• Journal of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems
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• v.14 no.6
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• pp.678-686
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• 2004

This paper presents a new method to securely conduct online sealed-bid auctions with a single auctioneer server The sealed-bid auctions have several vulnerable security problems when they are performed on the Internet. One of such problems is the trust establishment between an auctioneer and bidders who participate in an auction. Several online sealed-bid auction methods have been developed to address this trust problem. The proposed method solves the security problems that would happen in the sealed-bid auction using a blind signature scheme and a contract signature protocol. It prevents the auctioneer from illegally manipulating the bidders' bidding information, repudiating the reception of some bid, manipulating the auction period, and illegally adding or deleting bids. In addition, it keeps the bidders from modifying the bidding information after issuing their bid and doing intentional mistake to invalidate their own bid. The method can be easily implemented using the multiagent architecture.

• Proceedings of the Korea Society of Information Technology Applications Conference
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• 2005.11a
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• pp.247-250
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• 2005

Recently, a concept of bid-rigging is issued in electronic auction. To prevent this attack, Abe-Suzuki proposed firstly receipt-free scheme based on bidding-booth. Chen-Lee-Kim pointed out that Abe-Suzuki's scheme only provides receipt-freeness for losing bidders. Also, they introduced a new receipt-free sealed bid auction scheme using the homomorphic encryption technique. The main participants of their scheme are Auctioneer, Auction Issuer, Bidder and Seller. Bid-rigging can happen by a seller in their scheme. We propose receipt-free sealed-bid auction scheme using a universal re-encryption mixnet. For our receipt-free sealed-bid auction, we use Pseudo ID of a bidder and universal re-encryption technique of Golle et al. Also, our scheme satisfies privacy, correctness, public verifiability, non-reputation, and receipt-freeness.

• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
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• v.10 no.1
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• pp.205-214
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• 2019

In Korea, the first-price sealed bid auction and the constrained mean-price sealed bid auction(buchal-je in Korean) have been used alternatively as procurement auctions. In this paper, we characterize the constrained mean-price sealed bid auction in the context of mechanism design. We consider the general ?-bidder case in which each bidder has private information. Under the assumptions of uniformly distributed valuations and linear strategies, we derive the equilibrium of the constrained mean-price sealed bid auction. Furthermore, we analyze the efficiency and the expected revenue of this auction mechanism in comparison with the first-price sealed bid auction. Finally, we conclude with the critical remarks on the practical intention of the government which uses this auction.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.12 no.6
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• pp.3-15
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• 2002

In this paper, we propose an efficient and secure sealed-bid auction protocol with two servers, a seller S and a third party A . The proposed scheme uses the idea of the conditional oblivious transfer protocol proposed by Crescenzo-Ostrovskey-Rajagopalan. A server A is not a trusted third party, but is assumed not to collude with a server S. In the proposed auction protocol, barring collusion between A and S, neither party gains any information about the bids, and moreover, the outcome of the auction will be correct. And the computational complexity of our auction protocol is considerably efficient and the communication overhead is similar to that of Naor-Pinkas-Sumner's scheme.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.10 no.12
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• pp.5616-5642
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• 2016

Different from traditional auctions, electronic auctions provide a platform to allow bidders and auctioneers merchandise to each other over network anytime and anywhere. Auctioneers can publish information of goods, and bidders can choose the interested targets through this bidding platform. To ensure the fairness and security of electronic auctions, Li et al. have proposed a practical electronic auction scheme which can confirm the requirement of strong anonymity, bidding privacy, and secret bidding price. However, we have found out that Li et al.'s scheme may lurk the risk of the denial-of-service attack during the bidding phase in a sealed-bid auction. Thus, we propose a brand-new sealed-bid auction mechanism, in which the essentials of e-auction can be firmly preserved. In particular, each bidder only needs to register at the center once and then can join to multiple plays launched by different auctioneers. Moreover, the correctness of mutual authentication is confirmed according to the BAN logic model.

• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2009.05a
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• pp.827-834
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• 2009

In respond to the demand of an open, fair, transparent, and efficient environment for procurement, many governments have incorporated the use of internet in their procurement systems with online procurement (e-procurement). Given the different policies and laws which have to be complied with, the practice of government e-procurement system varies from one country to another. Thus, experiences in running e-procurement will vary as well. The achievements and obstacles of one country's experience will be a constructive reference for other countries in establishing e-procurement system. In this regard, government e-procurement system practices in two Southeast Asia countries i.e., Thailand and Indonesia particularly in public works are consecutively presented and finally compared in this paper. The government of Thailand has applied Online Auctions (e-Auctions) as the national procurement practice since 2005 and performed the e-Auctions in two types: Reverse Auction and Sealed Bid Auction. Contrary to the common practice of e-procurement, the Thai government, with some rationales, runs the bid documents obtaining manually as well as qualification and technical documents submission and holding the e-Auctions at bidding office. Whereas Indonesian government runs Online Sealed Bid Bidding (e-Procurement) and most of the bidding stages are performed electronically except bid evaluation for both technical and financial. The advantages and drawbacks of these two e-procurement practices are discussed as well as improvements that have to be made for successful of e-procurement.

• Proceedings of the Korean Information Science Society Conference
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• 2001.10b
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• pp.76-78
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• 2001

인터넷 사용이 급증하고 전자상거래의 발달과 동시에 전자 경매들이 인터넷 상에서 활발히 이루어지고 있다. 그 중에서 아웃크라이(Out-Cry) 스타일의 경매들은 봉인입찰(Sealed Bid) 경매에 비해서 많이 행해지고 있다. 봉인입찰 경매들을 인터넷 상에서 수행되었을 때에 보안상의 문제점을 가지고 있다. 가장 치명적인 단점은 경매자(Auctioneer)에 대한 신뢰문제로 입찰자(Bidder)들은 경매자가 자신의 입찰정보를 알아내어 다른 입찰자를 도와주거나 더 많은 이익을 얻기 위해서 입찰 정보를 조작하지 않을까 걱정한다. 이런 문제를 해결하기 위해서 몇몇의 보안 프로토콜이 등장하였는데, 그것들은 신뢰할 수 있는 제삼자(Trusted Third Party)와 다수의 입찰 매니져(Bidding Manager)를 둠으로써 해결하고 있다. 첫 번째 방법에서는 경매자에 대한 절대적 신뢰를 전제로 하고 두 번째 방법에서는 경매자와는 별도의 다른 기관들이 요구되어 진다. 이 논문에서는 다른 기관 없이 인터넷 상에서 안전하게 행해질 수 있는 봉인입찰 경매방법을 제시한다. 이 프로토콜은 Vickrey 경매와 FPSB 경매에서 모두 사용될 수 있고 다른 신뢰할 수 있는 제삼자의 도움 없이 입찰자와 경매자의 통신만으로 가능하기 때문에 비용이 절감된다.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.25 no.2
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• pp.89-102
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• 1994

This paper is to survey the major results of the game-theoretic models and recent research directions of the literature on auctions and competitive biddings. This paper classifies the auctions and competitive biddings into the following four major types:(i) English auction, (ii) Dutch auction, (iii) the first-price sealed-bid auction, (iv) the second-price sealed-bid auction. In order to survey the major ideas related to auctions and competitive biddings, we use two representative theoretical models developed under the game-theoretic framework : (i) the independent private value model are summarized as follows ; (1) The Dutch auction and the first-price auction are strategically equivalent, and so are the English auction and the second-price auction. (2) At the symmetric equilibria, the expected selling price is the same for all four types of auction. Meanwhile, the major results of the general model are as follows ; (1) When bidders are uncertain about their value extimate, the English and second-price auctions are not equivalent, but the dutch and the first-price auctions are still strategically equivalent. (2) The English auction generates the higher expected prices than the second-price auction. Also, when bidders are risk-neutral, the second-price auction generated higher average prices than the Dutch and the first-price auctions.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.340-346
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• 2003

This paper presents a game theory application for an analysis of uniform price auction in a simplified competitive electricity market and analyzes the properties of Nash equilibrium for various conditions. We have assumed that each generation firm submits his bid to a market in the form of a sealed bid and the market is operated as a uniform price auction. Two firms are supposed to be the players of the market, and we consider the maximum generation quantity constraint of one firm only. The system demand is assumed to have a linear relationship with market clearing prices and the bidding curve of each firm, representing the price at which he has a willingness to sell his generation quantity, is also assumed to have a linear function. In this paper, we analyze the effects of maximum generation quantity constraints on the Nash equilibrium of the uniform price auction. A simple numerical example with two generation firms is demonstrated to show the basic idea of the proposed methodology.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems
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• v.15 no.3
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• pp.382-388
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• 2005

We apply estimations of the intuitionistic fuzzy sets on the basis of which some amendments nay be undertaken. In particular, this paper describes the process of working out a university classes schedule.