재상업복무교역중적매매관계중상호신임대관계적효적영향(在商业服务交易中的买卖关系中相互信任对关系绩效的影响)

The Effect of Mutual Trust on Relational Performance in Supplier-Buyer Relationships for Business Services Transactions

信任在心理学, 经济学, 社会学中已被广泛研究, 其重要性不仅在市场营销中被强调, 在一般商业原则中也被强调. 供应商和买家之间的关系与过去不同, 过去的关系需要相当大的私人网络优势, 并可能涉及不道德的商业行为. 而在以工业营销成功的为核心的二十一世纪激烈的全球竞争中, 供应商和买家之间的关系是伙伴关系. 在相互合作的高级别信任的基础上, 通过交换的关系, 这会给买家和供应商带来长期的利益, 竞争力增强和交易成本的降低以及其他福利. 尽管现有的研究有信任的重要性, 但是在购买与供应关系中却忽视了信任的作用, 也没有系统地分析信任对关系的影响. 因此, 深入研究, 确定买家和商业服务供应商之间信任和关系绩效之间的联系是绝对需要的. 本研究中的商业服务, 包括那些支持制造业, 正作为下一代经济增长的引擎而吸引着人们的注意. 韩国政府已选择其作为制造业发展的战略领域. 由于商业服务开放市场的需求日趋激烈, 商业服务业的竞争力应该比以往得到更多的提倡. 本研究的目的是探索相互信任对买家和供应商之间的关系绩效的影响. 具体来说, 本研究在商业服务交易中提出了一个关于信任-关系绩效的理论模型, 并实证检验根据模型而提出的假设. 这项研究表明, 研究结果有战略意义. 本研究通过多种方法收集经验数据. 这些方法包括通过电话, 邮件和面试. 作为样本的公司是在韩国供应和购买商业服务的以知识为本的公司. 本研究收集的是二进的基础数据. 每个样本公司对包括购买公司及其相应的供应公司. 并跟踪调查每个公司对的相互信任. 本研究为商业服务的买卖双方提出了信任-关系绩效的模型. 该模型由信任和它的前因和后果. 买家的信任分为对供应公司的信任和对销售人员的信任. 根据Doney 和Cannon (1997)的研究我们在个人水平和组织水平上观察信任. 通常情况下, 买方是信任的受体, 但这项研究我们建议以供应商为观察受体. 因此, 它独特的关注了双边角度的知觉风险. 换言之, 供应商和买家一样, 是信任的主体, 因为交易通常是双边的. 从这个角度来看, 供应商对买家信任和买方对供货商的信赖一样重要. 供应商的信任从某种程度上受它信任的买方公司和买家的影响. 这种使用个人水平和组织水平的信任分类是根据Doney 和Cannon (1997)的研究. 信任影响供应商的选择, 这是一项双向放的工作. 供应商们积极参与供应商选择过程中, 和买家密切的一起工作. 此外, 该过程从某种程度上受每一方信任的合作伙伴的影响. 挑选过程包括一些步骤: 识别, 信息检索, 供应商选择和绩效评价. 作为这一进程的结果, 买家和供应商都进行绩效评估, 并就这些结果为基础, 采取有形或无形的纠正行动. 本研究中使用的关于信任的测量问项是根据Mayer, Davis 和 Schoorman (1995) 以及Mayer和Davis (1999)的研究发展起来的. 根据他们的建议, 有关信任的三个方面的研究包括有能力, 善和完整. 根据商业服务这个背景我们调整了原来的问题. 例如, 如 "他/她的专业能力" 已被改为 "当我们讨论我们的产品时销售人员表现出专业能力. "这项研究使用的测量问项不同于在以往的研究中使用的问项（Rotter 1967; Sullivan和Peterson 1982; Dwyer和Oh 1987. 本研究中有关信任的前因后果的测量问项是根据Doney和Cannon (1997)的研究为基础制定的. 根据商业服务这个背景我们调整了原来的问题. 特别是, 问题被设计为对买家和供应商以解决下列因素: 信誉 (诚信, 客户服务, 良好意愿), 市场地位 (公司规模, 市场份额, 在行业中的地位), 愿意定制（产品, 过程, 交付), 信息共享(专有信息, 个人信息), 愿意保持良好关系, 认为专业, 权威授权, 买方与卖方的相似性, 以及接触频率. 作为信任相应的变量, 我们对关系绩效进行了测试. 关系绩效分为有形的影响, 无形影响, 和副作用. 有形的影响包括财务业绩;无形的影响, 包括关系的改善, 网络开发, 以及内部员工的满意度;副作用包括既不是有形影响也不是无形影响的影响. 我们联系了350对公司, 105对公司答复了我们. 由于不完整我们删除了5对公司, 105对公司被用于数据分析. 用于数据分析的回应率为30%(三百五十零分之一百零五), 高于工业营销的平均回复比率. 至于回复的公司的特点, 大多数的公司运作的商业服务既为买方(85.4%)也为供应商(81.8%). 大部分买家是做消费品贸易(76%), 而供应商的大部分(70%)是做工业品贸易. 这可能意味着买家的过程是购入材料, 部件和组件从而生产消费品成品. 正如他们对他们与合作伙伴关系的长度的报告表示, 供应商比买家有更长的商业关系. 假设1测试买方-供应方特点对信任的影响. 销售人员的专业度(t=2.070, p<0.05)和权威授权(t=2.328, p<0.05)积极影响买方对供应方的信任. 另一方面, 权威授权(t=2.192, p<0.05)积极影响供应方对买方的信任. 对买方和供应方来说, 权威授权的程度对保持对彼此的信任有关键作用. 假设2测试买卖双方关系特点对信任的影响. 买家倾向于信任供应方, 因为供应方总是尽全力联系买方(t=2.212, p<0.05)这种倾向性在供应方方面也表现得很强(t=2.591, p<0.01). 另一方面, 供应商对买方的信任是由于供应商感知买家与自己的相似性(t=2.702, p<0.01). 这一发现证实了Crosby, Evans, 和Cowles(1990)的研究结果. 他们的结果表明供应方和买方通过商务或私务的定期会议来建立彼此的联系. 假设3测试信任对感知风险的影响. 结果表明无论对买方还是供应方, 信任越低, 感知风险就越大(买方: t =-6.621, p<0.01; 供应方: t=-2.437, p<0.05). 有趣的是, 这一趋势已被证明对买方更强. 这种较高水平的感知风险的一个可能的解释是在商业服务交易中买方通常比供应方感知到更大的风险. 为此, 有必要对供应商对买方实施减少风险的战略. 假设4测试信任对信息搜集. 根据结果, 对供应方和买方, 与预期相反, 信任取决于他们合作伙伴的名誉(买方t=2.929, p<0.01; 供应方t=2.711, p<0.05). 这一发现表明, 具有良好信誉的供应商往往是可信的. 以往的经验并没有显示出任何与买家或供应商信任的重要关系. 假设5测试信任对供应方/买方选择的影响. 与买方不同, 当供应方认为以往与买方的交易重要时, 供应方倾向信任买方(t=2.913 p<0.01). 但是, 本研究并没有现实资源忠诚和买方对供应方的信任之间有显著关系. 假设6测试的是信任对关系绩效的影响. 对买方和供应方, 当财务表现被报告提高时, 他们比较信任他们的合作伙伴(买方: t=2.301, p<0.05;供应方: t=3.692, p<0.01). 有趣的是, 这种趋势在供应方比较明显. 类似的, 当竞争力被报告提高时, 买卖双方比较信任他们的合作伙伴(买方t=3.563, p<0.01 ; 供应方t=3.042, p<0.01). 对供应方来说, 当对买方信任时效率和生产力会提高(t=2.673, p<0.01). 其他绩效指标与信任没有显著关系. 这项研究结果有一定的战略意义. 首先和最重要的是, 以信任为基础的交易对供应商和买家而言都是有益的. 根据研究证实, 通过努力建立和保持相互信任可以使财务表现提高. 同样, 可以通过同样的努力提高竞争力. 第二, 以信任为基础的交易能够减少购买情况中的感知风险. 这对供应商和买家都有启示. 人们普遍认为, 在一个高度参与的采购情况中买家感知到更高的风险. 为了减少风险, 以往的研究已建议供应商制定降低风险的策略. 而本研究的特点是从双边角度关注知觉风险. 换言之, 供应商也容易存在风险, 特别是当他们提供的服务, 需要非常先进的技术, 操作和维护. 因此, 购买者和供应商必须一起密切合作解决问题. 因此, 相互信任在问题解决过程中起着关键作用. 第三, 在这项研究中发现, 销售人员有更多的授权, 他或她越被信任. 这一发现从战术角度看是非常重要的. 建立信任是一个长期的任务, 然而, 当互信尚未开发, 供应商能够通过授权销售人员做出某些决定来克服遇到的问题, 这一结论也适用于供应商.

Trust has been studied extensively in psychology, economics, and sociology, and its importance has been emphasized not only in marketing, but also in business disciplines in general. Unlike past relationships between suppliers and buyers, which take considerable advantage of private networks and may involve unethical business practices, partnerships between suppliers and buyers are at the core of success for industrial marketing amid intense global competition in the 21st century. A high level of mutual cooperation occurs through an exchange relationship based on trust, which brings long-term benefits, competitive enhancements, and transaction cost reductions, among other benefits, for both buyers and suppliers. In spite of the important role of trust, existing studies in buy-supply situations overlook the role of trust and do not systematically analyze the effect of trust on relational performance. Consequently, an in-depth study that determines the relation of trust to the relational performance between buyers and suppliers of business services is absolutely needed. Business services in this study, which include those supporting the manufacturing industry, are drawing attention as the economic growth engine for the next generation. The Korean government has selected business services as a strategic area for the development of manufacturing sectors. Since the demands for opening business services markets are becoming fiercer, the competitiveness of the business service industry must be promoted now more than ever. The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of the mutual trust between buyers and suppliers on relational performance. Specifically, this study proposed a theoretical model of trust-relational performance in the transactions of business services and empirically tested the hypotheses delineated from the framework. The study suggests strategic implications based on research findings. Empirical data were collected via multiple methods, including via telephone, mail, and in-person interviews. Sample companies were knowledge-based companies supplying and purchasing business services in Korea. The present study collected data on a dyadic basis. Each pair of sample companies includes a buying company and its corresponding supplying company. Mutual trust was traced for each pair of companies. This study proposes a model of trust-relational performance of buying-supplying for business services. The model consists of trust and its antecedents and consequences. The trust of buyers is classified into trust toward the supplying company and trust toward salespersons. Viewing trust both at the individual level and the organizational level is based on the research of Doney and Cannon (1997). Normally, buyers are the subject of trust, but this study supposes that suppliers are the subjects. Hence, it uniquely focused on the bilateral perspective of perceived risk. In other words, suppliers, like buyers, are the subject of trust since transactions are normally bilateral. From this point of view, suppliers' trust in buyers is as important as buyers' trust in suppliers. The suppliers' trust is influenced by the extent to which it trusts the buying companies and the buyers. This classification of trust using an individual level and an organization level is based on the suggestion of Doney and Cannon (1997). Trust affects the process of supplier selection, which works in a bilateral manner. Suppliers are actively involved in the supplier selection process, working very closely with buyers. In addition, the process is affected by the extent to which each party trusts its partners. The selection process consists of certain steps: recognition, information search, supplier selection, and performance evaluation. As a result of the process, both buyers and suppliers evaluate the performance and take corrective actions on the basis of such outcomes as tangible, intangible, and/or side effects. The measurement of trust used for the present study was developed on the basis of the studies of Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995) and Mayer and Davis (1999). Based on their recommendations, the three dimensions of trust used for the study include ability, benevolence, and integrity. The original questions were adjusted to the context of the transactions of business services. For example, a question such as "He/she has professional capabilities" has been changed to "The salesperson showed professional capabilities while we talked about our products." The measurement used for this study differs from those used in previous studies (Rotter 1967; Sullivan and Peterson 1982; Dwyer and Oh 1987). The measurements of the antecedents and consequences of trust used for this study were developed on the basis of Doney and Cannon (1997). The original questions were adjusted to the context of transactions in business services. In particular, questions were developed for both buyers and suppliers to address the following factors: reputation (integrity, customer care, good-will), market standing (company size, market share, positioning in the industry), willingness to customize (product, process, delivery), information sharing (proprietary information, private information), willingness to maintain relationships, perceived professionalism, authority empowerment, buyer-seller similarity, and contact frequency. As a consequential variable of trust, relational performance was measured. Relational performance is classified into tangible effects, intangible effects, and side effects. Tangible effects include financial performance; intangible effects include improvements in relations, network developing, and internal employee satisfaction; side effects include those not included either in the tangible or intangible effects. Three hundred fifty pairs of companies were contacted, and one hundred five pairs of companies responded. After deleting five company pairs because of incomplete responses, one hundred five pairs of companies were used for data analysis. The response ratio of the companies used for data analysis is 30% (105/350), which is above the average response ratio in industrial marketing research. As for the characteristics of the respondent companies, the majority of the companies operate service businesses for both buyers (85.4%) and suppliers (81.8%). The majority of buyers (76%) deal with consumer goods, while the majority of suppliers (70%) deal with industrial goods. This may imply that buyers process the incoming material, parts, and components to produce the finished consumer goods. As indicated by their report of the length of acquaintance with their partners, suppliers appear to have longer business relationships than do buyers. Hypothesis 1 tested the effects of buyer-supplier characteristics on trust. The salesperson's professionalism (t=2.070, p<0.05) and authority empowerment (t=2.328, p<0.05) positively affected buyers' trust toward suppliers. On the other hand, authority empowerment (t=2.192, p<0.05) positively affected supplier trust toward buyers. For both buyers and suppliers, the degree of authority empowerment plays a crucial role in the maintenance of their trust in each other. Hypothesis 2 tested the effects of buyerseller relational characteristics on trust. Buyers tend to trust suppliers, as suppliers make every effort to contact buyers (t=2.212, p<0.05). This tendency has also been shown to be much stronger for suppliers (t=2.591, p<0.01). On the other hand suppliers trust buyers because suppliers perceive buyers as being similar to themselves (t=2.702, p<0.01). This finding confirmed the results of Crosby, Evans, and Cowles (1990), which reported that suppliers and buyers build relationships through regular meetings, either for business or personal matters. Hypothesis 3 tested the effects of trust on perceived risk. It has been found that for both suppliers and buyers the lower is the trust, the higher is the perceived risk (t=-6.621, p<0.01 for buyers; t=-2.437, p<0.05). Interestingly, this tendency has been shown to be much stronger for buyers than for suppliers. One possible explanation for this higher level of perceived risk is that buyers normally perceive higher risks than do suppliers in transactions involving business services. For this reason, it is necessary for suppliers to implement risk reduction strategies for buyers. Hypothesis 4 tested the effects of trust on information searching. It has been found that for both suppliers and buyers, contrary to expectation, trust depends on their partner's reputation (t=2.929, p<0.01 for buyers; t=2.711, p<0.05 for suppliers). This finding shows that suppliers with good reputations tend to be trusted. Prior experience did not show any significant relationship with trust for either buyers or suppliers. Hypothesis 5 tested the effects of trust on supplier/buyer selection. Unlike buyers, suppliers tend to trust buyers when they think that previous transactions with buyers were important (t=2.913 p<0.01). However, this study did not show any significant relationship between source loyalty and the trust of buyers in suppliers. Hypothesis 6 tested the effects of trust on relational performances. For buyers and suppliers, financial performance reportedly improved when they trusted their partners (t=2.301, p<0.05 for buyers; t=3.692, p<0.01 for suppliers). It is interesting that this tendency was much stronger for suppliers than it was for buyers. Similarly, competitiveness was reported to improve when buyers and suppliers trusted their partners (t=3.563, p<0.01 for buyers; t=3.042, p<0.01 for suppliers). For suppliers, efficiency and productivity were reportedly improved when they trusted buyers (t=2.673, p<0.01). Other performance indices showed insignificant relationships with trust. The findings of this study have some strategic implications. First and most importantly, trust-based transactions are beneficial for both suppliers and buyers. As verified in the study, financial performance can be improved through efforts to build and maintain mutual trust. Similarly, competitiveness can be increased through the same kinds of effort. Second, trust-based transactions can facilitate the reduction of perceived risks inherent in the purchasing situation. This finding has implications for both suppliers and buyers. It is generally believed that buyers perceive higher risks in a highly involved purchasing situation. To reduce risks, previous studies have recommended that suppliers devise risk-reducing tactics. Moving beyond these recommendations, the present study uniquely focused on the bilateral perspective of perceived risk. In other words, suppliers are also susceptible to perceived risks, especially when they supply services that require very technical and sophisticated manipulations and maintenance. Consequently, buyers and suppliers must solve problems together in close collaboration. Hence, mutual trust plays a crucial role in the problem-solving process. Third, as found in this study, the more authority a salesperson has, the more he or she can be trusted. This finding is very important with regard to tactics. Building trust is a long-term assignment; however, when mutual trust has not been developed, suppliers can overcome the problems they encounter by empowering a salesperson with the authority to make certain decisions. This finding applies to suppliers as well.