韩国对外战略调整的原因分析-美中战略竞争下不断增加的北韩威胁对东北亚安全局势带来的深远影响

Analysis of the Reason for ROK's Foreign Strategy Adjustment: The growing threat from DPRK under the U.S.-China strategic competition and its profound influences on the security situation in Northeast Asia

特朗普政府时期美国已表明了 "中国是美国的战略竞争者, 也是修正主义势力, 更是对美国繁荣和安全的主要挑战" 这种立场, 拜登政府也基本上继承了这种对中国的认识。中国也对此积极应对。因此, 美中战略竞争已成为当今国际体系中最重要的背景因素, 也对东北亚安全局势产生了巨大的影响。尽管如此, 观察最近韩美日三边安全合作的形成过程时我们可以发现, 尹锡悦总统上台之后韩国的对外战略调整对韩美日三边安全合作的形成起到了关键性作用。这是因为美国一如既往希望构建的韩美日三边安全合作的成败取决于韩日关系的改善, 而尹锡悦政府不顾韩国国内政治的制约因素, 果断推动了韩日关系的快速改善。随后, 在戴维营召开的韩美日三国峰会为未来三国在安全及其他更广泛领域的合作奠定了基础。中国对韩美日三边安全合作的形成提出了强烈的不满和抗议。但本文认为, 韩国虽然同意与美国和日本形成韩美日三边安全合作, 但韩国的战略目标与美国和日本的战略目标都不完全一致。比如, 回顾冷战结束之后的美日同盟发展历程, 美国与日本都对中国的崛起持有类似的看法和认识。最近几年美日同盟加强的实际目标也主要是如何应对中国的崛起。与此相反, 韩国历届政府都对韩美日三边安全合作持消极的态度。这是因为韩国想要追求的最主要的战略目标是如何减少或消除来自北韩的威胁, 而不是应对中国。面对北韩不断增强的挑衅与威胁, 过半数的韩国人支持通过加强韩美日三边安全合作来遏制或缓解来自北韩的威胁。因此, 只要北韩的核威胁与导弹挑衅持续存在, 那韩国的对外战略方向就很可能是加强韩美日三边安全合作, 以确保自身的安全与生存。所以, 如果中国想要减少韩美日三边安全合作给中国带来的战略上的压力, 最好的方案是降低北韩对韩国的挑衅和威胁, 在让北韩放弃核武器的问题上扮演更加实质性的角色。

Under the Trump administration, the U.S. has made clear that "China is America's strategic competitor, revisionist power and a major challenge to America's prosperity and security." The Biden administration has largely inherited this perception of China. China has also responded without backing down. Therefore, the U.S.-China strategic competition has become the most important background factor in the international system and has a great impact on the security situation in Northeast Asia. Nevertheless, if you look at the recent process of establishing trilateral security cooperation among ROK, the U.S. and Japan, we can find that ROK's foreign strategy adjustment has played a key role. This is because establishing trilateral security cooperation among ROK, the U.S. and Japan depends on improving ROK-Japan relations. And the Yoon Suk Yeol government is pushing for rapid improvement in ROK-Japan relations regardless of domestic political constraints. The trilateral summit at Camp David laid the groundwork for future cooperation among ROK, the U.S. and Japan in security and other broader areas. China is strongly dissatisfied with the formation of trilateral security cooperation among ROK, the U.S. and Japan. However, this paper argues that although ROK agrees to form trilateral security cooperation with the U.S. and Japan, ROK's strategic objectives are not exactly the same as those of the U.S. and Japan. For example, looking back at the development of the U.S.-Japan alliance after the end of the Cold War, both the U.S. and Japan share similar views and perceptions of China's rise. The real goal of the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance in recent years is also how to cope with China's rise. On the other hand, ROK's previous administrations have been negative about trilateral security cooperation with the U.S. and Japan. This is because ROK's main strategic goal is to reduce or eliminate threats from DPRK rather than respond to China. Faced with increasing DPRK's provocations and threats, more than half of South Koreans are in favor of reinforcing trilateral security cooperation with the U.S. and Japan to contain or mitigate threats from DPRK. As a result, if North Korea's nuclear and missile threats to ROK continue, then ROK's foreign strategy is likely to be to strengthen trilateral security cooperation between the U.S. and Japan to ensure its own safety and survival. If China wants to reduce the strategic pressure from the trilateral security cooperation among ROK, the U.S. and Japan, the best way is to reduce DPRK's provocations and threats to ROK and play a more substantive role in getting DPRK to give up its nuclear program.