• Language and Information
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.163-182
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• 2004

Since metaphor was proposed to be a matter of thought instead of language over two decades ago, the research in this area has made most of its progress by the cognitivists. For the cognitivists represented by Lakoff, metaphor is not a mere poetic or rhetoric device, but is central to our everyday language. Furthermore, according to them, we categorize the world and break it into concepts mainly through metaphors, and truth conditions simply cannot account for metaphor. However, this cognitivists' view has been severely counterattacked by the truth-conditional semanticists. Their main criticism is that the cognitivists do not provide a way to go from our internal representations to the outside world. It is also criticized that the cognitive theory of metaphor as cross-conceptual domain mappings is too broad and general, and that they do not explain why a particular metaphorical expression should be subsumed under one mapping rather than another mapping, i.e., their schemes and structural relations are not predictive. In this context, the purpose of this paper is to propose a model for metaphor interpretation that combines the virtues of the two opposite views of metaphor. Truth-conditional semantics cannot ignore cognitive aspects of language, so-called states of affairs or mental representations, while cognitive theories cannot neglect vigorous representation of meaning with objective reality. This paper will try to present a preliminary outline of this combining model.

• Language and Information
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.1-26
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• 2004

This paper investigates the nature of the discourse domain involved with focus sentences. The major theories of focus including Roothian Alternative Semantics are critically reviewed: Alternative Semantics takes a contradictory attitude toward the truth conditional aspect of free focus. The truth conditional differences are treated as a pragmatic inference, while they are captured by the semantic mechanism, that is, the alternative sets generated by focus constructions. In addition, the alternative sets are ad hoc since they are generated only for focus constructions. This paper attempts to show that the alternative sets introduced by foci in the framework of Alternative Semantics are neither necessary nor sufficient for an analysis of focus. It is argued that the domain sets simply provided by the model itself suffices for a proper analysis of focus constructions.

• Language and Information
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• v.3 no.2
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• pp.31-49
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• 1999

This paper deals with temporal markers -ess and -(nu)n in Korean, and provides formal interpretations of these markers within the framework of interval semantics. I propose that the truth-conditional interpretation of -ess and -(nu)n sentences is obtained by locating the involved eventuality within a 'completive interval' and 'imcompletive interval', respectively. Since characterization of these two invervals makes reference to the evaluation time, the basic distinction between the two lies on tense. Furthermore, I will argue that perfective/imperfective aspect meaning that usually arises in -ess/-nun sentences should be explained in terms of a conversational implicature.

• Language and Information
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• v.4 no.2
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• pp.69-92
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• 2000

It is well-known that default rules require a nonmonotonic logic. Veltman proposed one dynamic theory which interprets default rules in such a way that correct inferences can be made at each information state. But his theory has some problems. First, this theory excludes the possibility that a default rule can be true of false. Second, his representation of an information state makes it difficult to interpret a default rule embedded in another sentence. Third, the notion of a frame which is introduced in the interpretation of a default rule and the adjustment of inferential expectation has a more complex structure than is necessary, In this paper, I propose a truth-conditional theory of default rules in which the meaning of a default rule is defined as a truth-condition in a possible world and which assumes a simpler structure of a frame. This makes it possible to interpret a default rule embedded in a sentence. A dynamic theory for default rules is also proposed for correct inferences based on default rules.