The Future War in the 21st Century and the Groundwork for the Korean Style Military Thought

21세기 미래전과 한국적 군사사상 형성의 조건

This article aims to critically review recent U. S. RMA-centered theories of warfare having prevailed after the 1991-92 Gulf War upon which the current ROKA military transformation project, the Vision 2020, largely based. In order to evaluate validity as a universal warfighing theory of NCW (Network Centric Warfare) and EBO (Effects-Based Operations), this article reviews the intrinsic strength and weakness of the theories as well as results of several recent wars that the U. S. Army conducted based on doctrines derived form such theories, In addition, this article examines the impact of certain military technology or weapon system in some well-known historical wars to draw lessons regarding the relationship between technology(weapon system) and military victory. Historical examples has shown that victories in war were not achieved by new technologies alone in most cases. Rather military victories tended to owe to combination of new technology, original doctrine and well conceived organization. Although the U. S. Armed Forces showed brilliant records of operational successes anchored on the system of PGMs and NCW concepts in Iraq (1991-92; 2003) and Afghanistan (2001-02), it must be pointed out that the operational successes did not bring about political ones in cases of Iraq and Afghanistan. It reminds us of perils of too technologically tilted approach to the conduct of war. In sum, one ought to recognize that superior technology nowadays became a necessary condition of success but is not yet a sufficient condition, the ROKA needs to be abreast with development trends of military technologies and related theoretical concepts, it need not too be in a hurry in adopting cutting edged war-making technologies at the expense of large amount of budget. The essay recommends for the ROKA several basic requirements for coping with conduct of future wars as well as establishing a 'Korean style military thought'; (1) Recognition of importance of technology in conduct of war; (2) Imposition of officer self-study hours in working days; (3) Establishing a lifestyle of military professionalism in the Korean officer corps; (4) Setting up small or large groups of think-tanks that are specialized in army doctrinal formulation.