• 한국농공학회지
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• 제15권4호
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• pp.3170-3180
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• 1973

This study of the subject will review past and present irrigation development in Korea. Particular attention will be given to water pricing structure and a case study on the purpose of rational operation and management of irrigation water and organizations, and the optimum irrigation water and organizations, and the optimum irrigation water fee inorder to reduce farmers burden and to rationalize the farmland associations management so as to achieve development of the rural environment. In 1971, the reservoir of the Farmland Improvement A sociation (FIA) produced only 775 millison $m^3$ of irrigation water or 77% of planned capacity of 1,015 million $m^3$. It was caused by inefficient maintenance of irrigation facilities; for instance, about 21% of reservoirs, pumping stations and weirs in Korea have been silted by soil erosion which hinder to water production according to an ADC survey. The first Irritation Association was established in 1906, whcih was renamed the Farmland Assoeiation by the Rural Development Enouragement Law in 1970. By the end of 1971, 411,000 ha of rice paddies were under the control of 267 associations nationwide. The average water price assessed by Associations nationwide rose from 790 won per 0.1 ha. in 1966 to 1,886 won in 1971. The annual growth rate was 20%. The highest water price in 1971 was 4,773 won her 0.1 ha. and the lowest was 437 won. This range was caused by differences in debt burden, geographic conditions and management efficiency among the Associations. In 1971, the number of Associations which exceeded the average water price of 1,886 won per 0.1 ha. was 144, or 55.1% of all Association. In determination of water price, there are two principles; one is determined by production cost such as installation cost of irrigation facilities, maintenance cost, management cost and depreciation ect. For instance, the Yong San River Development project was required 33.7 billion won for total construction and maintenance cost is 3.1 billion won for repayment, maintenance and management cost per year. The project produces 590 million $m^3$ of irrigation water annually. Accordingly, the water price per $m^3$ is 5.25 won. The other principle is determined by water value in the crop products and in compared with production of irrigated paddy and non-irrigated paddy. By using this method, water value in compared with paddy rice vs. upland rice(Average of 1967-1971) was 14.15 won per $m^3$ and irrigated paddy vs. non-irrigated paddy was 2.98 won per $m^3$. In contrast the irrigation fee in average association of 1967-1971 was 1.54 won per $m^3$. Accordingly, the current national average irrigation fee(water price) is resonable compared with its water value. In this study, it is found that the ceiling of water price in terms of water value is 2.98 won per $m^3$ or 2,530 won per 0.1 ha. However, in 1971 55% of the associations were above the average of nationwide irrigation fees. which shows the need for rationalization of the Association's management. In connection with rationalization of the Association's management, this study recommends the following matters. (1) Irrigation fee must be assessed according to the amount of water consumption taking intoaccount the farmer's ability. (2) Irrigation fee should be graded according to behefits and crop patterns. (3) Training personnel in the operation and procedures of water management to save O&M costs. (4) Insolvent farmland association should be integrated into larger, sound associations in the same GUN in order to reduce farmers' water cost. (5) The maintenance and repair of existing irrigation facilities is as important as expansion of facilities. (6) Establishment of a new Union of Farmland Association is required to promoted proper maintenance and to protect the huge investment in irrigation facilities by means of technical supervision and guidance.

• 대한관절경학회지
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• 제13권3호
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• pp.249-253
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• 2009

목적: 말기 족근 관절염 환자에서 시행한 3개의 유관 나사와 관절경을 이용한 족근 관절 고정술의 임상적, 방사선적 결과를 평가하여 유용성을 알아보고자 하였다. 대상 및 방법: 2006년 5월부터 2009년 2월까지, 관절경하에 3개의 유관 나사를 이용하여 족근 관절 고정술을 시행한 족근 관절 관절염 환자 15명, 17예를 대상으로 하였다. 남자가 8명, 여자가 7명 이었으며 평균 나이는 62.2세였다. 임상적으로 수술 전과 수술 후의 미국 정형외과 족부 족관절 학회(American Orthopaedic Foot and Ankle Society)의 족관절-후족부 기능 평가 기준(ankle-hindfoot functional scale), 시각 상사 척도 동통 점수(visual analogue scale pain score) 및 환자의 만족도를 평가하였고, 방사선적으로 방사선 전후, 측면과 mortise 사진을 측정하여 골유합을 확인하였다. 평균 추시 기간은 24.2개월이었다. 결과: 족관절-후족부 기능 평가 기준은 수술 전 평균 47.4점에서 수술 후 최종 추시에서 평균 82.5점으로 향상되었고, 시각 상사 척도 동통 점수는 수술 전 평균 8.6에서 최종 추시 시 평균 2.4로 감소되었다. 환자의 만족도는 7예(41.2%)에서 매우 만족, 8예(47.0%)에서 만족(good), 1예(5.9%)에서 보통, 1예(5.9%)에서 불만족 소견을 보였다. 모든 예에서 족근관절은 성공적으로 골유합이 되었으며 유합의 평균 시간은 9.1주였다. 결론: 관절경하에서 3개의 유관 나사를 이용한 족근 관절 고정술은 좋은 임상 결과와 높은 골유합을 얻을 수 있어 진행된 족근 관절염에서 시행 할 수 있는 유용한 술식으로 사료된다.

• 대한정형외과학회지
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• 제54권6호
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• pp.528-536
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• 2019

목적: 저에너지 손상에 인한 척추체 압박골절이 발생한 골다공증 환자들에서 척추체 압박률의 변화, 요추부 동통 및 척추체 골절 치유에 테리파라타이드가 미치는 영향을 알아보고자 하였다. 대상 및 방법: 2016년 1월부터 2017년 12월까지 골밀도 검사상 T 점수가 -3.5 이하인 심한 골다공증성 척추 압박골절 환자 57명을 대상으로 하였다. 최소 6개월간 척추체 압박률의 변화, 시각통증지수(visual analogue scale, VAS) 및 Oswestry disability index(ODI)를 조사하였고 수상 후 자기공명영상에서 손상된 척추체의 골수 부종의 형태, 최종 추시 방사선 사진에서 추체내열의 유무, osteocalcin, N-terminal telopeptide (NTx) 등 골 형성 표지자의 변화 및 실험군 및 대조군에서 인구통계적 차이를 조사하였다. 결과: 실험군(테리파라타이드군)에서 3개월 후 평균 압박률은 20%, 대조군에서 38%였고 시간에 따른 척추체 압박률 변화에서 유의한 차이가 있었다(p<0.05; t-test). 각 군 내에서 추시 기간에 따른 척추체 압박률의 변화 정도를 비교하였을 때 실험군에서는 척추체 압박률이 유의하게 증가하지 않았으며(p=0.063), 대조군에서는 유의하게 증가하였다(p<0.05). 척추체의 평균 압박률이 변화하지 않는 평형기에 도달하는 시기는 실험군에서 1개월, 대조군에서 3개월이었다. 실험군에서 VAS가 0.39점, 대조군에서 1.07점으로 실험군에서 VAS의 호전 정도가 우수하였다. 실험군에서 ODI가 33.72점, 대조군에서 39.52점으로 실험군에서 ODI가 우수하였다. 최종 추시 방사선 사진에서 추체내열이 있는 증례가 실험군에서는 없었고(0%), 대조군에서는 1명이었다(2.2%). 실험군에서 osteocalcin 평균은 수상 직후 17.15 ng/ml, 6개월 후 24.20 ng/ml로 유의한 차이가 있었으며(p=0.003), NTx 평균은 수상직후 49.54 nMBCE/mMCr, 6개월 후 49.98 nMBCE/mMCr로 유의한 차이가 없었다(p=0.960). 결론: 심한 골다공증 환자에서 발생한 척추체 압박골절의 치료 약제로서 주 단위 테리파라타이드는 골절의 유합을 촉진하여 척추체 붕괴를 방지하며 요추부 동통을 더 빠르게 경감시킨다.

• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권13호
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• pp.687-738
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• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.

• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권8호
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• pp.49-168
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• 2010

Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.