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The Effect of Doctor's Payment Method on Practice Behavior

지불보상체계가 의사의 진료행태에 미치는 영향 : 미국사례 분석

  • Published : 2004.12.01

Abstract

Considering the existence of asymmetric information between doctor and patient, the doctor's reimbursement method has been considered as a desirable policy device of improving efficiency of patient's use of medical care in terms of its affecting doctor's practice pattern by determining doctor's practice revenue. By using the Community Tracking Study (CTS) physician data set, which includes not only various information on doctors practice arrangements and sources of practice revenue, but also vignettes of various clinical presentations, this paper investigates doctor's reaction to the financial incentive under the control of patient's specific medical situation. Under the econometric model for exploring the effect of doctor's reimbursement method on his/her practice patterns; referring patients, recommend doctor-visit or medical tests, the Hausman's specification test was used for checking out the possibility of the doctor's reimbursement method being endogeneized explanatory variable. In the case where the endogeneity problem of doctor's reimbursement method exists, the 2SLS method was used for correcting that problem, and the multiple regression method was used in the case where the problem is found to be nonexistent. Based on the empirical results, this paper finds that doctors do appear to respond to financial incentive. The empirical results show that the doctor's reimbursement method statistically significantly affects doctor's practice pattern and are coincident with the theoretical result proposed by previous researches, This results suggest, as doctor's practice revenues are mainly determined by prospective method, such as capitation, doctors would more refer their patients to specialists, and hesitate in recommending doctor-visit or medical exam.

Keywords

References

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