• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.59 no.12
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• pp.2143-2149
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• 2010

Market price and curtailment amounts of the Demand Resource Market(DRM) are determined by competition between electricity consumers. An important aspect of the DRM involves the assessment of strategic behavior of participants for maximizing their profits. This paper presents economic equilibrium models for simulating imperfect competition among electricity consumers in the DRM and analyzes the models at Nash Equilibrium of Game Theory. The proposed demand functions and supply functions of DRM are based on the Demand Resource Market Rules in Korean electricity market. Simulation results show that the models are adequate for obtaining Nash Equilibrium of consumers' competitive curtailment.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.291-319
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• 2002

This Paper investigates imperfect competition and economy of scale on Korean energy markets based on computable general equilibrium model. Some industries like energy sector have exhibited that their economies have strong economies of scale and imperfect competition. Thus these industrial organization facts should be incorporated into CGE model. In our model, non-competitive markets are adopted and compare these results with convention perfect competition model.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.89-91
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• 2009

This letter considers the problem of resource sharing among a relay and multiple user nodes in cooperative transmission networks. We formulate this problem as a sellers' market competition and use a noncooperative game to jointly consider the benefits of the relay and the users. We also develop a distributed algorithm to search the Nash equilibrium, the solution of the game. The convergence of the proposed algorithm is analyzed. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed game can stimulate cooperative diversity among the selfish user nodes and coordinate resource allocation among the user nodes effectively.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.23 no.8
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• pp.27-44
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• 2019

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to develop a tractable general-equilibrium model of examining the impact of human resource management on intra-industry trade. Commonly, managers of Korean firms are promoted internally. It necessitates a study of human resource management and its impact on an industrial equilibrium. Design/methodology - This paper relies on theoretical analysis. We build a model in firms are hierarchical; an entrepreneur, managers, and workers. All individuals have heterogeneous managerial talents, which are the main source of managerial quality. Firms search talents for prospect managers, and eventually delegate them to supervise workers. The searching incurs a sunk cost. Findings - Our finding is as follows. Country 1, relatively abundant of managerial talents, can gain more from trade than Country 2, relatively scarce of managerial talents. This is because the higher searching cost leads to the lower survival rate of firms in Country 2. Implicatively, good jobs are destroyed, and aggregate income falls in Country 2. Originality/value - According to our study, relative abundance of managerial talents affects distribution of firm size and determines trade gain. This study can contribute to the literature of organization management and trade.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.14 no.10
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• pp.4025-4041
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• 2020

Mobile edge computing (MEC) is capable of providing services to smart devices nearby through radio access networks and thus improving service experience of users. In this paper, an offloading strategy for the joint optimization of computing and communication resources in multi-user and multi-MEC overlapping scene was proposed. In addition, under the condition that wireless transmission resources and MEC computing resources were limited and task completion delay was within the maximum tolerance time, the optimization problem of minimizing energy consumption of all users was created, which was then further divided into two subproblems, i.e. offloading strategy and resource allocation. These two subproblems were then solved by the game theory and Lagrangian function to obtain the optimal task offloading strategy and resource allocation plan, and the Nash equilibrium of user offloading strategy games and convex optimization of resource allocation were proved. The simulation results showed that the proposed algorithm could effectively reduce the energy consumption of users.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.50 no.1
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• pp.17-37
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• 2019

The purpose of this study is to estimate the resource recovery effect and the economic effect of the fishermen by the fisheries vessel buy-back program. First, this study standardizes the fishing efforts of coastal gill net, coastal trap, and coastal composite fisheries using Gavaris general linear model. Second, the resource evaluation is performed by using vessel buy-back program data, and also the CYP model based on exponential growth function is applied. In order to derive the effect of the vessel buy-back program, the MSY with the vessel buy-back program is compared with the MSY without the vessel buy-back program. Finally, we compare and analyze producer surplus under the equilibrium of the MEY and the OA using bioeconomic model. In conclusion, the vessel buy-back program has shown an increase in resource growth and economic improvement for the remaining fishermen. The result shows that the remaining fishermen are able to obtain an increase in producer surplus of about 53% due to the vessel buy-back program under equilibrium levels of the open access and the maximum economic yield.

• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.201-207
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• 2009

Recently effective spectrum resource technologies have been studied using a game theorectical approach for cognitive radio networks. Radio resource management is required an effective scheme because the performance of a radio communication system much depends on it's effectiveness. In this paper, we suggest a game theoretical algorithm for adaptive power control which is required an effect scheme in cognitive radio networks. It will be a distributed network. In the network distributed cognitive radio secondary users require an adaptive power control. There are many results which are suggested some possibility of game theoretical approaches for communication resource sharing. However, we suggest a practical game algorithm to achieve Nash equilibrium of all secondary users using a Nash equilibrium theorem in this paper. Particularly, a game model was analyzed for adaptive power control of a cognitive radio network, which is involved in DSSS (Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum) techniques. In case of K=63 and N=12 in the DSSS network, the number of iteration was less than maximum 200 using the suggested algorithm.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.49 no.1
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• pp.67-89
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• 2018

In fisheries, as well as in other natural resource-based industries, there is difference between profit and rent. The former is a basic indicator for gauging the business performance of firms, while the latter is for the evaluation of the contribution of resources and industry to economic welfare. Put simply, resource economists are mainly concerned about rent, including pure resource rent and producer surplus (intra-marginal rent [IMR]). In other hand, business economists are mainly concerned about the profitability of the firms comprising the industry. In the academic literature, there are not always clear definitions of the profit and rent concepts and their use in actual analyses. This article will mainly discuss and clarify differences and similarities in profit and rent concepts. In the classical fisheries economic model with one-dimensional homogenous effort and a constant cost per unit of effort, no rent exists in open-access equilibrium. A simple change in this model, for example by introducing heterogeneous effort, opens it to the existence of rent, specifically IMR, at open-access equilibrium. We estimated resource rent and profit from the data using SNA(system of national accounts) and accounting data methods. RR(resource rent) is composed of value-added, compensation of employees, consumption of fixed capital and normal profit in SNA. RR(resource rent) is composed of EBT, Depreciation of fishing rights, financial costs of fishing rights and calculated interests on equity in accounting data methods. We found that the result of two methods is equal. RR is composed of excess profit, rent and interest expenses. In Korea, the magnitude of RR and profit is not different significantly.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.1-39
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• 1995

본 연구는 에너지정책을 종합적 차원에서 일반경제정책과 병행하여 정량적으로 분석할 수 있는 수리모형 (numerical multi-sector general equilibrium model)을 개발하기 위하여 시도되었다. 모형은 크게 (i) 가격/기술변화 반응적인 투입-산출계수를 내생화한 "산업간 거래모형 (inter-industry production model)", (ii) 민간에 의한 최종부문 수요를 나다내는 "소비자 선택모형 (consumer choices model)", 그리고 (iii) 생산물시장과 본원적 투입요소시장, 수출입시장 등에서 민간기업 정부 및 해외라는 개별 경제주체간의 행태를 반영하는 "거시경제 (성장) 모형 (macro-econometric growth model)"으로 구성되어 있다. 이러한 방법은 분석경제를 충분히 세분하고 제(諸)경제변수들의 동시결정적 과정을 중시한 일반균형적 /부문적 접근방법 (general equilibrium/sectoral approaches)을 취함으로써 지금까지 단순한 거시경제모형(aggregate macroeconomic models)이나 전통적 산업연관모형 (static input-output models)에만 의존해 오던 경제예측이나 경제 및 에너지관련 정책의 효과분석이 한층 더 강화될 수 있을 것으로 기대된다.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.1192-1207
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• 2014

Dynamic spectrum sharing is a key technology to improve spectrum utilization in wireless networks. The elastic spectrum management provides a new opportunity for licensed primary users and unlicensed secondary users to efficiently utilize the scarce wireless resource. In this paper, we present a game-theoretic framework for dynamic spectrum allocation where the primary users rent the unutilized spectrum to the secondary users for a monetary profit. In reality, due to the ON-OFF behavior of the primary user, the quantity of spectrum that can be opportunistically shared by the secondary users is limited. We model this situation with the renewal theory and formulate the spectrum pricing scheme with the Bertrand game, taking into account the scarcity of the spectrum. By the Nash-equilibrium pricing scheme, each player in the game continually converges to a strategy that maximizes its own profit. We also investigate the impact of several properties, including channel quality and spectrum substitutability. Based on the equilibrium analysis, we finally propose a decentralized algorithm that leads the primary users to the Nash-equilibrium, called DST. The stability of the proposed algorithm in terms of convergence to the Nash equilibrium is also studied.