• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.49 no.6
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• pp.266-271
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• 2000

The electric power industries are moving from the conventional monopolistic or vertically integrated environments to deregulated and competitive environments, where each participant is concerned with profit maximization rather than system-wide costs minimization. Consequently, the conventional least-cost approaches for the generation resource schedule can not exactly handle real-world situations. This paper presents a game theory application for analyzing power transactions and market design in a deregulated energy marketplace, where the market participants determine the net profits through the optimal bidding strategies. The demand elasticity of the energy price is considered for the realistic modeling of the deregulated marketplace.

• Information Systems Review
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• v.5 no.2
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• pp.169-182
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• 2003

The growth of electronic commerce make business to business electronic commerce market grow dramatically due to dramatic decrease of transaction cost and increase of productivity. It also influences the way of building transaction relationship between buyers and suppliers. This study tends to prove electronic market theory for Internet based 13213 commerce. We observe and analyze the implementation and usage patterns of procurement system of I company. The result shows that even through Internet enable many buyers and suppliers to participate and transact each other, the transaction pattern is different according to asset specificity and uncertainty as follows. First, with adoption of internet, the product with the higher asset specificity rather than lower asset specificity can be easily purchased. Second, Internet doesn't make any significant influence on the transaction of the product with higher uncertainty. But, organization's pre-audit process can indirectly influence on the decrease of the transaction uncertainty.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.10 no.12
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• pp.3775-3781
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• 2009

This aims of this study is to examine the factors influencing on the channel satisfaction and preference of the mobile commerce. This model tests various theoretical research relating to technology acceptance model(TAM), transaction cost theory and service quality. The model is tested Structural Equation Modeling(SEM) using AMOS 7.0 analysis on the sample collected from 320 respondents. The result of hypothesis testing is as follows. First, usefulness, asset specificity, uncertainty, trust and responsiveness were influenced by channel satisfaction. Second, channel satisfaction was influenced positively by channel preference.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.10 no.2
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• pp.391-410
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• 2008

Emphasis on relationship management might be found out from Williamson (1975), who tried to elucidate why an organization exists. According to his transaction cost theory, an organization is established to evade opportunistic actions of the market and build up a hierarchy of value chain. However, judged from the perspective of exchange relationship in a trade, the transaction cost theory was likely to approach to buyer-seller relationship by the mechanism of competition. Therefore, an organization exists to control the competition of the market. Relationship management suggested by relationship marketing focuses on cooperation between buyers and sellers, rather than competition against each other. Relationship management aims to provide a framework for making a market relationship that might become an asset or a resource of the firm. In the process of maintaining and strengthening long-term and cooperative relationship with all stakeholders included customers, suppliers and staff, they continue to create new values. The purpose of this empirical research, by investigating how relationship management of multinational enterprises influences on their competitive advantages and performances, is to suggest that a cooperative relationship established for a long time in the market, so-called quasi-market relationship, substitutes for an organization.

• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2005.10a
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• pp.768-773
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• 2005

Among various joint ventures, International Construction Joint Ventures (ICJVs) have emerged as a popular approach worldwide to developing large scale projects through international participation. A model, based on economic analysis and represented by several hypotheses obtained from the analysis, will be developed. Furthermore, we will empirically test the hypotheses/model using Structural Equation Model (SEM). This research is expected to explain why there exist different organizational forms for ICJVs, and to develop a framework for choosing appropriate forms with respect to various characteristics of ICJVs.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2000.07a
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• pp.19-21
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• 2000

This paper presents a game theory application for analyzing power transactions and market design in a deregulated energy marketplace such as PoolCo. The conventional least-cost approaches for the generation resource schedule can not exactly handle recent real-world situations. A systematic tool using game theory for the market participants is presented such that it determines the net profits through the optimal bidding strategies including the strategies for the bidding prices and bidding generations. We treat this power transaction game as incomplete information one, which means each market participants does not know other's cost function. And the demand elasticity of the energy price is considered for the realistic modeling of the deregulated marketplace.

• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.143-174
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• 1997

The model applied in this paper is based on the theory of economic order quantity (EOQ). EOQ model is introduced to explain the improvement of the transaction efficiency through the cooperative purchase. We examine explicitly how horizontal cooperation affects vertical transactions. A result of the analysis is that a seller can prefer transacting with a cooperative rather than with each buyer separately, even if he reduces the selling price of the product. Without increasing the demand for the product, this result is that dealing with a cooperative, rather than separately with each buyer, decreases the transaction cost for the seller-buyers system, the cost reduction more than off-setting the effect of price decrease on the sellers profit. For a coopative consisting of any number of buyers, Pareto efficient ordering policies that maximize the joint cost saving for the seller-buyers system are identified. We then discuss the conditions under which a cooperative under consideration can be modified to increase efficiency gain. Next, we relax the assumption that all buyers participate in a single cooperative and examine the issue of how many cooperatives, each consisting of a subset of the buyers, should be formed to maximize the total cost saving for the seller-buyers system. Finally, the issue of shapley value to divide the cooperatives gain among its members is discussed.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.35
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• pp.41-69
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• 2007

This study analyzes some important implications for the forthcoming revision of eUCP through the methodology of expected utility maximization theory. The overall results are as follows. First, beneficiary with an initial wealth has a risk-averse utility in traditional letter of credit transaction, and he would be more risk-averse in eUCP transaction. Secondly, the beneficiary who has risk-averse utility will pay for the risk premium to reduce the risk of corruption of an electronic record by means of cost of loss reduction activities. Thirdly, the cost of loss reduction activities is represented by a convex cost function, Fourthly, a risk averse beneficiary pursues loss reducing activities to the point where the expected marginal product of loss reduction is less than its marginal cost. Fifthly, a more risk-averse eUCP beneficiary will always select a higher level of loss reduction as long as the effectiveness of loss reduction is certain. Sixthly, when the effectiveness of loss reduction is uncertain, the more risk-averse eUCP beneficiary does not necessarily choose a higher level of loss reducing activities. Finally, it would be more reasonable that eUCP Article 11 should protect eUCP beneficiary who pursues a higher level of loss reducing activities.

• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.69-97
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• 2006

This research aimed to establish and test a empirical model for antecedents and consequences of manufacturer's degree of channel concentration in multiple channels from strategic perspective. For this purpose, I suggested new concept of channel concentration based on related literature review and developed the measurement index of channel concentration. Second, I examined and applied the transaction cost theory and market power theory to provide broad understanding of multiple channel structure and to explain it. Finally, I present the theoretical and managerial implications to the firms that build up channel strategy under multiple channel contexts on this research results. For the purpose of these goals, eight hypotheses were drawn from the previous researches. To verify these hypotheses, 248 data were collected as samples, and the data were tested by reliability test, factor analysis, and covariance structure analysis. Empirical findings strongly support that strategic management of distribution channel especially are important in multiple channels. The overall implications to researchers and practitioners are presented, and limits and further study direction were discussed as a final.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.10 no.2
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• pp.29-41
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• 2012

This paper undertakes a conceptual review of transaction cost to broaden the understanding of the transaction cost analysis (TCA) approach. More than 40 years have passed since Coase's fundamental insight that transaction, coordination, and contracting costs must be considered explicitly in explaining the extent of vertical integration. Coase (1937) forced economists to identify previously neglected constraints on the trading process to foster efficient intrafirm, rather than interfirm, transactions. The transaction cost approach to economic organization study regards transactions as the basic units of analysis and holds that understanding transaction cost economy is central to organizational study. The approach applies to determining efficient boundaries, as between firms and markets, and to internal transaction organization, including employment relations design. TCA, developed principally by Oliver Williamson (1975,1979,1981a) blends institutional economics, organizational theory, and contract law. Further progress in transaction costs research awaits the identification of critical dimensions in which transaction costs differ and an examination of the economizing properties of alternative institutional modes for organizing transactions. The crucial investment distinction is: To what degree are transaction-specific (non-marketable) expenses incurred? Unspecialized items pose few hazards, since buyers can turn toalternative sources, and suppliers can sell output intended for one order to other buyers. Non-marketability problems arise when specific parties' identities have important cost-bearing consequences. Transactions of this kind are labeled idiosyncratic. The summarized results of the review are as follows. First, firms' distribution decisions often prompt examination of the make-or-buy question: Should a marketing activity be performed within the organization by company employees or contracted to an external agent? Second, manufacturers introducing an industrial product to a foreign market face a difficult decision. Should the product be marketed primarily by captive agents (the company sales force and distribution division) or independent intermediaries (outside sales agents and distribution)? Third, the authors develop a theoretical extension to the basic transaction cost model by combining insights from various theories with the TCA approach. Fourth, other such extensions are likely required for the general model to be applied to different channel situations. It is naive to assume the basic model appliesacross markedly different channel contexts without modifications and extensions. Although this study contributes to scholastic research, it is limited by several factors. First, the theoretical perspective of TCA has attracted considerable recent interest in the area of marketing channels. The analysis aims to match the properties of efficient governance structures with the attributes of the transaction. Second, empirical evidence about TCA's basic propositions is sketchy. Apart from Anderson's (1985) study of the vertical integration of the selling function and John's (1984) study of opportunism by franchised dealers, virtually no marketing studies involving the constructs implicated in the analysis have been reported. We hope, therefore, that further research will clarify distinctions between the different aspects of specific assets. Another important line of future research is the integration of efficiency-oriented TCA with organizational approaches that emphasize specific assets' conceptual definition and industry structure. Finally, research of transaction costs, uncertainty, opportunism, and switching costs is critical to future study.