Towards a Combinatorial Auction Design Methodology

조합경매 설계방법론에 관한 연구

  • Choi, Jin-Ho (Graduate School of Management, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology(KAIST)) ;
  • Chang, Yong-Sik (Department of e-Business, Hanshin University) ;
  • Han, In-Goo (Graduate School of Management, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology(KAIST))
  • 최진호 (한국과학기술원 테크노경영대학원) ;
  • 장용식 (한신대학교 경상대학 e-비즈니스학과) ;
  • 한인구 (한국과학기술원 테크노경영대학원)
  • Published : 2006.08.30

Abstract

As the interest in the combinatorial auction has increased, diverse combinatorial auction market types have been proposed. Although there have been several studies on the combinatorial auction design, the studies covered some factors or partial dimensions of combinatorial auction design. Given the potential practical value of combinatorial auctions, it is necessary to approach it with an integrated and systematic design methodology for supporting a comprehensive range of combinatorial auction models. Thus, we present a systematic framework for combinatorial auction design methodology. In particular, we classified the combinatorial auction architecture types, process types, and mechanism types. This framework characterizes the different combinatorial auction models, and lead to a useful taxonomy of the combinatorial auction design factors and taxonomy of the market types by coordination among the design factors. In addition, we illustrate an n-bilateral combinatorial auction market, derived from our design methodology, to show the viability of our study.

기업간 전자상거래에서 조합경매(combinational auction)에 대한 관심이 증가함에 따라 다양한 조합경매 유형이 제시되고 있다. 조합경매의 실용성에 대한 잠재적 중요성을 고려할 때, 다양한 조합경매모델을 지원할 수 있는 통합적이고 체계적인 설계방법이 필요하다. 조합경매 설계에 대한 기존 연구들은 조합경매에 관한 일부 설계요소들에 대해서만 제시하였으며, 부분적인 측면에서 연구가 진행되어 전체적인 관점에서의 설계체계가 제시되지 않았다. 이에 본 연구에서는 조합경매모형에 대한 설계의 토대가 될 수 있는 체계적인 틀을 제시하고자 한다. 설계단계는 크게 아키텍처, 프로토콜, 거래전략 설계 과정으로 이루어진다. 설계과정에서 아키텍처 유형과 프로세스 유형을 분류하고 이들의 조합으로 나타나는 메커니즘 유형을 분류하여 조합경매 모형에 대한 분류체계를 제시하였다. 또한, 거래전략 설계 단계에서는, 거래 당사자들의 다양한 전략을 반영하여 최적의 거래대상을 선정하는 최적화 모형에 기반한 효과적인 조합경매모형 설계방법을 제안하였다. 마지막으로, 본 방법론에 기반하여 새로운 조합경매 모형인 다자간 일반 조합경매 시장에 대한 설계과정을 예시함으로써, 본 방법론의 적용 가능성을 제시하였다.

Keywords

References

  1. Abrache, J., B. Bourbeau, G. T. Crainic, and M. Gendreau, 'A new bidding framework for combinatorial e-auctions', Computers & Operations Research, Vol.31, No.8, 2004a, pp. 177-1203
  2. Abrache, J., T. G. Crainic, and M. Gendreau, 'Design issues for combinatorial auctions', 4OR, Vol.2, No.1, 2004b, pp. 1-33
  3. Ausubel. L, M., P. Cramton, and P. Milgrom, The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design. In P. Cramton; Y. Shoham; and R. Steinberd (1st ed.), Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press, 2006
  4. Ba, S., J. Stallaert, and A. B. Whinston, 'Optimal Investment in Knowledge Within a Finn Using a Market Mechanism', Management Science, Vol.47, No.9, 2001, pp. 1203-1219 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.47.9.1203.9781
  5. Babaioff, M. and W. E. Walsh, 'Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation', Decision Support Systems, Vol.39, No.1, 2005, pp. 123-149 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2004.08.008
  6. Bichler, M., A. Davenport, G. Hohner, and J. Kalagnanam, Industrial Procurement Auctions. In P. Cramton; Y. Shoham; and R. Steinberd (1st ed.), Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press, 2006
  7. Bichler, M., J. Kalagnanam, H. S. Lee, and J. Lee, 'Winner Determination Algorithms for Electronic Auctions: A Framework Design', Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol.2455, 2002, pp. 37-46 https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45705-4_5
  8. Bichler, M. and A. Segev, 'Methodologies for the design of negotiation protocols on E-markets', Computer Networks, Vol.37, No.2, 2001, pp. 137-152 https://doi.org/10.1016/S1389-1286(01)00212-2
  9. Chen, J., H. Huang, and R. J. Kauffman, 'A multi-attribute combinatorial auction approach to electronic procurement mechanism design', Available at http://misrc.umn.edu/workingpapers/fullpapers/full-papers/2005/0508_032805.pdf, 2005
  10. Fan, M., J. Stallaert, and A. B. Whinston, 'The Design and Development of a Financial Cybermarket with a Bundle Trading Mechanism', International Journal of Electronic Commerce, Vol.4, No.1, 1999, pp. 5-22
  11. Giovannucci, A., J. A. Rodriguez-Aguilar, A. Reyes, F. X. Noria, and J. Cerquides, 'Towards automated procurement via agent-aware negotiation support', Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2004, pp. 244-251
  12. Gomber, P., C. Schmidt, and C. Weinhardt, 'Efficiency, incentives and computational tractability in MAS-coordination', International Journal of Cooperative Information Systems, Vol.8, No.1, 1999, pp. 1-14 https://doi.org/10.1142/S0218843099000022
  13. Hoesel, S. V. and R. Muller, 'Optimization in electronic markets: examples in combinatorial auctions', Netnomics: Economic Research and Electronic Networking, Vol.3, No.1, 2001, pp. 23-33 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009940607600
  14. Holzman, R., N. Kfir-Dahav, D. Monderer, and M. Tennenholtz, 'Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions', Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.47, No.1, 2004, pp. 104-123 https://doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00184-2
  15. Jones, J. L. and G. J. Koehler, 'Combinatorial auctions using rule-based bids', Decision Support Systems, Vol. 34, No.1, 2002, pp. 59-74 https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-9236(02)00004-0
  16. Kim, J. B. and A. Segev, 'A framework for dynamic eBusiness negotiation processes', IEEE International Conference on E-Commerce, 2003, pp. 84-91
  17. Krishna, V. and R. W. Rosenthal, 'Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies', Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.17, No.1, 1996, pp. 1-31 https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0092
  18. Levin, J., 'An optimal auction for complements', Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.18, 1997, pp. 176-192 https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0534
  19. Leyton-Brown, K., M. Pearson, and Y. Shoham, 'Towards a Universal Test Suite for Combinatorial Auction Algorithms', Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. New York: ACM Press, 2000, pp. 66-76
  20. McAfee, R. P. and J. McMillan, 'Analyzing the Airwaves Auction', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.10, No.1, 1996, pp. 159-176 https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.10.1.159
  21. Nisan, N., 'Bidding and Allocation in Combinatorial Auctions', Electronic Commerce, 2000, pp. 1-12
  22. Park, S. J. and M. H. Rothkopf, 'Auctions with bidder-determined allowable combinations', European Journal of Operational Research, 161, 2005, pp. 399-415 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2003.08.057
  23. Pekec, A. and M. H. Rothkopf, 'Combinatorial Auction Design', Management Science, Vol. 49, No.11, 2003, pp. 1485-1503 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.49.11.1485.20585
  24. Porter, D., S. Rassenti, V. Smith, and A. Roopnarine, 'Combinatorial auction design', Available at http://www.ices-gmu.org/pdf/materials/419.pdf, 2003
  25. Rassenti, S. J., V. L. Simth, and R. L. Bulfin, 'A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport item slot allocation', Bell Journal of Economics. Vol.12, No.2, 1982, pp. 402-417
  26. Rothkopf, M. H., A. Pekec, and R. M. Harstad, 'Computationally manageable combinational auctions', Management Science, Vol.44, No.8, 1998, pp. 1131-1147 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.44.8.1131
  27. Sandholm, T., 'Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions', Artificial Intelligence, Vol.135, No.1/2, 2002a, pp. 1-54 https://doi.org/10.1016/S0004-3702(01)00159-X
  28. Sandholm, T., 'Approaches to winner determination in combinatorial auctions', Decision Support Systems, Vol.28, No.1/2, 2000, pp. 165-176 https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-9236(99)00066-4
  29. Sandholm, T. eMediator: 'A Next Generation Electronic Commerce Server', Computational Intelligence, Vol.18, No.4, 2002b, pp. 656-676 https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8640.t01-1-00209
  30. Sandholm, T. and S. Suri, 'BOB: Improved winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations', Artificial Intelligence, Vol.145, No. 1/2, 2003, pp. 33-58 https://doi.org/10.1016/S0004-3702(03)00015-8
  31. Sandholm, T., S. Suri, A. Gilpin, and D. Levine, 'Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auction Generalizations', Proceedings of the First Int'l Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, New York: ACM Press, 2002, pp. 69-76
  32. Schellhorn, H. A., 'Double-Sided Multiunit Com binatorial Auction for Substitutes: Theory and Algorithms', Available at http://www.hec.unil.ch/hsche-llhorn /20040723auctions.pdf, 2004
  33. Wurman, P. R., J. Zhong, and G. Cai, 'Computing price trajectories in combinatorial auctions with proxy bidding', Electronic Commerce Research and Applications, Vol.3, No.4, 2004, pp. 329-340 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.elerap.2004.06.003
  34. Xia, M., J. Stallaert, and A. B. Whinston, 'Solving the combinatorial double auction problem', European Journal of Operational Research, Vol.164, No.1, 2005, pp. 239-251 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2003.11.018