• 한국항공운항학회지
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• 제15권1호
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• pp.38-53
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• 2007

In a seminal judgment of November 2002 (Case C-476/98) relating to the compatibility with Community laws of the 'nationality clause' in the 1996 amending protocol to the 1955 U.S.-German Air Services Agreement, the European Court of Justice(ECJ) decided that the provision constituted a measure of an intrinsically discriminatory nature and was thus contrary to the principle of national treatment established under Art. 52 of the EC Treaty. The Court, rejecting bluntly the German government' submissions relying on public policy grounds(Art. 56, EC Treaty), seemed content to declare and rule that the protocol provision requiring a contracting state party to ensure substantial ownership and effective control by its nationals of its designated airlines had violated the requirement of national treatment reserved for other Community Members under the salient Treaty provision. The German counterclaims against the Commission, although tantalizing not only from the perusal of the judgment but from the perspective of international air law, were nonetheless invariably correct and to the point. For such a clause has been justified to defend the 'fundamental interests of society from a serious threat' that may result from granting operating licenses or necessary technical authorizations to an airline company of a third country. Indeed, the nationality clause has been inserted in most of the liberal bilaterals to allow the parties to enforce their own national laws and regulations governing aviation safety and security. Such a clause is not targeted as a device for discriminating against the nationals of any third State. It simply acts as the minimum legal safeguards against aviation risk empowering a party to take legal control of the designated airlines. Unfortunately, the German call for the review of such a foremost objective and rationale underlying the nationality clause landed on the deaf ears of the Court which appeared quite happy not to take stock of the potential implications and consequences in its absence and of the legality under international law of the 'national treatment' requirement of Community laws. Again, while US law limits foreign shareholders to 24.9% of its airlines, the European Community limits non-EC ownership to 49%, precluding any ownership and effective control by foreign nationals of EC airlines, let alone any foreign takeover and merger. Given this, it appears inconsistent and unreasonable for the EC to demand, $vis-{\grave{a}}-vis$ a non-EC third State, national treatment for all of its Member States. The ECJ's decision was also wrongly premised on the precedence of Community laws over international law, and in particular, international air law. It simply is another form of asserting and enforcing de facto extraterritorial application of Community laws to a non-EC third country. Again, the ruling runs counter to an established rule of international law that a treaty does not, as a matter of principle, create either obligations or rights for a third State. Aside from the legal problems, the 'national treatment' may not be economically justified either, in light of the free-rider problem and resulting externalities or inefficiency. On the strength of international law and economics, therefore, airlines of Community Members other than the designated German and U.S. air carriers are neither eligible for traffic rights, nor entitled to operate between or 'free-ride' on the U.S. and German points. All in all and in all fairness, the European Court's ruling was nothing short of an outright condemnation of established rules and principles of international law and international air law. Nor is the national treatment requirement justified by the economic logic of deregulation or liberalization of aviation markets. Nor has the requirement much to do with fair competition and increased efficiency.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• 제12권1호
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• pp.31-68
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• 1990

경제력집중(經濟力集中)은 경제적(經濟的) 자원(資源)과 수단(手段)의 상당부분이 소수의 경독주체(經瀆主體)에 집중되어 이들이 자원배분(資源配分)의 흐름에 큰 영향을 미칠 수 있는 상태를 말한다. 그러므로 경제력집중(經濟力集中)은 본질상 자유시장기구(自由市場機構)의 생리와는 부합하지 않지만 자본주의(資本主義)의 역사로 볼 때 그것이 바로 자유경쟁(自由競爭)의 소산이라는 측면도 있다는 점이 문제가 된다. 구미(歐美)와 일본(日本) 등에 있어서 자본주의체제(資本主義體制)의 진화궤적(進化軌跡)은 이 문제가 어떻게 전개되는가에 따라 결정되어 왔다. 우리나라에서의 경제역집중(經濟力集中)은 다수의 독(獨) 과점적(寡占的) 대기업(大企業)들이 소유관계(所有關係)로 결합되어 있는 기업집단(企業集團) 즉 소위 재벌(財閥)의 문제로 집약될 수 있다. 우리나라의 기업집단(企業集團)의 성장은 시장기구(市場機構)의 작동결과에 기인한 면도 있지만 고도경제성장기(高度經濟成長期)의 정부정책(政府政策)에 의하여 촉진된 것도 부인할 수 없다. 기업집단(企業集團)에 의한 경제력집중(經濟力集中)은 과거 우리나라의 정치(政治) 경제(經濟) 사회(社會)가 거쳐온 진화과정(進化過程)을 집약적으로 나타내는 것 이다. 그러므로 우리나라에서 민주주의(民主主義)와 자본주의(資本主義)의 이념(理念)과 질서(秩序)에 대한 국민적(國民的) 합의(合意)를 모색하려는 현시점에서 경제력집중(經濟力集中)을 객관적으로 인식하여 효율(效率)과 형평(衡平)을 조화하는 적절한 대응방향을 모색 하는 것은 매우 긴요한 과제이다.