• Journal of Science and Technology Studies
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• v.4 no.1 s.7
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• pp.1-30
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• 2004

In this paper, I have attempted to show how the environmental controversy surrounding the Saemangeurn Reclamation Project in Korea has been framed as narrow scientific debates. First of all, science, or specifically the Expert Review Pane, has played dual roles in the controversy. On the one hand, it has contributed to illuminating the future environmental impacts of reclamation, by so doing, to providing a momentum to reconsider the project. This has significant meaning that environmental concerns successfully checked the symbolic national project of developmental era through adopting a joint-investigation scheme that guaranteed participation of environmental groups on an equal footing with the government. On the other hand, by limiting the scope and participants of discussion, it fundamentally blocked the possibilities of public debates and deliberative decision-making with full considerations of the political, social, and cultural aspects of the controversy. I have shown that this is due to the realist belief shared by both the developers and the environmentalists in Korea that 'proper' science would disclose the truth. Environmental groups, in particular, were naive in evaluating the role of scientific expertise in the controversy and neglected the political role of the Expert Review Pane as a ritual. In opposition to the realist argument, I have shown through the analysis of the water quality debates concerning the future fresh water lakes that scientific 'facts' were not discovered but constructed through complex negotiations, conflicts, and compromises among related actors. The framing of the controversy as an experts' debate has resulted in the exclusion of an important actor from the discussion. Little attention has been paid throughout the controversy to the very people who have lived in the Saemangeum area for generations and will lose their livelihood all together soon. About 20,000 fishermen are living on the Saemangeum tidal flats.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.117
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• pp.57-84
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• 2011

As for the methodology of physical science, on the one side, Ludwig Boltzmann was declined to Scientific Realist and at the same time Epistemological Idealist. But on the other. He was neither fully nor consistently either one of them, because of rejecting the causal realism of the former and the belief in absolute certainty of the latter. Is there nevertheless any evidence that he had a coherent world view of his own? Yes. In short, he seems to identify his own position with what is called a mind-matter identity theory. In 1897, he supported that psychological processes are identical with certain processes in the brain(realism). And in 1903, he said : "Physics is not separated from psychology. They are only different sides." But Boltzmann did not explain concretely the possibility of this identity. So I tried to construct one theory of identity which is suitable for understanding problems n the physical world, though whether it would work for a full-scale world view which includes both physical and mental phenomena remains problematic. If light phenomena, for example, tend to be measured in terms of some contexts as if light were a wave and in others as if light were a particle, then one may be able to reasonably suppose that light has whatever characteristics in itself which it must have in order to seem like a wave under some conditions of measurement and like a particle in others. If this theory is provisionally to mental phenomena as well, it would mean that reality has those characteristics in itself which it must have to appear as it does to the various faculties of the mind and as it is measured in different physical situations. This is probably not what Boltzmann meant by his theory of identity, since it is very ontological and metaphysical. But in my opinion it is by far the most reasonable identity theory.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.7
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• pp.1-24
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• 2009

This article deals with military thought in general. First I tried to distinguish 'thought' from 'theory', 'philosophy', and 'principle'. Thought means the act of thinking about or considering something, an idea or opinion, or a set of ideas about a particular subject, e.g. military affairs in the present discussion. Theory means a formal statement of the rules on which a subject of study is based or of ideas which are suggested to explain a fact or event or, more generally, an opinion or explanation. Philosophy means the use of reason in understanding such things as the nature of reality and existence, the use and limits of knowledge. Principle means a basic idea or rule that explains or controls how something happens or works. Chapter 3 summarized the characteristics of military thoughts into five points', (i) it is closely related with concrete experiences of a nation; (ii) it includes philosophical and logical arguments; (iii) it relies heavily on the political thought of a nation; (iv) it includes necessarily value-judgments; (v) it contains visions of a nation which are not only descriptions or explanations of military affairs, but also evaluations and advocacies. Chapter 4 considers the relation of international political thoughts to military thought. Throughout the history of the modem states system there have been three competing traditions of thought: the Hobbesian or realist tradition, which views international politics as a state of war; the Kantian or universalist tradition, which sees at work in international politics a potential community of mankind; and the Grotian or internationalist tradition, which views international politics as taking place within an international society. Chapter 5 considers the law of war, which is a body of law concerning acceptable justifications to engage in war (jus ad bellum) and the limits to acceptable wartime conduct (jus in bello). Among other issues, modem laws of war address declarations of war, acceptance of surrender and the treatment of prisoners of war, military necessity along with distinction and proportionality, and the prohibition of certain weapons that may cause unnecessary suffering.

• Journal of the Korean earth science society
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• v.23 no.4
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• pp.309-323
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• 2002

This qualitative study investigated preservice teachers' understandings of the ontology and epistemology underlying constructivist notions of learning through four in-depth interviews. Of the sixteen participants in a larger study, five significantly changed ontological and epistemological beliefs and eleven did not. This study focused on these eleven teachers who have hardly changed their philosophical beliefs throughout the teacher education program. Ten teachers who consistently maintained the scientific realist beliefs were presented as a composite case (Young's case). Among the eleven teachers, there was one outlier who had consistently maintained an idealist and relativist epistemological position from the beginning of the study and was subjected to another case analysis (Ben's case). These cases corroborated the assertion that each individual's deeply entrenched ontological and epistemological beliefs are very hard to change. For researchers, this study offers insights into the reasons that preservice teachers give for non-changes in their thinking about learning to teach. The study also examines preservice teachers' perceived constraints in implementing their ideal pedagogies and the influence of the teacher education program on their pedagogical beliefs changes. The benefits and influences of the M.Ed. program's theoretical coursework and the field experiences on these teachers' learning-to-teach experiences are addressed with rich data. The implications for teacher educators as well as for the instructional practices of preservice teacher education programs are discussed. This research emphasize necessity of the field-based teacher education program and the need of empowering experienced school teachers as teacher educators in teacher preparation and professional development.