• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.253-266
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• 2016

In accordance with the classification system of radioactive waste in Korea, all the disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRSs) fall under the category of EW, VLLW or LILW, and should be managed in compliance with the restrictions for the disposal method. In this study, the management and disposal method are drawn in consideration of half-life of radionuclides contained in the source and A/D value (i.e. the activity A of the source dividing by the D value for the relevant radionuclide, which is used to provide an initial ranking of relative risk for sources) in addition to the domestic classification scheme and disposal method, based on the characteristic analysis and review results of the management practices in IAEA and foreign countries. For all the DSRSs that are being stored (as of March 2015) in the centralized temporary disposal facility for radioisotope wastes, applicability of the derivation result is confirmed through performing the characteristic analysis and case studies for assessing quantity and volume of DSRSs to be managed by each method. However, the methodology derived from this study is not applicable to the following sources; i) DSRSs without information on the radioactivity, ii) DSRSs that are not possible to calculate the specific activity and/or the source-specific A/D value. Accordingly, it is essential to identify the inherent characteristics for each of DSRSs prior to implementation of this management and disposal method.

• Nuclear industry
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• v.6 no.3 s.37
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• pp.18-22
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• 1986

• The Journal of Engineering Geology
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• v.14 no.3 s.40
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• pp.325-333
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• 2004

• JOURNAL OF ELECTRICAL WORLD
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• no.11 s.83
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• pp.18-23
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• 1983

• Proceedings of the Korean Nuclear Society Conference
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• 1998.05b
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• pp.441-446
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• 1998

As for safety assessment of a radioactive waste disposal facility, radiation dose to inadvertent intruders is evaluated according to scenarios related to intruder's postulated activities at the disposal site after the end of Institutional Control Period(ICP). Simple trench and Below Ground Vault(BGV) are considered for this study as alternative disposal systems, and different scenarios are applied to each disposal type. The results show that 300 years of ICP is needed for simple trench and 100 years for BGV. Even for BGV, concentration of long-lived radioactive nuclides should be limited considering degradation of BGV after 300 years.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.53 no.6
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• pp.2019-2024
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• 2021

For evaluating the radiological safety of dismantled concrete, the process of disposal and recycling of the radioactive concrete generated during the dismantling of Kori Unit 1 is analyzed. Four scenarios are derived based on the analysis of the concrete recycling and disposal process, and the potential exposure to the workers and public during this process are calculated. VISIPLAN and RESRAD code are used for evaluating the dosages received by the workers and public in the following four scenarios: concrete inspection, transport of concrete by the truck driver, driving on a recycled concrete road, and public living near the landfilled concrete waste. Two worker exposure scenarios in the processing of concrete and two public exposure scenarios in recycling and disposal are considered; in all the scenarios, the exposure dose does not exceed the annual dose limit for each representative.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.18 no.4
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• pp.517-536
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• 2020

The radionuclide inventory in radioactive waste from nuclear power plants should be determined to secure the safety of final repositories. As an alternative to time-consuming, labor-intensive, and destructive radiochemical analysis, the indirect scaling factor (SF) method has been used to determine the concentrations of difficult-to-measure radionuclides. Despite its long history, the original SF methodology remains almost unchanged and now needs to be improved for advanced SF implementation. Intense public attention and interest have been strongly directed to the reliability of the procedures and data regarding repository safety since the first operation of the low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste disposal facility in Gyeongju, Korea. In this review, statistical methodologies for SF implementation are described and evaluated to achieve reasonable and advanced decision-making. The first part of this review begins with an overview of the current status of the scaling factor method and global experiences, including some specific statistical issues associated with SF implementation. In addition, this review aims to extend the applicability of SF to the characterization of large quantities of waste from the decommissioning of nuclear facilities.

• Journal of Korean Tunnelling and Underground Space Association
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• v.22 no.4
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• pp.419-434
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• 2020

In this study, the damage parameters of Mazars model for KURT (KAERI Underground Research Tunnel) granite are measured form uniaxial compressive and Brazilian tests under the simulated coupled condition of a deep geological disposal. The tests are conducted in three different temperatures (15℃, 45℃, and 75℃) and dry/saturated conditions. Major model parameters such as maximum effective tensile strain (𝜖_d0), A_t, B_t, A_c, and B_c differ from the typical reference values of concrete specimens. This is likely due to the difference in elastic modulus between rock and concrete. It is found that the saturation of specimens causes an increase in value of B_t and B_c while, the rise in temperature increases 𝜖_d0 and B_t and decreases B_c. The damage model obtained from this study will be used as the primary input parameters in the development of coupled Thermo-Hydro-Mechanical Damage numerical model in KAERI.

• The Journal of Engineering Geology
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• v.33 no.4
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• pp.725-736
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• 2023

The compliance of deep geological disposal facilities for high-level radioactive waste with safety objectives requires consideration of uncertainties owing to temporal changes in the disposal system. A comprehensive review and analysis of the characteristics of this evolution should be undertaken to identify the effects on multiple barriers and the biosphere. We analyzed the evolution of the buffer, backfill, plug, and closure regions during the early phase of the post-closure period as part of a long-term performance assessment for an operating license application for a deep geological repository in Finland. Degradation mechanisms generally expected in engineered barriers were considered, and long-term evolution features were examined for use in performance assessments. The importance of evolution features was classified into six categories based on the design of the Finnish case. Results are expected to be useful as a technical basis for performance and safety assessment in developing the Korean deep geological disposal system for high-level radioactive waste. However, for a more detailed review and evaluation of each feature, it is necessary to obtain data for the final disposal site and facility-specific design, and to assess its impact in advance.

• Journal of Radiation Industry
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.33-44
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• 2023

The deep geological repository of high-level radioactive waste shall be designed to meet the safety objective set in the form of radiation dose or corresponding risk to protect human and the environment from radiation exposure. Engineering feasibility and conformity with the safety objective of the facility conceptual design can be demonstrated by comparing the assessment result using the computational model for scenario(s) describing the radionuclide release and transport from repository to biosphere system. In this study, as the preliminary study for developing the high-level radioactive waste disposal facility in Korea, we reviewed and analyzed the entire list of FEPs and how to handle each FEP from a general point of view, which are selected for the geosphere region in the radiological safety assessment performed for the license application of the KBS-3 type deep geological repository in Finland and Sweden. In Finland, five FEPs (i.e., stress redistribution, creep, stress redistribution, erosion and sedimentation in fractures, methane hydrate formation, and salt exclusion) were excluded or ignored in the radionuclide release and transport assessment. And, in Sweden, six FEPs (i.e., creep, surface weathering and erosion, erosion/sedimentation in fractures, methane hydrate formation, radiation effects (rock and grout), and earth current) were not considered for all time frames and earthquake out of a total of 25 FEPs for the geosphere. Based on these results, an FEP list (draft) for the geosphere was derived, and the relative importance of each item was evaluated for conducting the radiological safety assessment of the domestic deep geological disposal facility. Since most of information on the disposal facility in Korea has not been determined as of now, it is judged that all FEP items presented in Table 3 should be considered for the radiological safety assessment, and the relative importance derived from this study can be used in determining whether to apply each item in the future.