• Journal of Industrial Convergence
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• v.20 no.11
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• pp.105-112
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• 2022

The purpose of this study is to examine the moderating effect of the reporting earnings strategy on the relationship between managerial ability and manager performance-reward sensitivity. Both upward and downward adjustments can occur in the direction of management performance adjustment according to the manager's reporting earnings strategy. was found to decrease performance-based performance-reward sensitivity. The underreporting strategy is hypothesized that, although additional compensation is paid for the performance of the reporting strategy according to the manager's ability, the level of compensation increases, but this type of compensation will decrease the performance-reward sensitivity because this type of compensation is irrelevant to the actual performance of the manager. This is the result of indirectly confirming that discriminatory compensation is provided for upward and downward adjustment of business performance according to the reporting earnings strategy.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.16 no.10
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• pp.125-132
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• 2018

The purpose of this study is to analyze the effect of managerial predictive accuracy on managerial performance-compensation. In this study, we compared managerial performance with managerial performance, And to analyze the relationship between manager compensation and manager compensation using managerial profit prediction accuracy. As a result of this study, there is a significant positive relationship between profit prediction accuracy and manager compensation, which can be interpreted as a result of manager's ability to compensate manager's ability to predict the future well. In this paper, we propose a new methodology that can be used to analyze the effects of managerial compensation on managerial compensation. This is because there is a difference in that it is proved to be a factor. Therefore, it is important to note that the prediction of the future of the company also identifies the additional determinants that affect manager compensation contracts with the key managerial capabilities.