Journal of Digital Convergence (디지털융복합연구)

The Society of Digital Policy and Management (한국디지털정책학회)
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The Effect of Management Forecast Precision on CEO Compensation-Accounting Performance

경영자 이익예측 정확성이 성과-보상에 미치는 영향

  • Lee, Eun-Ju (Business School, Pusan National University) ;
  • Sim, Won-Mi (Business School, BUSAN INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY) ;
  • Kim, Jeong-Kyo (Business School, Pusan Natiional University)
  • 이은주 (부산대학교 경영학과) ;
  • 심원미 (부산과학기술대학교 경영과) ;
  • 김정교 (부산대학교 경영학과)
  • Received : 2018.08.03
  • Accepted : 2018.10.20
  • Published : 2018.10.28
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Abstract

The purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of managerial predictive accuracy on managerial performance-compensation. In this study, we compared managerial performance with managerial performance, And to analyze the relationship between manager compensation and manager compensation using managerial profit prediction accuracy. As a result of this study, there is a significant positive relationship between profit prediction accuracy and manager compensation, which can be interpreted as a result of manager's ability to compensate manager's ability to predict the future well. In this paper, we propose a new methodology that can be used to analyze the effects of managerial compensation on managerial compensation. This is because there is a difference in that it is proved to be a factor. Therefore, it is important to note that the prediction of the future of the company also identifies the additional determinants that affect manager compensation contracts with the key managerial capabilities.

본 연구는 경영자 능력의 대용치로 경영자가 자발적으로 공시하는 미래 기업의 성과에 대한 정보인 이익 예측 정확성을 사용하여, 미래 이익을 정확하게 예측하는 경영자의 우수한 능력이 높을수록 경영자 성과-보상에 어떠한 영향을 미치는지에 대해 분석하고자 한다. 본 연구의 분석결과, 이익 예측 정확성과 경영자 보상 사이의 유의한 양(+)의 관계가 나타났으며, 이는 미래에 대한 예측이 우수한 경영자의 능력을 경영자 보상 계약에 반영한 결과로 볼 수 있다. 본 연구는 기존 선행연구에서 경영자의 능력의 대용치로 회계성과 변수를 주로 사용하여 경영자 보상 계약을 확인한 것을 확장하여 미래 기업이 직면할 상황을 정확하게 예측하는 경영자의 능력이 경영자 보상에 영향을 미치는 주요한 결정 요인임을 검증하였다는 것에 차별성이 존재한다. 따라서 기업의 미래에 대한 예측 역시 중요한 경영자의 역량으로 경영자 보상 계약에 영향을 미치는 추가적인 결정요인을 파악했다는 것에 의의가 있다.

Keywords

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