• 수산경영론집
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• 제52권3호
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• pp.39-55
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• 2021

The purpose of this paper is to confirm the trend of inland water fish farming in North Korea and to suggest a plan for inter-Korean cooperation. North Korea's inland water fish farming laid the foundation for production in the 1950s and 1960s, and production facilities were expanded until 1980. In the midst of the severe economic crisis in the 1990s, North Korea paid attention to inland water fish farming as an alternative to food production. The military took the lead in expanding the aquaculture industry and catfish farming was encouraged. In the Kim Jong-un era, North Korea's inland fish farming continues the tradition of catfish farming and promotes a policy of expanding inland cage farming. This study comprehensively reviewed recent inter-Korean relations, North Korea's food crisis and acceptability, and UN sanctions. As a result, inland water fish farming is the most promising field for inter-Korean cooperation in the field of fisheries. In the initial stage of inter-Korean cooperation in the field of inland water fish farming, humanitarian aid projects such as feed and seed support can be promoted. In the stage of expanding inter-Korean cooperation, knowledge sharing program and materials and facilities support projects can be promoted. Development cooperation and direct private investment are possible at the full-scale stage.

• Strategy21
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• 통권31호
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• pp.27-56
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• 2013

The United Nations Command (UNC) and the communist North failed to reach an agreement on where the maritime demarcation line should be drawn in the process of signing a truce after the Korean War because of the starkly different positions on the boundary of their territorial waters. As a result, the Armistice Treaty was signed on July 1953 without clarification about the maritime border. In the following month, Commander of the UNC unilaterally declared the Northern Limit Line (NLL) as a complementing measure to the Armistice. Referring to this, North Korea and its followers in South Korea wrongfully argue that the NLL is a "ghost line" that was established not based on the international law. However, one should note that the waters south of the NLL has always been under South Korea's jurisdiction since Korea's independence from Japan on August 15, 1945. There is no need to ask North Korea's approval for declaring the territorial waters that had already been under our sovereign jurisdiction. We do not need North Korea's approval just as we do not need Japan's approval with regard to our sovereign right over Dokdo. The legal status of the NLL may be explained with the following three characteristics. First, the NLL is a de facto maritime borderline that defines the territorial waters under the respective jurisdiction of the two divided countries. Second, the NLL in the West Sea also serves as a de facto military demarcation line at sea that can be likened to the border on the ground. Third, as a contacting line where the sea areas controlled by the two Koreas meet, the NLL is a maritime non-aggression line that was established on the legal basis of the 'acquiescence' element stipulated by the Inter-Korea Basic Agreement (article 11) and the Supplement on the Non-aggression principle (article 10). Particularly from the perspective of the domestic law, the NLL should be understood as a boundary defining areas controlled by temporarily divided states (not two different states) because the problem exists between a legitimate central government (South Korea) and an anti-government group (North Korea). In this sense, the NLL problem should be viewed not in terms of territorial preservation or expansion. Rather, it should be understood as a matter of national identity related to territorial sovereignty and national pride. North Korea's continuous efforts to problematize the NLL may be part of its strategy to nullify the Armistice Treaty. In other words, North Korea tries to take away the basis of the NLL by abrogating the Armistice Treaty and creating a condition in which the United Nations Command can be dissolved. By doing so, North Korea may be able to start the process for the peace treaty with the United States and reestablish a maritime line of its interest. So, North Korea's rationale behind making the NLL a disputed line is to deny the effectiveness of the NLL and ask for the establishment of a new legal boundary. Such an effort should be understood as part of a strategy to make the NLL question a political and military dispute (the similar motivation can be found in Japan's effort to make Dokdo a disputed Island). Therefore, the South Korean government should not accommodate such hidden intentions and strategy of North Korea. The NLL has been the de facto maritime border (that defines our territorial waters) and military demarcation line at sea that we have defended with a lot of sacrifice for the last sixty years. This is the line that our government and the military must defend in the future as we have done so far. Our commitment to the defense of the NLL is not only a matter of national policy protecting territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction; it is also our responsibility for those who were fallen while defending the North-Western Islands and the NLL.

• 한국군사과학기술학회지
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• 제23권6호
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• pp.591-601
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• 2020

After North Korea's sixth nuclear test, the operational environment on the Korean Peninsula has fundamentally changed, and the South Korean military faces various security challenges, including a reduction in military service resources and shorter military service periods. In particular, the South Korean military is seeking a new paradigm in military construction amid changes in the defense acquisition environment linked to the push for defense reform 2.0 and the utilization of the fourth industrial revolution. Therefore, this study considered strategies for improving the operational test and evaluation of weapons systems suitable for changes in the defense acquisition environment to effectively prepare for existing military threats and future warfare patterns. For this purpose, external environment analysis and internal capabilities were diagnosed using PEST Analysis and SPRO Analysis, and improvement strategies were derived through SWOT analysis.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제16권2호
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• pp.3-49
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• 2006

The purpose of this paper is to make research on the settlement mechanism of the commercial disputes between the South and the North of Korea. Also, this paper is to make research on the south-north Korea's cooperative tasks to promote the disputes settlement, including the operation and management of the South-North Arbitration Commission as well as the enactment of the South-North Arbitration Rules. To realize the spirit of the South-North Joint Declaration of June 15, 2000, the Authorities concerned of the South and the North of Korea have reached an agreement titled 'Agreement on Settlement Procedure of Commercial Disputes' on December of the same year. As the follow-up measures of the said Agreement, the South-North Authorities have signed an another agreement called 'Agreement on Organization and Administration of the South-North Arbitration Commission' on October, 2003, which is becoming vital importance for settlement of the commercial disputes between south and north Korea including the Gaeseong Industrial Complex. Gaeseong, a city surrounded by the North Korean military and a symbol of inter-Korean tensions, is now turning into a peace zone where thousands of North and South Koreans are working side by side. The Gaeseong Industrial Complex project, driven by the logic and economic necessity of cooperation, has been steadily moving forward since the North designated it as a special economic zone and has enacted related laws and regulations for its development. Under the situation, the matter of primary concern is how to organize and conduct the Arbitration Commission for the prompt and effective settlement of the south-north commercial disputes. First of all, the South-North Authorities should recognize that the availability of prompt, effective and economical means of dispute resolution such as arbitration and mediation to be made by the Arbitration Commission would promote the orderly growth and encouragement of the south-north trade and investment. In this connection, the Korean Commercial Arbitration Board(KCAB) should be designated as the arbitral institution of the south Korean side under the Agreement on Organization and Administration of the South-North Arbitration Commission. The KCAB is the only authorized arbitral organization in South Korea to settle all kinds of commercial disputes at home and abroad.

• 한국과 국제사회
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• 제1권2호
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• pp.171-208
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• 2017

본 논문은 북한 핵전략의 유형적 특징과 전망을 분석하기 위한 것이다. 이를 위해 핵전략의 개념과 유형, 북한의 핵능력과 선언적 핵전략, 북한 핵전략의 운용상의 특징과 전망을 살펴본 후 결론에서 우리의 대응을 도출해본 것이다. 최근 북한의 핵무기 배치와 핵능력 증강은 우리의 안보와 군사적 대비태세에 매우 심각한 문제를 제기하고 있다. 핵전략이란 핵무기의 구성 배치 운용을 둘러싼 군사전략을 의미한다. 북한의 핵전략에 대한 연구는 북한의 핵무장이 실체화되었다는 매우 현실적인 가정에서 출발한다. 우리 국방당국이 북핵에 대한 대응책으로 선제공격, 미사일방어, 대량응징보복 개념을 제시하고 그 도입과 전개를 서두르는 것은 북한의 핵무장을 전제로 한 조치이다. 표출된 북한의 선언적 핵전략은 (1)'핵보유국법'상의 핵억제 보복전략, (2)핵선제공격론, (3)제7차 당대회에 나타난 '핵선제 불사용원칙으로, 그리고 북한 핵전략의 저의 및 운용상의 특징은 (1)기존핵국가 관행모방을 통한 비난회피, (2)선언적 핵전략을 통한 자신의 핵전략의 호도, (3)핵전력과 핵태세간 격차로 인한 핵전략의 미정착 등으로 각각 요약해 볼 수 있다. 북한은 개정헌법(2012.7), '핵무력과 경제건설의 병진노선(2013.3),' 그리고 핵보유국법(2013.4) 등을 통해 스스로 핵보유국임을 규정 선언하고 있다. 하지만 '핵보유국(핵국가)' 지위는 오로지 NPT만 부여할 수 있는데, 이것은 이미 닫힌 시스템이다. 현실적으로 우리가 당면한 북핵위협을 억제 극복해 나가기 위해서는 튼튼한 한미동맹과 긴밀한 한미 공조하에 북한핵의 억제는 물론 비핵화 무력화를 위한 우리의 단 중 장기적인 정치 군사적 대응책의 수립 이행노력이 긴요하다.

• 문화기술의 융합
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• 제9권5호
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• pp.403-407
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• 2023

본 연구는 최근 전쟁의 필수 수단이 된 '드론'을 활용한 사례를 분석 및 고찰하여 미래 우리나라 군(軍) 조직이 무인체계를 연계한 복합체계로 발전시켜야 한다는 배경에서 출발한 연구이다. 최근, 2014년과 2022년 연달아 우리나라 영공을 침범한 북한 무인기가 심각한 안보의 위협을 미치고 있으며 만약, 북한 무인기가 폭발물 및 독가스를 탑재하여 우리나라 영공을 침범하였다면 그 피해의 심각성은 더 할 것이다. 더 나아가 지난, 2020년 아제르바이잔-아르메니아 전쟁과 현재 진행 중인 우크라이나-러시아 전쟁의 공통점은 소위, '공격드론'을 적극 활용한 전투를 진행하고 있다. 이러한 국내·외 전쟁의 패러다임 전환을 지켜볼 때 드론은 더 이상 군사작전에 필요한 필수재가 되었으며 더불어 한반도의 군사적 환경과 '휴전'이라는 상황 속에서 우리나라도 적극적으로 군사용 드론을 활용한 기술개발과 무인체계를 연계한 목표물에 대한 정밀한 타격과 휴대성을 고려한 '공격드론'을 운용 가능하도록 발전켜야 할 것이다.

• 한국토양비료학회지
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• 제44권6호
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• pp.1004-1009
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• 2011

Soil erosion in North Korea has been continued to accelerate by deterioration of topographical conditions. However, few studies have been conducted to predict the amount of soil loss in North Korea due to limited data so far. Rainfall erosivity is an important factor to predict the amount of long-term annual soil loss by USLE (universal soil loss equation). The purpose of this study is to investigate rainfall erosivity, which presented the potential risk of soil erosion by water, in North Korea. Annual rainfall erosivities for 27 stations in North Korea for 1983~2010 were calculated using regression models based on modified Institute of Agricultural Sciences (IAS) index in this study. The result showed that annual average rainfall erosivity in North Korea ranged from 2,249 to 7,526 and averaged value was $4,947MJmm\;ha^{-1}\;hr^{-1}\;yr^{-1}$, which corresponded to about 70% of annual average rainfall erosivity in South Korea. The finding was that the potential risk of soil erosion in North Korea has been accelerated by the increase of rainfall erosivity since the late 1990s.

• 한국군사과학기술학회지
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• 제18권4호
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• pp.402-408
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• 2015

Protection against direct projectiles has been adapted just to the main command posts in the existing protective facility standards. However, protective capacity for the shelters against direct projectiles is also required because the initial survivability as well as the operation sustainment of the shelters is critical during a couple of days from outbreak of war. In this study, the Russian artillery is used to determine the existing and future threat of the North Korean Armed Forces indirectly. And then, required protective capacity of military shelters in the contact areas is calculated along with UFC 3-340-02 and it is verified using modeling and simulation. Based on the assessed capacity, actual inspect of military facilities with contact areas on spot is performed whether military shelters have enough protection capacity against determined threats. According to the field study, it is verified that proper earth bermed shelter has enough protection capacity. The results in this study could be used how to retrofit the current shelters in the contact areas.

• Journal of Korean Neurosurgical Society
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• 제65권5호
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• pp.652-664
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• 2022

The Kernohan-Woltman notch phenomenon (KWNP) refers to an intracranial lesion causing massive side-to-side mass effect which leads to compression of the contralateral cerebral peduncle against the free edge of the cerebellar tentorium. Diagnosis is based on "paradoxical" motor deficit ipsilateral to the lesion associated with radiologic evidence of damage to the contralateral cerebral peduncle. To date, there is scarce evidence regarding KWNP associated neuroimaging patterns and motor function prognostic factors. A systematic review was conducted on Medline database from inception to July 2021 looking for English-language articles concerning KWNP, in accordance with the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines. The research yielded 45 articles for a total of 51 patients. The mean age was 40.7 years-old and the male/female sex ratio was 2/1. 63% of the patients (32/51) suffered from head trauma with a majority of acute subdural hematomas (57%, 29/51). 57% (29/51) of the patients were in the coma upon admission and 47% (24/51) presented pupil anomalies. KWNP presented the neuroimaging features of compression ischemic stroke located in the contralateral cerebral peduncle, with edema in the surrounding structures and sometimes compression stroke of the cerebral arteries passing nearby. 45% of the patients (23/51) presented a good motor functional outcome; nevertheless, no predisposing factor was identified. A Glasgow coma scale (GCS) of more than 3 showed a trend (p=0.1065) toward a better motor functional outcome. The KWNP is a regional compression syndrome oftentimes caused by sudden and massive uncal herniation and leading to contralateral cerebral peduncle ischemia. Even though patients suffering from KWNP usually present a good overall recovery, patients with a GCS of 3 may present a worse motor functional outcome. In order to better understand this syndrome, future studies will have to focus on more personalized criteria such as individual variation of tentorial notch width.

• 한국컴퓨터정보학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국컴퓨터정보학회 2020년도 제62차 하계학술대회논문집 28권2호
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• pp.107-110
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• 2020

북한의 사이버 공격은 매년 증가하고 있으며 공격 수행인력 또한 6,800여 명으로 지속 늘어나고 있어 우리에게 큰 위협이 되고 있다. 그럼에도 불구하고 현재까지 북한의 사이버 공격사례 분석은 각각의 사건에 대한 개별 현황분석밖에 되지 않아 큰 시각에서의 공격 기술 유형이 어떻게 변화하였는지와 관련된 연구가 필요하다. 이에 따라 본 논문에서는 우선 사이버전의 일반사항 및 공격 기술을 확인하고 최근 3년간 발생한 북한의 사이버 공격사례를 조사하여 세부적으로 사용된 주요 공격 기술의 유형을 확인하고자 한다.