• Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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• v.27 no.7
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• pp.987-994
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• 2021

The Yellow sea, as described in article 123 of UNCLOS, is semi-enclosed sea surrounded by the Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China and North Korea. In addition, the Yellow Sea is one of the 66 large marine ecosystems as it contains large amounts of marine resources. According to article 194 of UNCLOS, states should be aware of rights and duties with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment to be engaged with countries directly as regional entity or indirectly. Therefore, the legal blank is urgent in terms of trans-boundary environmental pollutant issues. The UNDP has conducted a project called Yellow Sea Large Marine Ecosystem (YSLME) which has reached the 2^nd phase. The project has some notable achievements, namely performing joint activities on analysis of diagnostic trans-boundary issues in collaboration with China and South Korea, developing a strategic action plan based on TDA, and establishing regional strategic action plan. However, on the other hand, the project could not reflect the full participation of North Korea as a state party. As a result, the project has a limitation on effective implementation of RSAP. Therefore, this study focuses on the suggestion of a legally-binding trilateral treaty as a blue print for the next, 3^rd phase of the project. By analyzing the best practice of the Wadden Sea Trilateral Treaty case, the study verifies the validity of legislative measures on establishing and managing a legally-binding trilateral YSLME Commission. By suggesting a three phase treaty, incorporating a joint declaration by establishing the commission, the signing of the treaty, and formulating an umbrella convention and implementation arrangement, the study expects to guarantee the consistency and sustainability of the trilateral treaty regardless of political issues pertaining to North Korea.

• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.27-56
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• 2013

The United Nations Command (UNC) and the communist North failed to reach an agreement on where the maritime demarcation line should be drawn in the process of signing a truce after the Korean War because of the starkly different positions on the boundary of their territorial waters. As a result, the Armistice Treaty was signed on July 1953 without clarification about the maritime border. In the following month, Commander of the UNC unilaterally declared the Northern Limit Line (NLL) as a complementing measure to the Armistice. Referring to this, North Korea and its followers in South Korea wrongfully argue that the NLL is a "ghost line" that was established not based on the international law. However, one should note that the waters south of the NLL has always been under South Korea's jurisdiction since Korea's independence from Japan on August 15, 1945. There is no need to ask North Korea's approval for declaring the territorial waters that had already been under our sovereign jurisdiction. We do not need North Korea's approval just as we do not need Japan's approval with regard to our sovereign right over Dokdo. The legal status of the NLL may be explained with the following three characteristics. First, the NLL is a de facto maritime borderline that defines the territorial waters under the respective jurisdiction of the two divided countries. Second, the NLL in the West Sea also serves as a de facto military demarcation line at sea that can be likened to the border on the ground. Third, as a contacting line where the sea areas controlled by the two Koreas meet, the NLL is a maritime non-aggression line that was established on the legal basis of the 'acquiescence' element stipulated by the Inter-Korea Basic Agreement (article 11) and the Supplement on the Non-aggression principle (article 10). Particularly from the perspective of the domestic law, the NLL should be understood as a boundary defining areas controlled by temporarily divided states (not two different states) because the problem exists between a legitimate central government (South Korea) and an anti-government group (North Korea). In this sense, the NLL problem should be viewed not in terms of territorial preservation or expansion. Rather, it should be understood as a matter of national identity related to territorial sovereignty and national pride. North Korea's continuous efforts to problematize the NLL may be part of its strategy to nullify the Armistice Treaty. In other words, North Korea tries to take away the basis of the NLL by abrogating the Armistice Treaty and creating a condition in which the United Nations Command can be dissolved. By doing so, North Korea may be able to start the process for the peace treaty with the United States and reestablish a maritime line of its interest. So, North Korea's rationale behind making the NLL a disputed line is to deny the effectiveness of the NLL and ask for the establishment of a new legal boundary. Such an effort should be understood as part of a strategy to make the NLL question a political and military dispute (the similar motivation can be found in Japan's effort to make Dokdo a disputed Island). Therefore, the South Korean government should not accommodate such hidden intentions and strategy of North Korea. The NLL has been the de facto maritime border (that defines our territorial waters) and military demarcation line at sea that we have defended with a lot of sacrifice for the last sixty years. This is the line that our government and the military must defend in the future as we have done so far. Our commitment to the defense of the NLL is not only a matter of national policy protecting territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction; it is also our responsibility for those who were fallen while defending the North-Western Islands and the NLL.