• International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.91-99
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• 2021

In Korea, some pharmaceutical companies and agricultural machine manufacturers associate the length of the credit period with the retailer's order size. This kind of commercial practice is based on the principle of economy of scale from the supplier's point of view and tends to make retailer's order size large enough to qualify a certain credit period break. Also, the credit period allowed by the supplier makes it possible to reduce the retail price expecting that the retailer can earn more profits by the stimulating the customer's demand. Since the retailer's order size is affected by the end customer's demand, it is reasonable to determine the retail price and the order size simultaneously. In this regard, this paper analyzes the retailer's problem who has to decide his sales price and order quantity from a supplier who offers different credit periods depending on his order size. And we show that the retailer's order size large enough to qualify a certain credit period break. Also, it is assumed that the end customer's demand rate is represented by a linear decreasing function of the retail price.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.8 no.6
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• pp.655-660
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• 2022

This paper analyzes the problem of the economic order quantity (lot size) of a retailer in a two-stage supply chain consisting of a supplier, a retailer(distributor), and a customer. In this two-stage supply chain, the supplier permits the retailer to defer payment for a certain fixed period of time for the purchase cost to be paid by the retailer as a price differentiation strategy with his competitor. In addition, in the case of customer goods such as food and grain, it is common to see that end-customer demand is generally depend on the level of inventory displayed by the retailer. From this perspective, this paper analyzes the inventory problem of retailers under the assumption that the supplier may allow a certain period to suspend payments for the purchase of goods and the end customer demand is a function of the retailer's inventory level increasing with size. In this regard, we need to analyze how much the length of the grace period for product purchase costs affect the retailer's lot-sizing policy. Therefore, we formulate the retailer's annual net profit and analyze the effect of the length of credit period on the retailer's inventory policy numerically.

• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.17 no.4
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• pp.29-53
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• 2012

As so many marketers get to use diverse sales promotion methods, manufacturer and retailer in a channel often use them too. In this context, diverse issues on sales promotion management arise. One of them is the issue of unplanned buying. Consumers' unplanned buying is clearly better off for the retailer but not for manufacturer. This asymmetric influence of unplanned buying should be dealt with prudently because of its possibility of provocation of channel conflict. However, there have been scarce studies on the sales promotion management strategy considering the unplanned buying and its asymmetric effect on retailer and manufacturer. In this paper, we try to find a better way for a manufacturer in a channel to promote performance through the retailer's sales promotion efforts when there is potential of unplanned buying effect. We investigate via game-theoretic modeling what is the optimal cost sharing level between the manufacturer and retailer when there is unplanned buying effect. We investigated following issues about the topic as follows: (1) What structure of cost sharing mechanism should the manufacturer and retailer in a channel choose when unplanned buying effect is strong (or weak)? (2) How much payoff could the manufacturer and retailer in a channel get when unplanned buying effect is strong (or weak)? We focus on the impact of unplanned buying effect on the optimal cost sharing mechanism for sales promotions between a manufacturer and a retailer in a same channel. So we consider two players in the game, a manufacturer and a retailer who are interacting in a same distribution channel. The model is of complete information game type. In the model, the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader and the retailer is the follower. Variables in the model are as following table. Manufacturer's objective function in the basic game is as follows: ${\Pi}={\Pi}_1+{\Pi}_2$, where, ${\Pi}_1=w_1(1+L-p_1)-{\psi}^2$, ${\Pi}_2=w_2(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. And retailer's is as follows: ${\pi}={\pi}_1+{\pi}_2$, where, ${\pi}_1=(p_1-w_1)(1+L-p_1)-L(L-{\psi})+p_u(b+L-p_u)$, ${\pi}_2=(p_2-w_2)(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. The model is of four stages in two periods. Stages of the game are as follows. (Stage 1) Manufacturer sets wholesale price of the first period($w_1$) and cost sharing level of channel sales promotion(${\Psi}$). (Stage 2) Retailer sets retail price of the focal brand($p_1$), the unplanned buying item($p_u$), and sales promotion level(L). (Stage 3) Manufacturer sets wholesale price of the second period($w_2$). (Stage 4) Retailer sets retail price of the second period($p_2$). Since the model is a kind of dynamic games, we try to find a subgame perfect equilibrium to derive some theoretical and managerial implications. In order to obtain the subgame perfect equilibrium, we use the backward induction method. In using backward induction approach, we solve the problems backward from stage 4 to stage 1. By completely knowing follower's optimal reaction to the leader's potential actions, we can fold the game tree backward. Equilibrium of each variable in the basic game is as following table. We conducted more analysis of additional game about diverse cost level of manufacturer. Manufacturer's objective function in the additional game is same with that of the basic game as follows: ${\Pi}={\Pi}_1+{\Pi}_2$, where, ${\Pi}_1=w_1(1+L-p_1)-{\psi}^2$, ${\Pi}_2=w_2(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. But retailer's objective function is different from that of the basic game as follows: ${\pi}={\pi}_1+{\pi}_2$, where, ${\pi}_1=(p_1-w_1)(1+L-p_1)-L(L-{\psi})+(p_u-c)(b+L-p_u)$, ${\pi}_2=(p_2-w_2)(1-{\epsilon}L-p_2)$. Equilibrium of each variable in this additional game is as following table. Major findings of the current study are as follows: (1) As the unplanned buying effect gets stronger, manufacturer and retailer had better increase the cost for sales promotion. (2) As the unplanned buying effect gets stronger, manufacturer had better decrease the cost sharing portion of total cost for sales promotion. (3) Manufacturer's profit is increasing function of the unplanned buying effect. (4) All results of (1),(2),(3) are alleviated by the increase of retailer's procurement cost to acquire unplanned buying items. The authors discuss the implications of those results for the marketers in manufacturers or retailers. The current study firstly suggests some managerial implications for the manufacturer how to share the sales promotion cost with the retailer in a channel to the high or low level of the consumers' unplanned buying potential.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.13 no.3
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• pp.304-318
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• 2014

It is necessary for a retailer to improve responsiveness to uncertain customer demand in product sales. In order to solve this problem, this paper discusses an optimal operation for a 2-stage-ordering-production system consisting of a retailer and a manufacturer. First, based on the demand information estimated at first order time $t_1$, the retailer determines the optimal initial order quantity $Q^*_1$, the optimal advertising cost $a^*_1$ and the optimal retail price $p^*_1$ of a single product at $t_1$, and then the manufacturer produces $Q^*_1$. Next, the retailer updates the demand information at second order time $t_2$. If the retailer finds that $Q^*_1$ dissatisfies the demand indicated by the demand information updated at $t_2$, the retailer determines the optimal second order quantity $Q^*_2$ under $Q^*_1$ and adjusts optimally the advertising cost and the retail price to $a^*_2$ and $p^*_2$ at $t_2$. Here, decision-making approaches for two situations are made-a decentralized supply chain (DSC) whose objective is to maximize the retailer's profit and an integrated supply chain (ISC) whose objective is to maximize the whole system's profit. In the numerical analysis, the results of the optimal decisions under DSC are compared with those under ISC. In addition, supply chain coordination is discussed to adjust the unit wholesale price at each order time as Nash Bargaining solutions.

• Journal of the Korea Fashion and Costume Design Association
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• v.18 no.3
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• pp.1-19
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• 2016

This study tried to find out implementation factors of internal marketing for a cosmetic retailer, and to look into their effects on Salesperson's job satisfaction, organization commitment, customer orientation and sales performance. For this, this study inquired into the concepts and relationships of internal marketing, job satisfaction, organization commitment, customer orientation and sales performance through literature review; and tested the relationships between the variables by setting up a research model and hypotheses. The findings of this study may be summarized as follows: First, it was found that the better the education & training, the supervisor support and the compensation system among internal marketing factors of a cosmetic retailer were, the higher a door-to-door salesperson's job satisfaction was. Second, it was found that the better internal communication and the education & training among internal marketing factors of a cosmetic retailer were, the higher a door-to-door salesperson's organization commitment was. Third, the higher the job satisfaction of a door-to-door salesperson in a cosmetic retailer was, the higher the organization commitment was. Fourth, it was found that the higher the organization commitment of a door-to-door salesperson in a cosmetic retailer was, the higher the customer orientation was. Fifth, it was found that the higher the organization commitment and customer orientation of a door-to-door salesperson in a cosmetic retailer were, the higher the sales performance was. In conclusion, the internal marketing increases door-to-door Salesperson's job satisfaction, and enhances the sense of belonging to their cosmetic retailer. Further, they come to have a customer-oriented attitude in serving customers, which is directly connected to sales performance, and thus the retailer can create profits through internal marketing. Therefore, a cosmetic retailer will need to strengthen internal communication activities through diverse methods, expand and activate employees' professional education, and develop fair and just compensation system; and supervisors will need to give support to employees, trusting their judgment.

• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.97-123
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• 2008

Recently, there has been a growing trend toward private brand. Although much has been written about the determinants of attitude and purchase intention on PB, little is known about the influence of manufacturer and retailer trust on private brand purchase. This research addresses three questions:(1) what impact do manufacturer and retailer trust have on private brand purchase?(2) What is a key mediating variable in the relationship retailer between trust(on retailer/manufacture) and purchase intention?(3) Are the impacts of these factors differ depending on the level of customer knowledge? The findings indicate that retailer trust directly influence on the perceived quality, attitude toward private brand, and purchase intention. Manufacturer trust affects on attitude and purchase intention, however, only when it is through perceived quality. In addition, the relative impact of theses two factors differs to some extent, depending on the level of consumer knowledge. When customer knowledge is relatively high, retailer trust is a very important factor influencing perceived quality, attitude and purchase intention. On the other hand, both retailer trust and manufacturer trust are considered when customer knowledge on private brand is low.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.49-68
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• 2012

When a channel is vertically separated, there can be inefficiencies, double marginalization. Channel coordination to amend this inefficiency has been an important issue in marketing and economics. Channel coordination deals with maximization of joint profit and achieving proper profit sharing among participants. In this paper, a manufacturer and heterogeneous multiple retailers with exclusive territory are assumed, and channel coordination with two-part tariff is considered. When multiple heterogeneous retailers are assumed, profit sharing can be an issue even though the tariffs based on marginal cost can maximize joint profit. In case of multiple heterogeneous retailers, the manufacturer earns the same profit (fixed fee) from each retailer. This means that a large retailer occupies all the gaps of channel profit between small and large markets. Then, the manufacturer, which generally plays the role of Stackelberg leader, will consider increasing fixed price or marginal price to earn more profit from large retailer. Those reactions can sacrifice maximization of joint profit by making small retailer withdraw or by changing the sales quantities. In this paper, to maximize joint profit and achieve proper profit sharing, two kinds of optional tariffs are considered. The first is an optional two-part tariff based on marginal cost and the second is an optional modified two-part tariff in which marginal prices are higher than the manufacturer's marginal cost. In both types of optional tariffs, maximization of joint profit in each market can be achieved. Moreover, optional tariffs alleviate the problem of profit sharing. Optional tariffs can provide a manufacturer more profit from a large retailer when profit from a small retailer is given. However, the analysis shows that the maximum share of manufacturer from a large retailer is restricted by the condition for self-selection. In case of optional two-part tariffs based on marginal cost, if the gap between demands is large, the maximum share of the manufacturer is sufficient to achieve proper profit sharing. If the gap between demands is not sufficiently large, the manufacturer cannot earn sufficient share from increased profit. An optional modified two-part tariff where marginal price is more than marginal cost of manufacturer is considered because of this scenario. The marginal price above the marginal cost may additionally control the distribution of the increased profit. However, the analysis shows that a manufacturer's maximum profit from a large retailer with given profit from a small retailer is the same as or lower than the maximum profit when optional two-part tariffs based on marginal cost are applied. Therefore, it can be concluded that the optional modified tariffs do not have additional contribution to profit sharing relative to the tariffs based on marginal cost. Although this paper does not cover all kinds of optional tariffs that are different from tariffs based on marginal cost, it shows the advantage of optional tariffs based on marginal cost and has important theoretical implications. The result of this paper also gives guide for channel coordination. Optional two-part tariff based on marginal cost can increase efficiency in channel coordination.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.17 no.10
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• pp.5-15
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• 2019

Purpose - Compared with the past when customers regarded a price factor as one of the most important criteria when choosing a retailer as a shopping destination, they seem to show different attitudes toward retailers in recent. This research, therefore, aims to explore how Korean customers respond to the CSR business activities provided by retailers. Research design, data, and methodology - The authors have developed the 6 hypotheses based on the literature review and adopted the 4 hypotheses after removing the 2 hypotheses through discriminant validity analysis. Results - Amongst the 4 hypotheses selected, H1 (community support), H3 (environment protection) and H6 (trading with unethical suppliers) related to a retailer's CSR business practices are accepted, whilst H4 (product issues) is rejected. Surprisingly, Korean customers are not interested in a product safety issue, when deciding a shopping store. Conclusions - Rather than emphasizing cheaper prices to attract new customers or maintain existing ones, it is demonstrated through the research that retailers have to pay their attention to their CSR activities. For a retailer's CSR practices, the retailer's social role has become more important than ever before, from a customer's point of view.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.18 no.34
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• pp.193-204
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• 1995

Many studies show that the value of the warehouse is good. However, studies explicitly mention the tradeoff between costs of operating the warehouse and benefits from the warehouse. Also, it is important to know when the benefits overcome the costs. We study a one-warehouse/N-retailer(s,Q) distribution system with stochastic lead times in order to answer two questions: "What are the optimal policies of the system that minimizes total system costs\ulcorner" and given the optimal policies, "Is the value of the warehouse always good\ulcorner" We use an analytical model for answering the questions. We find that the optimal policies are different from those with deterministic lead times. In fact it is reverse. We alse find the existence of the breakeven point beyond which the benefits starts overcomming the costs. And, we show that one of the breakeven points is the mean ratio of a supplier's lead time to transportation lead time between the warehouse and the retailer. Finally, we show that the breakeven point is sensitive to the ratio of holding costs of the warehouse and the retailer and it is also sensitive to the unit backorder costs at the retailer.sts at the retailer.

• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 1998.10a
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• pp.392-395
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• 1998

This paper suggests the“infinite-retailer model”to approximate expected backorders per cycle of the One-warehouse N-retailer distribution system where the warehouse holds back some of the replenishment quantity to satisfy retailer backorders at the end of the cycle through direct shipping to customers. The main objective is to show the functional relationship between the warehouse inventory and the expected backorders per cycle. We illustrate the relationship using a uniform demand case.