• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.18 no.4
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• pp.658-669
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• 2016

The tremendous increase in mobile data traffic coupled with fierce competition in wireless industry brings about spectrum scarcity and bandwidth fragmentation. This inevitably results in asymmetric-valued long term evolution (LTE) spectrum allocation that stems from different timing for twice improvement in capacity between competing operators, given spectrum allocations today. This motivates us to study the economic effects of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum allocation. In this paper, we formulate the interactions between operators and users as a hierarchical dynamic game framework, where two spiteful operators simultaneously make spectrum acquisition decisions in the upper-level first-price sealed-bid auction game, and dynamic pricing decisions in the lower-level differential game, taking into account user subscription dynamics. Using backward induction, we derive the equilibrium of the entire game under mild conditions. Through analytical and numerical results, we verify our studies by comparing the latest result of LTE spectrum auction in South Korea, which serves as the benchmark of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum auction designs.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.6 no.1
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• pp.11-19
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• 2008

The Bidding System of the public IT project in Korea is fallen behind, because of the ordering habitual practice based old system, overcompetition based sealed bid and subcontract practice. To innovate this old-fashioned practice for public IT project bidding, this paper wants to generate a proper improvement direction of the public IT project contract law and the related policy through the literature review about the ordering and receiving system in Korea, the practical survey about bidding marketplace in Korea, and competition between bidding system and/or policy of major countries: USA, UK, France and Japan. As a result of practical survey, many problems of the current public IT project bidding system came out and improvement ideas toward future situation turned up. These outputs implicate that the current law and system related public IT project demands better improvement work for the future ubiquitous Korea. Therefore, this paper, to solve these problems about bidding systems and practice, propose the new public IT project contract law and the related policy, reflecting these improvement ideas by the practical survey and the literature review, and benchmarking points from bidding system of other countries.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.17 no.3
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• pp.135-166
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• 2008

This paper reports the empirical results of comparing the willingness to pay(WTP) for health risk reductions and the willingness to accept(WTA) for risk increases using experimental market methods in the first time in Korea. Health risks were defined as probabilities of premature death from exposure to one of As, Pb, and THM in tap water. A total of six experimental markets with 15 participants in each experiments were held using 20 repetitive Vickrey second-price sealed-bid auctions. To compare the effects of market experiences, trading a marketed good, candy bar, was introduced before the trading the non-marketed good, drinking water risks. Moreover, an objective risk information was provided after the first 10 trials to incorporate learning processes. Regardless of marketed or non-marketed goods, the mean of WTA exceeded the mean of WTP at the first auction trial. As experimental trials proceeded, the disparity between WTA and WTP for marketed goods disappeared. However results for non-marketed goods were rather mixed to the extent that WTA for health risks from As (relatively high risk leves) were significantly larger than WTP, while there were no significant difference between WTA and WTP for health risks fro Pb and THM (relatively low risk levels). On the other hand, participants seemed to respond in a 'rational' manner to the objective risk information provided, with positive learning effects of market-like experience(especially in the WTA experiments).