li, and Wang (2011)'s model. Results: Firms with cost stickiness are less efficient in their investment than firms with non-cost stickiness. In other words, cost stickiness is an empirical result that supports the previous research on cost decision-making from perspective of managers pursuing private benefits due to information asymmetry. Conclusions: By showing that the manager's decision-making on the cost behavior affects the investment efficiency corresponding to capital management, the implications for the mechanism for efficient capital management are provided. Through the empirical results, it was shown that the cost stickiness is a product of opportunistic cost decision-making due to information asymmetry, and it is to present evidence that expands the meaning of the causes of asymmetric cost behavior.

Purpose: This study used ESG grade, but defined AESG, adjusted to the size of a company and examines whether it can be used as an investment strategy. Research design, data and methodology: The analysis sample in this study is a company that has given an ESG rating among companies listed on the Korea Stock Exchange. We examine the results through portfolio analysis and Fama-macbeth regression analysis. Results: As result of examining the long-only performance and the long-short performance by constructing quintile portfolios, it was observed that a significant positive return was shown. It was observed that there was an alpha that could not be explained in asset pricing models. Also, AESG had a return prediction effect in the result of a Fama-Macbeth regression that controlled corporate characteristic variables in individual stocks. Next, we confirmed AESG's usage through various portfolio composition. In the portfolio optimization, the Risk Efficient method was the most superior in terms of sharpe ratio and the construct multi-factor model with Value, Momentum and Low Vol showed statistically significant performance improvement. Conclusions: The results of this study suggest that it can be helpful in ESG investment to reflect the ESG rating of relatively small companies more through the scale adjustment of the ESG rating (i.e.AESG).