A one-upper warehouse n-lower retailer inventory model is discussed. The probability distribution of demand for a given perod is independent. The inventory holding cost is proportional to the number of unsold units and the cost of shortages is proportional to the number of shortages. In the event of a shortage, units are redistributed with a cost proportional to the number of units from the retailers which are a surplus at the end of the period. The optimum stock levels are obtained and the effects of redistribution are analized.
In this paper, the impact of information sharing, possibly with some delay, on costs in a simple supply chain in which there are two participants, a single retailer and a single manufacturer, is considered. When participants in the supply chain do not use fully integrated EDI, some delay associated with information sharing is inevitable. A mathematical model that allows us to quantify the cost incurred by the manufacturer in the supply chain under information sharing, possibly with some delay, vs. no information sharing is presented. From this model, some managerial implications are gleaned.
Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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v.15
no.26
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pp.99-109
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1992
This paper presents a cost model of the system which is managed under a continuous review (Q,r) policy at each retailer and peridic review (R,T) policy at the central warehouse. An iterative procedure is performed to find the optimal or near-optimal' solution for the policy parameters at each retailers and a central warehouse in this study.
The selection of keywords for bidding is a critical component of paid search advertising. When the number of possible keywords is enormous, it becomes difficult to choose the best keywords for advertising and then subsequently to assess their effect. To this end, we propose an ultrahigh dimensional keyword selection approach that not only reduces the dimension for selections, but also generates the top listed keywords for profits. An empirical analysis using a unique panel dataset from a large online clothes retailer that advertises on the largest search engine in China (i.e., Baidu) is presented to illustrate the usefulness of our approach.
Internet commerce has been growing at a rapid pace for the last decade. Many firms try to reach wider consumer markets by adding the Internet channel to the existing traditional channels. Despite the various benefits of the Internet channel, a significant number of firms failed in managing the new type of channel. Previous studies could not cleary explain these conflicting results associated with the Internet channel. One of the major reasons is most of the previous studies conducted analyses under a specific market condition and claimed that as the impact of Internet channel introduction. Therefore, their results are strongly influenced by the specific market settings. However, firms face various market conditions in the real worlddensity and disutility of using the Internet. The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of various market environments on a firm's optimal channel strategy by employing a flexible game theory model. We capture various market conditions with consumer density and disutility of using the Internet.
shows the channel structures analyzed in this study. Before the Internet channel is introduced, a monopoly manufacturer sells its products through an independent physical store. From this structure, the manufacturer could introduce its own Internet channel (MI). The independent physical store could also introduce its own Internet channel and coordinate it with the existing physical store (RI). An independent Internet retailer such as Amazon could enter this market (II). In this case, two types of independent retailers compete with each other. In this model, consumers are uniformly distributed on the two dimensional space. Consumer heterogeneity is captured by a consumer's geographical location (ci) and his disutility of using the Internet channel (${\delta}_{N_i}$).
shows various market conditions captured by the two consumer heterogeneities.
(a) illustrates a market with symmetric consumer distributions. The model captures explicitly the asymmetric distributions of consumer disutility in a market as well. In a market like that is represented in
(c), the average consumer disutility of using an Internet store is relatively smaller than that of using a physical store. For example, this case represents the market in which 1) the product is suitable for Internet transactions (e.g., books) or 2) the level of E-Commerce readiness is high such as in Denmark or Finland. On the other hand, the average consumer disutility when using an Internet store is relatively greater than that of using a physical store in a market like (b). Countries like Ukraine and Bulgaria, or the market for "experience goods" such as shoes, could be examples of this market condition.
summarizes the various scenarios of consumer distributions analyzed in this study. The range for disutility of using the Internet (${\delta}_{N_i}$) is held constant, while the range of consumer distribution (${\chi}_i$) varies from -25 to 25, from -50 to 50, from -100 to 100, from -150 to 150, and from -200 to 200.
summarizes the analysis results. As the average travel cost in a market decreases while the average disutility of Internet use remains the same, average retail price, total quantity sold, physical store profit, monopoly manufacturer profit, and thus, total channel profit increase. On the other hand, the quantity sold through the Internet and the profit of the Internet store decrease with a decreasing average travel cost relative to the average disutility of Internet use. We find that a channel that has an advantage over the other kind of channel serves a larger portion of the market. In a market with a high average travel cost, in which the Internet store has a relative advantage over the physical store, for example, the Internet store becomes a mass-retailer serving a larger portion of the market. This result implies that the Internet becomes a more significant distribution channel in those markets characterized by greater geographical dispersion of buyers, or as consumers become more proficient in Internet usage. The results indicate that the degree of price discrimination also varies depending on the distribution of consumer disutility in a market. The manufacturer in a market in which the average travel cost is higher than the average disutility of using the Internet has a stronger incentive for price discrimination than the manufacturer in a market where the average travel cost is relatively lower. We also find that the manufacturer has a stronger incentive to maintain a high price level when the average travel cost in a market is relatively low. Additionally, the retail competition effect due to Internet channel introduction strengthens as average travel cost in a market decreases. This result indicates that a manufacturer's channel power relative to that of the independent physical retailer becomes stronger with a decreasing average travel cost. This implication is counter-intuitive, because it is widely believed that the negative impact of Internet channel introduction on a competing physical retailer is more significant in a market like Russia, where consumers are more geographically dispersed, than in a market like Hong Kong, that has a condensed geographic distribution of consumers.