루드빅 볼츠만의 과학 방법론에 대한 역사-비판적 검토

Critics on Ludwig Boltzmann's Methodology of Science

본 연구는 루드빅 볼츠만의 과학 방법론 및 물리학적 인식들에 대한 인식론적 지위 문제를 역사-비판적으로 검토한다. 잘 알다시피, 그는 열역학의 확률론적 해석을 통해 통계 물리학의 발판을 마련했을 뿐만 아니라, 과학 방법론에 대한 많은 논문들을 발표했고 직접 철학을 강의하기도 했다. 그러나 물리학의 인식론에 대한 그의 입장은 실재론과 현상론, 유물론과 관념론, 절대적 진리관과 상대적 진리관 사이에서 배회했다. 이에 본 연구에서는 과학사 및 과학 철학의 관점에서 19 세기 말에서 20 세기 초에 걸쳐 전개된 물리학의 방법론 및 인식론들에 대한 다양한 논쟁들을 비판적으로 검토하면서 볼츠만의 이러한 배회의 배경을 해명하면서 동시에 그에게서 볼 수 있는 일관된 과학방법론 및 인식론을 도출하여 재구성하려고 노력할 것이다. 단정적으로 말하면, 우리는 그것을 '정신-물체 동일성 이론'으로 특성화하면서, 아울러 이러한 동일성 이론은 작금의 물리학적 인식론의 바람직한 한 형태가 될 수 있다는 것을 정당화하려고 노력할 것이다.

As for the methodology of physical science, on the one side, Ludwig Boltzmann was declined to Scientific Realist and at the same time Epistemological Idealist. But on the other. He was neither fully nor consistently either one of them, because of rejecting the causal realism of the former and the belief in absolute certainty of the latter. Is there nevertheless any evidence that he had a coherent world view of his own? Yes. In short, he seems to identify his own position with what is called a mind-matter identity theory. In 1897, he supported that psychological processes are identical with certain processes in the brain(realism). And in 1903, he said : "Physics is not separated from psychology. They are only different sides." But Boltzmann did not explain concretely the possibility of this identity. So I tried to construct one theory of identity which is suitable for understanding problems n the physical world, though whether it would work for a full-scale world view which includes both physical and mental phenomena remains problematic. If light phenomena, for example, tend to be measured in terms of some contexts as if light were a wave and in others as if light were a particle, then one may be able to reasonably suppose that light has whatever characteristics in itself which it must have in order to seem like a wave under some conditions of measurement and like a particle in others. If this theory is provisionally to mental phenomena as well, it would mean that reality has those characteristics in itself which it must have to appear as it does to the various faculties of the mind and as it is measured in different physical situations. This is probably not what Boltzmann meant by his theory of identity, since it is very ontological and metaphysical. But in my opinion it is by far the most reasonable identity theory.