A Metamathematical Study of Cognitive Computability with G del's Incompleteness Theorems

인지적 계산가능성에 대한 메타수학적 연구

This study discusses cognition as a computable mapping in cognitive system and relates G del's Incompleteness Theorems to the computability of cognition from a metamathematical perspective. Understanding cognition as a from of computation requires not only Turing machine models but also neural network models. In previous studies of computation by cognitive systems, it is remarkable to note how little serious attention has been given to the issue of computation by neural networks with respect to G del's Incompleteness Theorems. To address this problem, first, we introduce a definition of cognition and cognitive science. Second, we deal with G del's view of computability, incompleteness and speed-up theorems, and then we interpret G del's disjunction on the mind and the machine. Third, we discuss cognition as a Turing computable function and its relation to G del's incompleteness. Finally, we investigate cognition as a neural computable function and its relation to G del's incompleteness. The results show that a second-order representing system can be implemented by a finite recurrent neural network. Hence one cannot prove the consistency of such neural networks in terms of first-order theories. Neural computability, theoretically, is beyond the computational incompleteness of Turing machines. If cognition is a neural computable function, then G del's incompleteness result does not limit the compytational capability of cognition in humans or in artifacts.