An Investment Model for OPEC Crude Oil Supply with Real Option Game

실물옵션 게임을 이용한 OPEC의 원유공급 투자모형

This paper is a study of the investment dynamics focusing on crude oil supply by OPEC and non-OPEC. Oil supply capacity is first determined by a leader, OPEC, and by an aggregate that represents non-OPEC producers. OPEC wants to increase a gain from oil price increase while keeping its market share relative to non-OPEC's share. An investment rule model is developed for OPEC crude oil supply capacity in response to non-OPEC's decision. In presence of oil price uncertainty, oil price threshold is derived above which it is optimal for OPEC to expand oil supply capacity since otherwise the increased supply of non-OPEC results in weakening of OPEC market share in the world oil market. In addition, a lower threshold price is derived below which OPEC triggers a capacity reduction to regain its otherwise forgone profits. A simulation is provided for calculating the capacity expansion and reduction thresholds.

시장점유율을 고려한 OPEC와 비OPEC의 게임을 고려한 원유공급 투자모형을 분석한다. 국제유가의 불확실성을 반영하기 위하여 확률투자모형인 실물옵션 모형을 이용한다. 원유공급시설의 확장 및 감축을 위한 조정은 국제유가로 표시되는 분기점으로 나타난다. 국제유가가 확장(감축)분기점을 초과(하회)하면 OPEC는 공급시설을 확장(감축)한다. 최근 국제유가를 활용한 시뮬레이션 분석 결과, 확장분기점은 배스켓 가격 기준으로 높게는 56.93달러/배럴, 낮게는 48.44달러/배럴인 것으로 나타났으며, 감축분기점은 36.52달러/배럴과 36.93달러/배럴 사이에 머무는 것으로 나타났다.