• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.129
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• pp.247-265
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• 2014

In this paper I will undertake three tasks: first, to identify the difference between John Rawls's liberal conception of liberty and Will Kymlicka's; second, to briefly examine the problems with liberal conception of liberty; finally, to propose a certain alternative that will be able to make liberal conception of liberty more meaningful In Kymlicka's view, Rawls seems to fail to make the best defence of freedom of choice because he wants to explain of individual freedom on the basis of Kant's moral theory about liberty. Kymlicka thinks that it is not a desirable way of defending liberal conception of liberty. According to his liberal theory, Rawls's defence of freedom of choice might make us think that we should have our freedom of choice for its own sake because freedom is the most valuable in the world. So Kymlicka wants to provide stronger argument to defend freedom of choice in liberalism. He insists that it is our projects and tasks that are most important things in our lives. Furthermore, he argues that we should conceive our freedom of choice as a precondition for pursuing those projects and practices that are valued for our good lives. Now I want to look at two concepts of liberty in liberalism with Rawls's theory and Kymlicaka's. In this paper, I shall look at criticisms of the liberal account of freedom of choice. These would give us a certain chance for understanding true freedom.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.145
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• pp.325-350
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• 2018

The overemphasis of the priority of reason over will runs the risk of resulting in intellectual determinism. On the contrary, it is also unfair to underestimate the role of reason in Saint Thomas Aquinas' theory of the free will to avoid intellectual determinism. For, according to Thomas, "the will inclines to the good, insofar as it is an appetite, and it follows the judgment of the reason in the pursuit of the good, insofar as it is a 'rational' appetite." It is the objective of this article to show that, for Thomas, the idea of the free will is not contradictory to that of the will's following the judgment of reason. For this purpose, it is decisive to adequately evaluate the role of reason in Thomas's theory of the free will. This article therefore proves that in principle Thomas argues the priority of the will over reason as well as the freedom of the will, and that he nevertheless recognizes the role of reason which precedes the choice of the will by making the second-level judgment even when the will chooses not to follow the first-level judgement of reason. It is entirely up to the will to follow the judgement and order of reason or not. It explains the freedom of the will. But 'not to follow reason' is contradictory to the essential determination of the will as the 'rational' appetite. For from the will's not following reason, wrong-doing follows; the human act which does not conform to reason. This article therefore argues that for Thomas, the 'true' liberty of the will corresponding to its determination as the rational appetite consists in its following the rule and order of reason, not in acting against the judgement of reason.