• English Language & Literature Teaching
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.25-49
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• 2006

Though a large amount of research concerning listening strategies has been conducted, the strategic behaviors of younger students in this area have received less attention. This study is a follow up study of an earlier case study by the author (2006). The purpose of this study is to verify what listening strategies Korean elementary learners use in a general L2 listening situation. 213 elementary students participated in this study, and a listening strategy questionnaire was used. ANOVA, MANOVA, Correlation and Multiple Regression Analysis were used to interpret the data. The results of this study reveal that younger participants used all four types of listening strategies, cognitive, compensation, metacognitive and affective, fairly often; however, the results also show that they differ in how frequently they use each strategy according to their listening proficiency. Overall, highly proficient learners use more strategies compared to less proficient learners. High proficiency learners use compensation strategies most and cognitive strategies least. Low proficient learners use affective strategies most and compensation strategies least. Moreover, the results showed no significant grade- or gender-related strategic behaviors, and also showed that L2 listening proficiency can be a significant predictor of strategic behavior of young learners. 12% of the variance in L2 strategic behaviors was attributable to L2 listening proficiency.

• Journal of Korean Society for Quality Management
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• v.38 no.1
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• pp.10-19
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• 2010

The competitive strategies of the Korean manufacturing companies have changed from the "cost leadership" strategy in the early developing stage since 1960's to the "stuck in the middle" position since 1990's in the face of emerging new cost leaders as the Chinese companies. The data on the strategic contents of the Korean manufacturing companies show that their strategies are seeking the value innovation through not only quality improvement but also cost reduction altogether rather than selecting one on the trade-off relation between the both competitive dimensions. Their strategic actions seem to be seeking the operational efficiencies through all the value chain activities rather than the strategic effectiveness by selecting and focusing on the specific competitive dimension, which is considered as a typical strategic approach. Their strategy seems to be non-strategic in the general sense. But their non-strategically looking behaviors can be reasonable enough for their sandwiched competitive position between the global quality leaders and following cost leaders. This paper explains why their strategies can be right through the theoretical explanations by using the quality-price elasticity approaches for the consumer behaviors. We can call their strategic activities as the value innovation strategy.

• Korea Journal of Hospital Management
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.108-135
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• 1996

This paper investigates the current feature of management strategy of hospitals in Korea, and examines the relationships between adoption of a particular strategic orientation and the hospitals environmental and organizational characteristics, strategic behaviors and management improvement activities, and financial performance. Data were collected from CEOs of 88 hospitals among 650 hospitals for a 13.5% response rate using the self-administered questionnaire by mail survey. The major findings that obtained are as follows: 1. Only 37.2% of response hospitals carried out strategic planning, Most of these hospitals established the first strategic planning in 1991(81.3%) and renovated strategic planning by 4 or 5 years(56.3%), and modified strategic planning with flexibility(59.4%). Most strategic plans were documented, but informalized(68.8%). And only 29.0% of these hospitals had independent planning division. 2. Hospital services that CEOs assessed rank ordered for their impact on profitability are as follows: i)diagnostic ultrasound facility, computerized tomography scanner, obstetric inpatient unit, therapeutic X-ray, and physical therapy at present. ii)diagnostic ultrasound facility, physical therapy, computerized tomography scanner, emergency department, and health screening at future. And the services rank ordered that CEOs hoped to introduce are as follows: emergency department, physical therapy, health screening, volunteer services, and computerized tomography scanner. 3. Using a typology developed by Miles and Snow(l978), the strategic orientation of response hospitals are shifting significantly from defenders in the past to analyzers in the present, and to prospectors in the future(p<.01). 4. With regard to hospital environmental and organizational characteristics such as ownership, physician training, location, bed size, and hospital management training career and specialty of CEOs, the four strategic orientation archetypes varied not significantly. But, hospitals with a analyser orientation in the present and a reactor orientation in the future perceived competition significantly higher than the other three archetypes(p<.05). 5. The four archetypes rank ordered in terms of appling strategic behaviors and management improvement activities are as follows: prospector, analyzer, reactor, and defender. 6. The four archetypes differed significantly in terms of their financial performance using revenue per bed(p<.05). Reactors and prospectors in terms of total revenue per bed, prospectors in terms of outpatient revenue per bed, and reactors and prospectors in terms of inpatient revenue per bed had the best performance.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2007.11b
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• pp.258-260
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• 2007

MAS based market simulator has attracted the attentions of people who are interested in using or developing electricity market simulator. MAS based approach makes it possible to model each market participant's strategic behaviors. Traditional market simulators have used optimization formulation to model market operation, which has been used since vertically integrated system. Optimization mainly uses cost minimization or welfare maximization of entire system. Therefore it is somehow difficult to model the independently strategic behaviors of market participants. MAS is one of AI technology based on distributed intelligence which makes it possible to model independently acting entities in competitive market. This paper proposes the method to model strategic participants in electricity market based on MAS.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.15 no.7
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• pp.81-90
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• 2017

The purpose of this study is to analyze the strategic behaviors of the Broadcasting advocacy coalition and IT advocacy coalition in the process of establishing the Korea Communications Commission(KCC) in 2008. Broadcasting and telecommunications convergence policy has been confronted with long-term conflicts because of ideological clashes between public interest and industrialism and stakeholder relations. Under this circumstance, the two advocacy coalitions sought to bring out the favorable outcomes through strategic behavior. However, the strategic behaviors were limited, and the establishment of the Korea Communications Commission was decided by political negotiation. Since then, KCC has been buried in political issues and has produced policy failure cases. In order to reduce these adverse effects, it is necessary to establish institutional devices in the reorganization process. Above all, efforts are needed to overcome the practice of using organizational restructuring as a political tool.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.9
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• pp.542-549
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• 2003

In this paper, a novel approach to generator maintenance scheduling strategy in competitive electricity markets based on non-cooperative dynamic game theory is presented. The main contribution of this study can be considered to develop a game-theoretic framework for analyzing strategic behaviors of generating companies (Gencos) from the standpoints of the generator maintenance-scheduling problem (GMP) game. To obtain the equilibrium solution for the GMP game, the GMP problem is formulated as a dynamic non-cooperative game with complete information. In the proposed game, the players correspond to the profit-maximizing individual Gencos, and the payoff of each player is defined as the profits from the energy market. The optimal maintenance schedule is defined by subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. Numerical results for two-Genco system by both proposed method and conventional one are used to demonstrate that 1) the proposed framework can be successfully applied in analyzing the strategic behaviors of each Genco in changed markets and 2) both methods show considerably different results in terms of market stability or system reliability. The result indicates that generator maintenance scheduling strategy is one of the crucial strategic decision-makings whereby Gencos can maximize their profits in a competitive market environment.

• Journal of KIISE:Software and Applications
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• v.31 no.2
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• pp.101-110
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• 2004

In dynamic systems, such as social and economic systems, complex interactions emerge among its members. In that case, their behaviors become adaptive according to Changing environment. In many cases, an individual's behaviors can be modeled by a stimulus-response system in a dynamic environment. In this paper, we use the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game, which is simple yet capable of dealing with complex problems, to model the dynamic systems. We propose strategic coalition consisting of many agents and simulate their emergence in a co-evolutionary learning environment. Also we introduce the concept of confidence for agents in a coalition and show how such confidences help to improve the generalization ability of the whole coalition. Experimental results are presented to demonstrate that co-evolutionary learning with coalitions and confidence allows better performing strategies that generalize well.

• Journal of agriculture & life science
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• v.46 no.6
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• pp.185-195
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• 2012

The purpose of this paper is to analyze how strategically the bilaterally monopolistic firms, only-one-seller and only-one-buyer, behave in a situation in which each firm has uncertain information on its opponent firm's cost. Even though the two firms know that seeking integrated profit leads to the optimized profit for both firms, each firm has an incentive to opportunistically behave to increase its share of the integrated profit. These opportunistic behaviors of the firms are analyzed through a game theoretic approach especially finding Nash equilibrium mixed strategies for the strategic profiles such as true-report or not and monitoring or not. The comparative statics to the Nash equilibrium mixed strategies shows that as the profit share increases the probability of monitoring an opponent firm is decreased while the probability increases as the size of the overstated production cost increases. This study also shows that high penalty and low monitoring cost lead to high probability to tell the truth of the production cost.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.379-384
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• 2014

This paper proposes a Cournot model that can be used to analyze the strategic behaviors of generation companies which try to maximize their profits in an imperfectly competitive electricity and carbon markets. The proposed model consists of two parts. First, the strategic behaviors of generation companies are modeled based on the Cournot theory. Second, the market operation is modeled based on the assumption that the market operator tries to maximize the total social welfare in consideration of environmental welfare. To find the Nash equilibrium of the proposed model, the two-level optimization technique is used. The proposed method has been applied to an illustrative example of oligopolistic markets. We found that the proposed method has strong potential to analyze the influence of the strategic biddings of the generation companies and the impact of renewable generator on markets where the competitiveness of the markets is not fully developed.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.14 no.9
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• pp.31-45
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• 2016

Purpose - This study develops a simulation model that looks at the dynamics between social capital and business performance in strategic networks to understand their behaviors in relation to each other, and to suggest dynamic relationship strategies. Research design, data, and methodology - Based on existing literature, this study identifies the complex causal loop diagram on social capital and business performance in strategic networks, and converts them into a simulation model for observing how the changes in business environment and relationship dependency affect social capital and business performance. Results - The simulation results showed that, first, the formation in social capital and business performance of networks with low relationship dependency was less affected by the changes in business environment. Second, the formation in social capital and business performance of networks with high relationship dependency was negatively impacted by the changes in business environment. In other words, higher relationship dependency strengthened the impact of changes in business environment on business performance. Conclusions - Thus, this study confirmed that in strategic networks, the changes in business environment and the degree of relationship dependency dynamically affect business performance, and that relationship dependency mediates the degree in which changes in the business environment affect business performance. The results of the simulations were further verified through actual business cases.