• Asia Marketing Journal
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.37-59
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• 2018

This study investigates the effects of the distribution channel structure on quality decisions under duopoly competition. I considers a set-up in which two retailers compete on product quality and retail price. In the set-up, the integrated retailer has the power to determine the quality of its exclusive product, while the decentralized retailer does not. For the decentralized retailer, the supplier determines product quality. I find that asymmetric pairs of a decentralized channel by one retailer and an integrated channel by the other retailer can be a Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous-channel-choice model. The two retailers select different levels of quality, and this quality competition benefits retailers by softening price competition. In a sequential-channel-choice model, I find that the leader can obtain a first-mover advantage. From the perspective of the supplier, which can decide the distribution channel structure and level of quality, both suppliers choose the decentralized channel in equilibrium.

• Journal of Information Processing Systems
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.513-526
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• 2023

Supply chain coordination plays a critical role in improving the enterprise performance and the competitive advantage of fresh e-commerce. This study explores the coordination problem of a two-echelon fresh produce e-commerce supply chain comprising a fresh e-commerce enterprise and a fresh supplier in a novel framework. In this framework, the fresh e-commerce sells fresh produce and provides promotion effort; meanwhile, the fresh supplier deliveries fresh produce and provides freshness-keeping effort. Specifically, the optimal decisions under centralized and decentralized decision-making are compared, and it is found that centralized decision-making is more profitable. Based on this work, we created a cost-sharing and revenue-sharing combination contract. This study demonstrates that this contract effectively coordinates the supply chain and makes both parties achieve Pareto optimization when the parameters meet certain conditions. Finally, the feasibility and validity of the contract are presented through a numerical example.

• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2011.02a
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• pp.357-363
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• 2011

Mediation has long been praised as one of effective dispute resolution methods in the area of construction law. Article 85-1 of the Taiwan Government Procurement Act was amended and promulgated by presidential decree on July 4, 2007. The second paragraph of the Article elaborates explicitly, "In the event that the application for mediation referred to in the preceding paragraph is made by the supplier, the agency may not object to such application." Beyond that, if an unsuccessful mediation of a construction dispute is due to the agency's disagreeing with the proposal or resolution for mediation proposed by the Complaint Review Board for Government Procurement ("CRBGP"), the agency may not object to the arbitration filed by the supplier. It undoubtedly reinforces the importance of the mediation-arbitration procedure. Accordingly, this paper elaborates on the mediation mechanism in Taiwan in the framework of construction disputes first. After that, dispute resolution of a local public work case is provided to demonstrate the practice of construction mediation in Taiwan. Lastly, this study proposes suggestions on applying mediation to ease similar subsequent cases.

• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.55-80
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• 2012

I. Introduction Developing the relationships between companies is very important issue to ensure a competitive advantage in today's business environment (Bleeke & Ernst 1991; Mohr & Spekman 1994; Powell 1990). Partnerships between companies are based on having same goals, pursuing mutual understanding, and having a professional level of interdependence. By having such a partnerships and cooperative efforts between companies, they will achieve efficiency and effectiveness of their business (Mohr and Spekman, 1994). However, it is difficult to expect these ideal results only in the B2B corporate transaction. According to agency theory which is the well-accepted theory in various fields of business strategy, organization, and marketing, the two independent companies have fundamentally different corporate purposes. Also there is a higher chance of developing opportunism and conflict due to natures of human(organization), such as self-interest, bounded rationality, risk aversion, and environment factor as imbalance of information (Eisenhardt 1989). That is, especially partnerships between principal(or buyer) and agent(or supplier) of companies within supply chain, the business contract itself will not provide competitive advantage. But managing partnership between companies is the key to success. Therefore, managing partnership between manufacturer and supplier, and finding causes of conflict are essential to improve B2B performance. In conclusion, based on prior researches and Agency theory, this study will clarify how business hazards cause conflicts on supply chain and then identify how developed conflicts have been managed by two control mechanisms. II. Research model III. Method In order to validate our research model, this study gathered questionnaires from small and medium sized enterprises(SMEs). In Korea, SMEs mean the firms whose employee is under 300 and capital is under 8 billion won(about 7.2 million dollar). We asked the manufacturer's perception about the relationship with the biggest supplier, and our key informants are denied to a person responsible for buying(ex)CEO, executives, managers of purchasing department, and so on). In detail, we contact by telephone to our initial sample(about 1,200 firms) and introduce our research motivation and send our questionnaires by e-mail, mail, and direct survey. Finally we received 361 data and eliminate 32 inappropriate questionnaires. We use 329 manufactures' data on analysis. The purpose of this study is to identify the anticipant role of business hazard (environmental dynamism, asset specificity) and investigate the moderating effect of control mechanism(formal control, social control) on conflict-performance relationship. To find out moderating effect of control methods, we need to compare the regression weight between low versus. high group(about level of exercised control methods). Therefore we choose the structural equation modeling method that is proper to do multi-group analysis. The data analysis is performed by AMOS 17.0 software, and model fits are good statically (CMIN/DF=1.982, p<.000, CFI=.936, IFI=.937, RMSEA=.056). IV. Result V. Discussion Results show that the higher environmental dynamism and asset specificity(on particular supplier) buyer(manufacturer) has, the more B2B conflict exists. And this conflict affect relationship quality and financial outcomes negatively. In addition, social control and formal control could weaken the negative effect of conflict on relationship quality significantly. However, unlikely to assure conflict resolution effect of control mechanisms on relationship quality, financial outcomes are changed by neither social control nor formal control. We could explain this results with the characteristics of our sample, SMEs(Small and Medium sized Enterprises). Financial outcomes of these SMEs(manufacturer or principal) are affected by their customer(usually major company) more easily than their supplier(or agent). And, in recent few years, most of companies have suffered from financial problems because of global economic recession. It means that it is hard to evaluate the contribution of supplier(agent). Therefore we also support the suggestion of Gladstein(1984), Poppo & Zenger(2002) that relational performance variable can capture the focal outcomes of relationship(exchange) better than financial performance variable. This study has some implications that it tests the sources of conflict and investigates the effect of resolution methods of B2B conflict empirically. And, especially, it finds out the significant moderating effect of formal control which past B2B management studies have ignored in Korea.

• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 1999.04a
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• pp.302-302
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• 1999

• Proceedings of the CALSEC Conference
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• 2001.08a
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• pp.25-33
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• 2001

eProcurement System io for the improvement of costs and productivity, and consists of eCatalog, eSourcing supporting the supplier selection, and ePurchase system supporting purchase request, approval, and PO.(omitted)

• Proceedings of the Korean Nuclear Society Conference
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• 2005.05a
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• pp.964-965
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• 2005

• IE interfaces
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• v.25 no.1
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• pp.21-30
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• 2012

In the past, buyers and suppliers met each other to find common interests off-line in exhibitions and conferences, or through personal connection. These activities were time consuming and costly. With the advent of information era, these activities moved to online market places, where buyers search for suppliers with a set of keywords that are believed to be representative of their requirements. Its fundamental assumption is that all the potential candidates are registered in a certain database. However, recently buyers want to diversify suppliers due to needs of cost competitiveness or frequent new product development. To this end, instead of choosing suppliers from the supplier pool, discovering suppliers from all over the world should be emphasized. In order to enable buyers to describe their requirements and suppliers to capture their manufacturing capabilities via online market places, the semantic differences of terms between buyers and suppliers should be resolved. The paper summarizes various supplier discovery frameworks and prototype systems, which can be employed to expose domestic small-medium enterprises into global buyers in the near future.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.41 no.2
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• pp.101-127
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• 2016

Irrational ordering decisions of supply chain members have been gaining growing importance in the area of supply chain management. Irrational ordering behaviors that deviate from the profit maximizing decisions in the newsvendor settings have observed with human experiments in recent research. These behaviors can be modeled with several typical decision bias elements. This bias in ordering decisions affects the performance of supply chain contracts designed based on the assumption that the supply chain members make optimal decisions, making it necessary to design supply chain contracts by considering the irrationality. The purpose of this research is to derive a method to design the revenue sharing contract that considers human irrationality in ordering decisions. This research considers a simple two-echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer, where the supplier is assumed to be perfectly rational while the retailer making newsvendor type ordering decisions displays irrational ordering behaviors. Under this environment, this research analytically models the revenue sharing contract to maximize the total supply chain profit or the supplier's own profits while considering the three decision bias patterns of the retailer, which include the pull-to-center effect, the prospect theory, and the increased subjective sensitivity to the revenue sharing ratio. Irrationality parameters are measured through human experiments based on which and through numerical simulations, we showed that significant improvements in the supply chain performance can be achieved.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• v.20 no.4
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• pp.1-23
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• 2010

Some researches insist that, to participate in an e-partnership, a distributor needs a given level of trust to reduce the perceived risk of an e-partnership to his/her own threshold. However, other researches insist that if a distributor has only a given level of trust in his/her suppliers, irrelevant of the perceived risk level, he/she participates in the e-partnership. Thus, from the perspective of a distributor, this study built a trust model in which these two viewpoints were reflected. And then this study examined whether or not perceived risk mediates an influence of trust to e-partnership. The proposed trust model was tested with 265 questionnaires about a distributor-supplier e-partnership in food wholesale markets. The analysis results Indicated that perceived risk partially had a mediating effect between trust and e-partnership Intention. That is, of the two risk types, only perceived performance risk mediated an influence from competence trust to e-partnership intention. Relational risk did not play a mediating role between goodwill trust and e-partnership intention. This result Implies two managerial meanings. First, a distributor Intends to engage In e-partnership with his/her supplier, irrelevant of relational risk's level if goodwill trust level surpasses his/her own threshold. Thus, suppliers should concentrate more effort in developing goodwill trust than in reducing relational risk. To develop goodwill trust, they should endeavor to establish mutual interests and individual trust with their distributor, and to utilize institutional trust bases. Second, a distributor requires a certain competence In his/her suppliers to sufficiently reduce performance risk caused bye-partnership. Thus, to develop competence trust in e-partnership, suppliers should improve on any lack of competence and build a good reputation.