The Problem of Disjunctive Causal Factors: In Defense of the Theory of Probabilistic Causation

The problem of disjunctive causal factors is generalized as follows. Suppose that there are no factors of the kind considered so far that need to be held fixed in background contexts. Nevertheless, it is still possible that within the background contexts, each disjunct of a disjunctive causal factor X v W confers a different probability on an effect factor in Question. So a problem arises of how we identify a single causally significant probability of the effect factor in the presence of the disjunctive causal factor, assuming that each disjunct of the disjunctive causal factor confers a different probability on the effect factor. In this paper, I first introduce an experiment in which disjunctive causal factors seem to pose a problem for the theory of probabilistic causation. Second, I show how Eells' solution to the problem of disjunctive causal factors meets the problem that arises in the experiment. Third, I examine Hitchcock's arguments against Eells' solution, arguing that Hitchcock misconstrues Eells' solution, and disregards the feature of the theory of probabilistic causation such that a factor is a causal factor for another factor relative to a population P of a population type Q.