• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.135-165
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• 2010

In this paper, I explore Turner's argument against libertarianism. He claims that libertarians can't be compatible with naturalism, without abandoning the Consequence Argument. In order to support this claim, he proposes the Supervenience Argument. According to him, the Supervenience Argument can't be rejected without abandoning either the Consequence Argument or naturalism. But I show that libertarians don't have to accept his Supervenience Argument, even though they stick to the Consequence Argument, and that even though they accept his Supervenience Argument, they don't have to abandon the freedom of agent. For these reasons, I conclude that Turner's argument against libertarianism turns out a failure.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.105
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• pp.75-94
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• 2008

In philosophy of mind, both reductionism and deflationism claim that the problem of mental causation is overstated, but the reason why they claim that way is quite different. On the one hand, for deflationism, since the problem of mental causation is bogus problem we need to focus on epistemology or scientific explanation rather than metaphysics. On the other hand, although the proponents of nonreductionism seem to think of the principles of causal closure of the physical and causal exclusion proposed by Jaegwon Kim as tenable, they do not go with the reductive approach to the problem of mental causation. Instead they stay with the concept of supervenience to overcome mental causation problem that, reductionists think, leads us to the dilemma situation. Of course, deflationists do not think that supervenience is plausible not as much as supervenience physicalists think that it is. If so, in what way and how do deflationists regard the problem of mental causation as a bogus problem? In this paper, I shall examine the most plausible response to mental causation problem, the contemporary version of mind-body problem by critically discussing and clarifying matters concerning the problem.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.32
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• pp.215-244
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• 2008

This article's aim is to criticise ontological physicallism, supervenience, and eliminativism on theory of mind-body relation, and to present Confucian theory of mind-body relation as an alternative. Confucianism on theory of mind-body relation. Ontological physicallism reduce 'the psycho' to 'the physical'. Therefore, Physicallism as theory of mind-body relation reduce mind to physical body. Mind-Body supervenience theory insists property co-variation and dependency of mind-body. Eliminative materialism is to eliminate 'the psycho'. But confucianists believe in reality of the human mind-heart & it's nature. Confucianism is to establish the mina-heart & it's nature as real. Confucianism can be an alternative of physicallism, supervenience, and eliminativism on theory of mind-body relation. And Confucian's opinion differs from theory of the substance and phenomenalism.