International conference on construction engineering and project management (국제학술발표논문집)

  • 2024.07a
  • /
  • Pages.706-713
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  • 2024
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  • 2508-9048(eISSN)
Korea Institute of Construction Engineering and Management (한국건설관리학회)
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Effect of internal conflicts among private sponsors on bundling and risk sharing in PPP projects

  • Yujia HE (Zhejiang Development and Planning Institute) ;
  • Lei SHI (Department of Construction Management, Dalian University of Technology)
  • Published : 2024.07.29
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Abstract

Public-private partnership (PPP) projects are characterized by the bundling of construction and operation phases and risk sharing, which motivate private sponsors to enhance project efficiency throughout its life-cycle. However, internal conflicts of interest among sponsors can potentially distort these incentives. Building on agency theory, this study presents a game model to examine the effect of internal conflicts among private sponsors on bundling and risk sharing. The results show that the degree of the bundling and risk transfer from the government to private sponsors depend on the sponsors' shareholding and capabilities. This study contributes to the PPP knowledge body by introducing the internal conflicts among sponsors into the incentive mechanism of risk-sharing between the government and private sponsors. The findings also provide support for the government to formulate risk-sharing strategies and shed light on the sponsor selection of PPP projects.

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