• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.55-75
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• 1992

At the outset of import liberalization, most economists expected a significant drop in the prices of domestic goods that faced foreign competition. However, it is now generally acknowledge that a significant drop in prices of those goods has not occurred. A common claim is that the prices did not drop significantly because the major importers of many imported goods were also the domestic producers of competing goods. The objective of this paper is to analyze the welfare effect of importation by domestic firms that produce competing goods, to identify the factors that facilitate such business practices, and to formulate a policy that could improve the welfare. We proved that importation by competing domestic firms definitely raises the prices of both imported and domestic goods compared to the situation where foreign goods are imported by non-producers, ceteris paribus. The intuition behind this result is that since a producer-importer is essentially a cartel, its overall profit maximization requires reduced competition between the products that it sells. On the other hand, if a producer-importer is more efficient at distrinbution than a simple importer, the comparison between the two cases is a priori indeterminate. We also find that the industries in which domestic producers are actively involved in importing competing goods are the ones in which the distribution channels are tightly controlled by importer-producers. This finding suggests that exclusive dealing contracts, which work as an entry barrier, may be the source of importing by domestic producers. We argue that in a country such as Korea, where financial market is highly incomplete, tight control of the distribution channels by oligopolistic manufacturers is likely to be an effective entry barrier that leads to importing by domestic producers of similar goods. We further argue that seemingly superior distribution costs of importer-producers is likely to be a result of market foreclosure which would disappear once the entry barrier of exclusive dealing contracts is removed. Above findings suggest that market imperfections are the source of importation by domestic competitors, which in turn constitutes a market imperfection in itself and reduces consumer welfare. As potential remedies, we considered three alternatives; direct price control by the government over the imported goods sold by major domestic producers, regulation of trade itself between major producers, and regulation of exclusive dealing contracts. For reasons both theoretical and pratical, we find that the last alternative is the most attrative. Prohibiting exclusive contracts between manufacturers and dealers in industries where exclusive dealing contracts are a significant entry barrier is expected to break up the importer-producer cartel and improve the welfare.

• Journal of Korean Society of Forest Science
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• v.80 no.1
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• pp.72-81
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• 1991

This study was carried out to provide necessary information for improving quarrying industry management in Korea. The results of the study are summarized as follows : 1. In aggregate and building-stone quarrying firms the managers over 40 years of age are 97% and 89.1%, the ones above education level of high school are 90% and 85% and the ones not more than 10 years of quarrying experience are 70% and 52%, respectively. Accordingly it can be pointed out that most of the managers of two types of firms are relatively old, have high educational background, while quarrying experiences of building-stone firm managers are longer than that of aggregate firm managers. 2. Most of the management forms are social corporation(60%) for aggregate quarry firms and private management(76%) for building-stone firms. Average areas of permitted stone-pits of aggregate and building-stone quarries are about 2.86ha and 1.66ha respectively. That is, aggregate quarrying firms are carried on a larger scale than building-stone quarrying firms. 3. The yearly average product of aggregate quarrying firms has increased steadily from $88.961m^3$ in 1985 to $144.028m^3$ in 1988, while, in case of building-stone quarry firms, it has significantly increased from $4.155m^3$ to $19.462m^3$ from 1985 to 1987, but reduced to $13.400m^3$ in 1988. Unstable production activities of building-stone quarrying firms may require continuous government support. 4. Major cost items are equipment rental, depreciation, salaries, repair, maintenance for aggregate quarrying firms, and salaries, depreciation, fuel, tax for building-stone quarrying firms. The yearly average rate of return is about 9.7% for aggregate quarry firms and 2.6% for building-stone quarry firms. It can be pointed out that aggregate quarrying firms is better managed than building-stone quarrying firms. 5. The production elasticity of salary for aggregate quarrying firms is 0.495, that of employees is 0.559, and that of capital service is 0.513. The sum of the elasticities is 1.257>1. Fur building-stone quarrying firms, that of employees is 0.492, that of variable costs is 0.192, and that of capital service is 0.498. The sum of elasticities is 1.172>1, thus denotes the increasing returns to scale for both types quarrying firms. 6. The ratio of marginal value product to opportunity cost of empolyees is 2.54, that of variable costs is 3.62, and that of capital service is 1.45, in aggregate quarrying firms. That of employees is 2.47, that is variable costs was 2.34, and that of capital service is 19.67 in building-stone quarrying firms. Therefore the critical factors for more expansion of management scale in aggregate quarrying firms are variable cost and employees, and are capital service in building-stone quarry ing firms. 7. The break-even points of stone sales are about 0.587 billion won and 0.22 billion won in aggregate and building-stone quarrying firms respectively. The optimum sales Level for profit maximization are about 2.0 billion and 0.5 billion in aggregate and building-stone quarry firms respectively.